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The blog Speculative Non- Buddhism (www.speculativenonbuddhism.com) 
provided me with a venue for experimenting with and thinking through many 
of the ideas developed in this book. I am grateful to the many participants on 
that blog for creating a passionate and productive site of ideological struggle.
Tom Pepper read several versions of the manuscript and always offered 
trenchant and astute comments. I  am fortunate to have someone with his 
intelligence and ardor as a reader.
Lalle Pursglove and Lucy Carroll, my editors at Bloomsbury, have been 
unfailingly gracious and helpful during the course of producing this book. 
I would like to thank them for their encouragement and professionalism.
My wife, Friederike Baer, and two daughters, Alexandra Wallis and Mia 
Wallis, have always been my most insightful partners for discussions. Our topic 
of conversation was not, of course, always explicitly the contents of this book. 
But when you’re absorbed in a creative project, somehow everything around you 
takes on the hue of its problematic. The book was conceived during long walks 
in the Swiss Alps with Alexandra. It developed further during walks in the park 
with Mia, accompanied by our dogs Oscar and Bruno. Knots were smoothed 
out and concepts clarified over Kaffee und Kuchen with Friederike. The three 
of them— Alexandra, Mia, and, Friederike— always ask the most difficult and 




A ruin is a curious thing. Imagine the Acropolis or Borobudur, Ephesus or 
the Great Wall of China. Magnificent structures erected on the foundation of 
a society’s most advanced technologies and its most sophisticated sciences. 
Constructed from raw materials— wood, metals, stone, lime mortar, marble, 
glass, turf, and soil— quarried, excavated, transported, and formed by the labor— 
the debilitating, depleting sweat and toil— of flesh and blood men, women, and 
children. But a ruin is more than the material out of which it is fashioned. It in 
infused with the longing of a people; longing for meaning and order; longing for 
fellowship and community; longing for the reign of beauty on earth. More than 
mere material, a ruin is saturated with culture. It is a culture’s loftiest aesthetic 
imagination manifest in the light of day in all of its sensuousness. But a ruin is 
more than the designs and desires of a people. A ruin is nature. Its very matter 
is fired in the furnace of the elements. And once in place, the edifice is eternally 
embraced by earth, fire, wind, and water. As Georg Simmel wrote in 1907, “a 
ruin is fused into the surrounding landscape and, like tree and stone, grows into 
and is integrated in that landscape.” As much as it tries, a thriving cathedral 
or a bustling office building cannot achieve this integration:  its relationship 
to its natural surroundings is one of artificiality at best, domination at worst. 
Its atmosphere is charged by an ordering of its own making. By contrast, “an 
atmosphere of peace emanates from the ruin; for, in the ruin the contrary 
aspirations of both world potencies [the energies of nature and the conceptions 
of society] appears as a calm image of purely natural being.” What has wrought 
this change in the charge of the structure’s atmosphere is time. A ruin, finally, is 
time. It is transhistorical time, “ruin time,” the steady chroniker of past glory and 
decay, present cause and effect, and future promise and peril. “Ruin time unites,” 
says Florence Hetzler. It suffuses the “biological time of birds and moss” with 
the immemorial “synergy” of all of living beings— human, animal, bacterial, 
microbial— whose bodies have touched, however fleetingly, however gently, 
the ruin.1
Western Buddhism is not a ruin. It is a sprawling estate, operating daily 
at peak capacity. Western Buddhism is a prodigious ancillary of an ancient 




it would be best to fuse with the atmosphere of its surroundings, always 
originates another order of things, and unites with the order of nature only 
in retrospect.” Why should it “be best” to do so? Western Buddhism itself 
provides the answer: because there is no real division between culture, society, 
person, and “nature.” The Buddha has taught us that it is nature all the way 
through. He also taught us that the very nature of nature inexorably impels 
our— the world’s— very ruination. Ruin is ruin because our desires and 
actions, however exalted, cannot withstand the nonnegotiable consequences 
of impermanence, dissolution, and emptiness. And yet, somehow, the edifice 
that is Western Buddhism does not merely remain in place: it stands fortified 
against the consequences of its own self- acknowledged insights into our 
“natural” condition. In doing so, it originates an order, both for itself and for 
its practitioner, that is at odds with these very insights. For, “to fuse with the 
order of nature only in retrospect” is to create the illusion that it does not fuse 
with nature at all. It creates the illusion that the object of Western Buddhism’s 
fusion— the object of its most abiding desire— is of an altogether different 
order from nature’s ruin. It is, rather, of a higher order that somehow enables 
escape from the raw contingencies of nature— the very ones that Buddhism 
itself articulates— leaving the subject ultimately unscathed.
The term for “nature” that I use in the subtitle and throughout the book is 
“the Real.” Like Western Buddhism’s “emptiness” or “no- self,” in the history 
of Western thought, “the Real” names some profoundly productive a priori, 
awareness of which is a sine qua non of human awakening and of the liberation 
that such awakening is said to entail (however variously those consequences 
might be understood). Paradoxically, the Real is as evasive as it is productive, 
eluding capture by our strategies of linguistic and symbolic communication. 
Of course, it is we creaturely humans who enable this evasion by constructing 
obfuscating, at best, symbolization around the nonetheless fecund Real. In his 
twentieth- century masterpiece of literary criticism, The Origin of the German 
Tragic Drama, Walter Benjamin wrote that “in the ruins of great buildings the 
idea of the plan speaks more impressively than in lesser buildings, no matter 
how well preserved they are.”2 For Benjamin, it is precisely the ruin’s proximity 
to “creaturely nature” that infuses it with its “uncontrollable productivity.”3 Of 
what, then, does the well- preserved building speak? Of what is it productive if 
not of the very idea that saw it rise from the dust in the first place? In proximity 
to what would this construction be, if not to the passion and pain coursing 
through the veins of earthly creatures? Such questions merely postpone my 




This, at least, is the belief animating this book. I have come to this belief after 
forty- some years of actively surveying the Western Buddhist landscape. At turns 
figuratively and literally, my exploration has taken me from the tropical forests 
of the achans to the austere rusticality of the roshis to the stark mountainous 
terrain of the rinpoches. It has taken me from the temple to the practice center to 
the university classroom. It has enveloped me in the exertion of several practices, 
each of which is deeply contemplative in the degree of steady concentration 
involved: still, silent meditation; laborious reading of Pali, Sanskrit, and Tibetan 
texts; and, the most difficult of all, sustained and unflinching critical thinking. 
Why is critique so difficult? Well, it is not only philosophers who fall in love 
with their subject. That love will ensure that the critique that follows does not 
obliterate, does not grind back to dust, the finely wrought edifice of Western 
Buddhism. And if I do succeed in my plan, it is only to view the ensuing ruin in 
the glow of a stranger, more creaturely, light.
I have learned a lot about ruin from the people I mentioned earlier. Another 
teacher not mentioned is the Persian Muslim poet Jalāl ad- Dīn Muhammad 
Rūmī (1207– 1273). Rūmī employed the conceit of ruin as an image of the 
catalyzing loss required to come in possession of our most potent human 
quality: love. He doesn’t mean love as a commonplace affection. He means love 
as a ferocious force of ruination: “What care I though ruin be wrought?/ Under 
the ruin there is royal treasure.”4 One collection of his poetry is titled The Ruins 
of the Heart. I have also learned a great deal about ruin from Canadian poet, 
novelist, and singer- songwriter Leonard Cohen (1934– 2016). A  line from his 
1992 song “Anthem” has become a kind of cultural cliché, like the Vincent van 
Gogh painting Starry Night that can be had on a tee- shirt or coffee mug, but it 
nonetheless captures his notion of ruin:  “There is a crack in everything/ that’s 
how the light gets in.”5 For Cohen as for Rumi, ruin is a question of igniting the 
“furnace of the spirit,” whose ardent issue, always, is love.6
I first heard Leonard Cohen in 1975 while in the room of my friend, Thomas 
Adams, who had then borrowed the album Songs of Love and Hate from a local 
library. At that point in our lives, Thomas and I were drinking from the trough of 
Alice Cooper, the New York Dolls, and Black Sabbath. Yet, we sat in rapt silence 
as the black vinyl turned, slowly secreting the passionate, melancholy ambience 
that is Leonard Cohen— his voice, his guitar, his verse. One of those verses, from 
the first song on the record, “Avalanche,” could be the Universal Beloved inciting 
Rūmī to ecstatic embrace. Or is it Shams, the mysterious dervish perpetually 
wandering in search of a beloved friend, someone with whom he could speak 





as a weapon of ruination. After admonishing his wavering lover not to feign 
such passion in the face of doubt, the singer intones (or cautions?): “It is your 
turn, beloved/ It is your flesh that I wear.”7 It is a disturbing, almost ghastly, line. 
But can you conceive of a more direct and unadorned image of union born of 
annihilation? Imagining that ruined building once again, I picture it obliterated 
as an edifice for narrow worldly concerns (commerce, service, bureaucracy) 
because it has become clothed in the flesh of nature.
Thomas and I  intravenously ingested Leonard Cohen’s intoxicant. At the 
same time, together with my brother Damon, we began imbibing the violent 
metallic hootch of the Stooges’ Vietnam War– contaminated Raw Power: “I am 
the world’s forgotten boy/ The one who searches and destroys.”8 The three of us 
began imperceptibly to mix the dark elixir of Leonard Cohen and the volatile 
firewater of the Stooges with a form of music that would come to define our 
lives: punk rock. Like so many young people in search of an expression for their 
still nascent superpowers, we formed a band. Joined by like- minded insurgents 
of the moribund American middle class, we unleashed our Dionysian energy, 
power, passion, and heat on the Philadelphia (and beyond) underground from 
1981 to 1987. The name of our band is Ruin. (Present tense: like an alcoholic, 
you are never cured of your band.)
With love and with inexpressible gratitude, I  dedicate this book to the 
members of Ruin:  Damon Wallis, Thomas Adams, Cordy Swope, Richard 








Introduction: Raise the Curtain on  
the Theater of Western Buddhism!
What are we to make of Western Buddhism? It presents itself as the treasure house 
of ideas and practices that were formulated by an enlightened teacher who lived 
in India 2,500 years ago. Followers of Western Buddhism tell us that this man’s 
teachings accurately identify the real conditions of human existence. If true, that 
is quite a remarkable achievement. It would mean that an ancient diagnosis of 
human experience still pertains in our hyper- accelerated, ultra- technological 
modern society. Is such a correspondence possible? Western Buddhism might, 
conversely, be made out to be less of an unchanging universal account of human 
reality and more of a contemporary ideology. In its basic sense, an ideology is a 
strategy that “represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence.”1 To recognize Western Buddhism as an ideology is not 
to view it as an instance of false consciousness or nefarious deception. It is rather 
to acknowledge it as being uniquely productive of a quite particular subject, one 
that imagines his or her relation to the world in quite particular ways. If we view 
Western Buddhism as an ideology, as, that is, a form of life, an apparently natural 
way of being within any given social formation, we could certainly better explain 
the incredible diversity among its forms throughout time and place. For, unlike 
an idealist timeless teaching, “ideology has a material existence.”2 Its dictates 
are always enacted within the presently existing social arena and realized as a 
practice by real people therein. Invoking the prospect of an imaginary relation to 
one’s world suggests a third, altogether different, possibility. Western Buddhism 
might be understood as a strategy for engaging with the dominant ideology of 
a society. In this case, it would be a practice of critiquing and possibly even 
improving the social formation in which its practitioners find themselves 
currently embedded.
My observation of Western Buddhism leads me to the conclusion that it 
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I mean, of course, the combined effect of the people— the formulators, teachers, 
and practitioners— who act in the name of “Western Buddhism,” or really of 
“Buddhism” in the West today. Their accumulated record is an expression of 
adamant faith in the universal veracity of their teachings. Somewhat paradoxically, 
they are equally willing to perform operations on those same teachings, to adjust 
and alter them, in ways that suggest that they are aware of the time- and place- 
dependent ideological nature of the teachings. More puzzling, these same people 
regularly invoke concepts that caution, watch your head! radical critique of self 
and society underway!
One contention driving this book is that Western Buddhism functions in 
all three of these modes, but to varying degrees of explicitness. I see Western 
Buddhism as a critique subsumed within an ideology subsumed within a 
faith. I am almost tempted to apply to Western Buddhism, along with a grain 
of salt, Freud’s famous topography. Faith is Western Buddhism’s superego. 
It internalizes and echoes back society’s sense of morality, righteousness, 
and goodness. It aims to produce the ideal subject, one who spontaneously 
conforms to the social law. The superego- faith of this subject compels him or 
her to eschew expression of aggressions that are forbidden by decorum. The 
faithful Western Buddhist subject is thus adept at channeling aggression into 
affirmation. Critique is Western Buddhism’s id. The critical drive bound up in 
certain Western Buddhist postulates (e.g., emptiness, no- self, impermanence) 
are primitive and instinctual. This drive impels the subject’s visceral desire to 
be unbeholden to subjugating norms, to be free of society’s (and of faith’s) self- 
serving moralistic constraints. It thus tends to produce a subject who takes up 
conceptual arms against the deceptively polite policing of those norms and 
thrusts them into a controverting chaos. The critical Western Buddhist subject is 
adept at flushing out repressive sleeper cells within the doctrinal and communal 
compound. Ideology is Western Buddhism’s ego. It is the “I” of the subject, the 
“we” of the community. It is motivated by the demands of society (and of faith) 
and is thus acutely sensitive and responsive to “reality,” to, that is to say, society’s 
status quo. The ideological Western Buddhist subject seeks, above all, some form 
of wellbeing. Happiness would be optimal; but, short of that eternally elusive 
goal, certainly the reduction of stress and tension isn’t too much to ask for. After 
all, Western Buddhist ideology, as Freud says of the ego, “serves three severe 
masters and does what it can to bring their claims and demands into harmony 
with one another.”3 Ideology- ego’s “tyrannical masters” are, of course, reality, 
faith, and critique. Western Buddhist ideology thus paradoxically produces an 
anxious Western Buddhist subject, one who is able to minimize conflicts with 
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the pious demands of faith only by repressing and shoring up against the primal 
aggressive force circulating within the concepts of that very faith.
As the title suggests, one aim of this book is to give voice to the critical 
unconscious, to stay with our psychoanalytic metaphor, of Western Buddhist 
discourse. I will give the details of my approach later. Here, just a brief word 
about the general purpose of critique. Marjorie Gracieuse sums up this purpose 
when she speaks of “wresting vital potentialities of humans from the artificial 
forms and static norms that subjugate them.”4 That is a generous definition of 
the task. It allows at the outset that the object of critique has something of value 
to offer us. At the same time it suspects that this value comes embedded in a 
system of thought and practice that has superfluous, and problematic, elements. 
These elements constitute a symbolic surplus value that functions to capture 
the desire of the practitioner. It is reasonable to think that it is in this surplus 
that we discover features that limit and coerce the subject’s agency. Advertising 
gives us the most obvious examples of the value/ surplus differential. It pitches 
item after item that relates to the fulfilment of some basic human need— food, 
clothing, hygiene, mating, transportation, security, relaxation, and so on. Yet 
it should not be difficult to discern how an ad for, say, a Prius SUV or a pair 
of Aéropostale ripped skinny jeans elicits desires that far exceed fulfillment of 
basic transportation and clothing needs. In addition, advertisement is produced 
by, and further reproduces, quite particular social relations (economic, gender, 
racial, political). Symbolic surplus value is easily discernible when it comes to 
such goods as a pair of pants that, beyond the basic need of covering the flesh 
in cold weather, inscribe their young female wearer into “consumer society’s 
colonization of youth and sexuality through [selling her] ‘freedom’ . . . to do 
whatever she wants with her body.”5 It becomes more difficult to discern in the 
cases of the “vital potentialities” that Gracieuse alludes to. At what point, for 
example, does education cross over from being the practice of developing the 
human potential for thinking and knowing into a means of social inculcation? 
Paulo Freire, for instance, holds that all people possess the potential to become 
aware of the forces (social, political, cultural, linguistic, psychological, etc.) that 
constitute “the logic of the present.”6 An educational program can facilitate that 
end, he says, by training students in “the practice of freedom,” whereby they learn 
to discern the operations of these forces on their own sense of identity, as well as 
on the ways in which these forces serve to replicate and perpetuate “the logic of 
the present.” An educational program can just as likely be put in the service of a 
political agenda that precisely wants to hinder such awareness of that logic. To 




6 A Critique of Western Buddhism
for creative critical inquiry. Rather, it perversely directs this potential into a 
stultifying framework (forms and norms) of preordained outcomes. Another 
example, one familiar to readers of the present book, is meditation. Let’s assume 
for a moment that sitting still, silently, and attentively serves, like education, 
the vital potentiality of the human for a certain type of creative critical self- 
inquiry. At what point does this ostensibly neutral, natural inquiry become a 
node in an ideological system? Is it not curious that meditators virtually always 
happen to discover in their meditation the very claims of their community’s 
doctrine? What does such “validation” tell us about the relationship between 
the vital human potential affixed (possibly) to silent sitting and the apparently 
overdetermining forms and norms that frame such a practice?
I leave those questions hanging for now. The point here is that critique is 
a practice that attempts to “wrest” vital value from subjugating surplus. It is a 
practice that allows us to make explicit the operations of a system of thought 
and practice that the system itself, in order to remain whole, keeps implicit— 
its unstated assumptions; its unspoken values; its relationship to existing social, 
economic, and political formations; and, perhaps most importantly, its tacit 
formation of individual actors in the world. Without a practice of critique, we 
cannot distinguish a catalyst for a vital human potentiality from a self- serving 
prescription of a covertly ideological program, however well- meaning that 
program may be. The wager of this book is that, in distinguishing between the 
two types of practice, we are dealing with a difference that makes a world of 
difference. But what might that difference be? I will deal with this question in 
depth later. For now, just to give the reader some initial orientation, we can 
consider the purpose of the “wresting” that Gracieuse recommends. In brief, 
it has to do with something that will sound familiar to readers of Buddhism, 
namely, a certain unbinding from violence, delusion, and fugitive desire. We 
might call this unbinding freedom, liberation, or even nirvana. If these terms 
sound grandiose in the present context, they may nonetheless name a genuine 
vital potentiality of human beings. If so, this unbinding will require, like the 
Buddha besieged beneath the bodhi tree, a ferocious struggle against “the world 
under the sway of death.”7 For, in naming coercive structures, in speaking of 
subjugation, stasis, and dissemblance, Gracieuse is giving voice to nothing if 
not the necessity of a kind of human insurrection against the existing world. 
I believe that Western Buddhism understands this struggle. The crucial question 
is whether it provides arms in solidarity with the struggling human or whether it 
performs a kind of spiritualized Dolchstoß in the very heat of battle. Or perhaps 
we will discover another potent image to characterize Western Buddhism in 
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our time. First, however, we must explore many criticisms and refutations and 
propose many new ideas, concepts, and claims.
Why Western Buddhism?
Why Western Buddhism? The title of this book surely suggests that I am treating 
a quite specific variety of Buddhism:  that which exists in the West. It would 
follow that this western variety has something— texts, doctrines, teachers, 
practices, beliefs, communities— that differs significantly from its eastern 
relatives. Otherwise, why would it be necessary to add the modifier? At the same 
time, though, the reader will notice that I often use “Buddhism” interchangeably 
with the modified form “Western Buddhism” and, indeed, rarely differentiate 
between the two usages. I will have more to say about this matter later. Here, 
I would like to highlight what I mean by the term “Western Buddhism.”
Western Buddhism originated in the East, in Asia. I am not referring to the 
obvious fact that Asia, specifically India, is the wellspring of all subsequent 
international forms of Buddhism. Rather, from its core values to its high 
aspirations, Western Buddhism is the result of an articulation and self- 
understanding that initially took shape in Asia. According to the German 
Indologist Heinz Bechert, the lineaments of what we now think of as Western 
Buddhism were first drawn in Sri Lanka. This origin should not be surprising. As 
Bechert points out, since 1517 the coastal areas of the island had been occupied by, 
first Portuguese, then Dutch, and finally British, forces of merchants, militaries, 
and missionaries. At that time, too, the Buddhist Kingdom of Kandy (1521– 1818) 
was rising in the land’s interior, preserving the ancient domination of Buddhism 
in daily affairs. This hotbed of East– West proximity led to encounters such as 
the spirited public debates between Buddhist monks and Christian missionaries, 
where opposing worldviews could be aired, evaluated, critiqued, and defended. 
It is thus also not surprising that Asian Buddhists were subjected to a long 
and ultimately far- reaching exposure to “European ways of thinking.”8 The 
movement of the arrow, though, was turning in the other direction as well: the 
colonizing Westerners were showing a sustained interest in Buddhism. However 
scheming and skeptical this newfound interest may have been on the side of 
the colonizers, it created, in turn, an equally new self- consciousness among 
Buddhists concerning their own tradition. “Thus,” writes Bechert, “an essential 
presupposition for the development” of what would become Western Buddhism 
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By the early nineteenth century, under British rule, Buddhism in Sri Lanka 
was, Bechert writes, “exhibiting serious signs of decay.”10 Significantly, at the 
same time “the influence of Christian schools and missionaries on the country’s 
educated classes was rapidly increasing.”11 By mid- century, members of this 
new Anglophile elite feared that Buddhism would disappear altogether from 
the island by the end of the century. Precisely the opposite occurred: Buddhism 
underwent radical reforms, eventually strengthening its standing on the island 
and beyond. From a traditionalist’s perspective, however, this preservation of 
Buddhism must have seemed a deal with the devil. The Westernized Sri Lankan 
leaders of this Buddhist “renewal,” writes Bechert,
used, for the most part and without being fully aware of the fact, methods and 
arguments copied from their opponents. It benefited these reformers, moreover, 
that, at that time, there were several highly educated Buddhist monks who 
possessed the ability to formulate the reformers’ concerns in modern terms, and 
to bring these concerns closer to their contemporaries whose ways of thinking 
had been strongly influenced by the European mindset. They recognized the 
necessity of compromising with modern civilization in order to secure the 
survival of the Buddhist tradition.12
Following the designation for similar compromising tendencies unfolding 
within the Catholic Church at the same time, Bechert employed the term 
“Buddhist modernism” to capture the basic character of this emerging form of 
Buddhism.13 He adds that this modernizing tendency would “eventually gain a 
foothold in every Buddhist country,”14 from where, of course, it would eventually 
be exported to the West. Perhaps the most striking claim made by Bechert here 
is that the Westernized Sri Lankan instigators of the reform had so internalized 
their former opponents’ values that these values were introduced imperceptibly 
back into the reformed Buddhism as preeminently Buddhist.
What, then, were these epoch- changing values? What were the decisive 
features of this “European mindset” that so altered Asian Buddhists’ self- 
understanding? A comment by Gunapala Malalasekera (1899– 1973), an eminent 
product of the English- educated Sri Lankan elite and one of the leading figures 
behind the modern conceptualization and internationalization of Buddhism, 
provides several hints.
Asia, after having lain dormant for nearly five centuries, is once more taking 
its due place in the world and bids fair to be the leader of the new age. It is 
significant that Buddhism, which, more than any other force, was responsible 







also be coming back to its rightful place. The Buddha was the first great scientist 
to appear among men. That Buddha discovered what scientists have only now 
discovered, that there is nothing called matter or mind existing separately in 
this world but they are the result of forces which continually cause them to 
come into operation and that they dissolved and came into operation again. 
Buddhism seeks the meaning of life in life itself. In this search, life is ennobled. 
Life becomes an external and a fulfilled Now. Truth is not a revelation but a 
discovery. The human person has to realise itself as the subject of knowledge, as 
socially responsible and as artistically creative.
This passage reads like the endorsement of Enlightenment values, Romantic 
sentiments, and Protestant ethos that it in fact is. It also tacitly repudiates much 
of what Buddhism had been traditionally understood to represent. For example, 
Buddhism is no longer the world- denying vehicle that provides refuge from 
the poisonous, painful lure of civilization. It is now celebrated, retrospectively, 
as a positive impetus behind the very cultural formations that traditional 
Buddhists were admonished to renounce. The Buddha, the shamanic superman 
(mahāpuruṣa) who descended from heaven at birth, possessed supernatural 
power, performed miracles, and attained transcendental cosmic wisdom, 
was now converted into a rational, empirically minded scientist. Buddhism 
consequently no longer had on offer the cosmological vision— gods, heavens, 
hells, rebirth, karmic retribution, and all— that grounded its “total cure, opening 
to the unconditional beyond space and time.”15 Rather, it now offers “optimism 
and activity”16 on behalf of society and society’s engaged, creatively expressive, 
if neurotically divided, individual. The practice of Buddhism itself is now seen 
as predominantly lay rather than monastic. Even here, though, it is no longer 
realized in the community celebrations and ritual participation that marked 
superstitious “folk” Buddhism, but rather in the “privatized and internalized” 
psychological sphere of “one’s mind or soul.”17 It should be obvious by now that 
the terms I used earlier— Enlightenment, Romantic, and Protestant— are fitting 
monikers for this new articulation of Buddhism; and indeed they have been 
from time to time suggested in place of “modernist.” Thus, we can summarize 
as follows. Western Buddhism is a progeny of the Enlightenment: it implicitly 
values, for instance, reason and rationality, progress, equality, empiricism, 
and the primacy of science. It is the spiritual kin of Romanticism: it valorizes 
personal emotions, creative imagination, intuition, nature, the exemplar of the 
heroic figure, and the primacy of the subject. It is a guardian of Protestantism: it 
reflexively values laicization, individual effort and personal achievement, 
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return to scriptural sources, and the primacy of “self- culture.”18 Finally, this 
modernized and Westernized Buddhism, far from being confined to the 
West, is international in scope, transcending as it does “cultural and national 
boundaries, creating . . . a cosmopolitan network of intellectuals, writing most 
often in English.”19
What I  have sketched here is, of course, an idealized type of Buddhism. 
No single instantiation of Buddhism, East or West, fulfills the ambitions of its 
modernist reformers. And, for that matter, neither do the most fervent devotees 
of the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Protestantism live up to their cults’ 
lofty expectations. If we were to sift carefully through the values I just mentioned 
and compare them to how people behave historically in real life, would we not 
find self- delusion, contradiction, and outright dishonesty at every turn? So, let’s 
bear in mind Max Weber’s warning that “to speak in terms of ideal types” is “in 
a certain sense doing violence to historical reality.”20 As Weber further reminds 
us, however, without this little act of violence we will not get very far in our 
investigations. So there it is. Whether in Tokyo or Toledo, you now know how to 
spot a Western Buddhist.
Some readers may still wonder why I am limiting my critique to this Western, 
albeit internationalized, Buddhism. Isn’t Western Buddhism too easy of a target, 
with its facile prescriptions for happiness and its Pollyannish affirmationism? 
Wouldn’t this be a much more substantive critique if it addressed Buddhism 
as a whole, taking into account, for instance, the serious ancient and medieval 
philosophical traditions? If we dwell on the first point for a moment, we will 
discover an additional characteristic of Western Buddhism. It is, in fact, a feature 
that is to a great extent definitive of Western Buddhism. I  should also admit 
that it is a feature that strengthens my imaginary interlocutor’s argument against 
making Western Buddhism the sole target of my critique. I am thinking here of 
the widespread application of the “Easy- Easy Principle” in Western Buddhist 
discourse. This principle is a concept of the logician and argumentation theorist 
John Woods. In brief, the principle states that if a human activity is easy, so is, 
or so should be, the theory informing that activity. In The Death of Argument, 
Woods offers these definitions:
A task is easy when a human being can perform it competently without formal 
tutelage, and without noticeable effort . . . An easy theory is similarly one that can 
be understand by an arbitrarily selected competent individual without tutelage 
and without noticeable effort. Easy theories include common sense theories, but 






Elsewhere, Woods says that the theory of such a practice “must likewise be free 
of technical or theoretically abstruse content.”22 Western Buddhist rhetoric, 
of course, is more prone to speaking of the “simple” nature of Buddhism, its 
practices, and its corresponding theories. The principle, however, still holds, as 
does the condition that Western Buddhist thought and practice is, according 
to its rhetoric and unlike “hard” theories and techniques, largely available 
“without formal tutelage, and without noticeable effort.” As a prominent figure 
sums up this feature of Western Buddhism: “Practice: you can’t do it wrong.”23 
In fact, simplicity is a trope burrowed within the very marrow of the tradition. 
Alexander Wynne provides some insight into this trope in The Origins of 
Buddhist Meditation. His intent and context are admittedly different from mine; 
but what he says is nonetheless instructive. Wynne argues that the simplicity 
of a particular canonical account of the Buddha’s awakening “likely” proves 
that account to have greater veracity over another, more complex, variant. 
Wynne acknowledges that “simplicity is not necessarily an unambiguous sign 
of the historical authenticity of any Buddhist text,” and yet his acceptance of 
the simpler account in this case exceeds the old- text critical principle of lectio 
brevior.24 As is all- too- common in Buddhist studies scholarship, Wynne the 
scholar is indistinguishable from a devout practitioner when he argues that the 
“simplicity in the account [of the Buddha’s first encounter with a passer- by after 
his awakening] suggest the possibility that it is a description of liberating insight, 
i.e. ‘an immediate verbalisation of (a conceptualisation of) an actual experience,’ 
rather than a theory.” Wynne, perhaps unintentionally, broadcasts his faith- 
driven assumptions at work here:
We can assume that the Buddha’s own accounts of his awakening would have 
been “immediate verbalisations of an actual experience,” rather than secondary 
theories. If any trace of the original account of the Buddha’s awakening is to 
be found in the early Buddhist sources, we should expect to find it in a simple 
description, and not a complex theory; the simpler the description the better.25
Unless we subscribe to such values in advance, why we would assume 
that a “description of liberating insight” would necessarily be simple and 
untheoretical? In any case, Wynne is giving voice to a widespread rhetorical 
premise of Buddhism, East and West; and that premise is perfectly congruent 
with the Easy- Easy— or, in this case, the Simple- Simple— Principle. Another 
leading figure of Western Buddhism offers a somewhat cruder version of this 
principle:  “sutras and sastras are treated by Zen as mere waste paper whose 
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and, particularly, śāstras are, of course, the repositories of the theoretical 
“intellectual analysis” of ostensibly untheoretical liberating insights. Such 
rhetoric, typical of Western Buddhism, assumes that to attach a complex 
theory to a natural, hence “easy” or simple, human task is to burden it with 
unnecessary, indeed counterproductive, intellectualization. Worse even, it is 
to woefully mischaracterize that activity. There is, however, a serious problem 
with this Easy- Easy Principle:  it is “a hopelessly mistaken maxim.”27 Riding 
a bike, Woods points out, is easy; but “plotting the underlying kinesiology is 
not.” Dogen (1200– 1253) might consider meditation to be “the dharma gate 
of enjoyment and ease,” but plotting the hidden value system, much less the 
neurology, of such an activity involves neither.28 The latter, difficult, project is the 
theoretically complex working out of what is occurring in the former, ostensibly 
easy, activity. Western Buddhist figures eschew the supposed overcomplication 
of its theoretical project because it holds its (superior) practical application to 
be necessarily of utmost simplicity.
The ubiquity of the Easy- Easy Principle in Western Buddhist discourse— rising 
quite often to a pronounced anti- intellectualism— might be a cause for turning 
our critical attention to the supposedly more philosophically sophisticated 
eastern varieties. The error in that move would be in assuming that the same 
principle does not hold for the more traditional forms of Buddhist thought and 
practice. That point is too complex to flesh out here. However, Tom Tillemans’s 
work on the influential Indian Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti (flourished 
around 600– 650) suggests a line of inquiry in this direction. Tillemans speaks, 
for instance, of the fact that for Candrakīrti our everyday “conventional truth is 
very much a dumbed- down truth” requiring, if at all, a theoretical explanation 
in which “sophistication itself is to be ruled out.”29 To be fair, Tillemans suspects 
that Candrakīrti sits as high as he does in the Buddhist philosophical firmament 
only because later Tibetan thinkers, such as Tsongkhapa (1357– 1419), wrestled 
mightily with his “pedestrian world picture,” transforming the Indian thinker 
into “a significantly better philosopher than he actually was.”30 This line of 
inquiry, however, just might reveal that the most sophisticated goods that 
traditional Buddhism has to offer rarely, if ever, actually rise above faith- bound 
philosophical theology.
With the neologism “x- buddhism,” which I will explain in Chapter 4 (under 
the subheading “Decision”), I argue that all forms of Buddhism, East and West, 
share an identity that is reducible to a common factor. For that reason, a critique 








With that description in mind, it will be useful to revisit the question: what are 
we to make of Western Buddhism? Is it the serious form of thought and practice 
that its adherents would have us believe? It certainly speaks in the idiom of 
seriousness. Buddhist teachings invite us to entertain possibilities that should 
make even the most impulsive of the proverbial rushing fools balk: emptiness, 
selflessness, freedom, rebirth, the multiverse, enlightenment, abiding happiness. 
Topics like these, of course, have occupied some of the brightest minds that 
humanity has produced since the dawn of recorded human thought, thinkers 
from Parmenides and Plato to David Hume, Hannah Arendt, and Stephen 
Hawking, to just barely get the list going. Now, we’re hearing about Buddhism’s 
ability to address the most vexing issues confronting the twenty- first century, 
issues such as the domination of technology, environmental degradation, the 
intricacies of trauma and addiction, and the mysteries of the human brain. 
Western Buddhist teachers suffer no loss for words when it comes to any of these 
topics. Academics, too— principally in Buddhist studies, but also in fields like 
neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy— laud Buddhism’s contributions to 
interminable debates on epistemology, ontology, logic, language, perception, and 
consciousness. The accumulated result is that Buddhism enjoys a blue- ribbon 
reputation in the West as a profound all- encompassing system of thought, or 
at least, to those less inclined toward intractable conundrums, as a self- help 
remedy par excellence.
Is this reputation deserved? Perhaps the most obvious approach to 
investigating the viability of Buddhists’ claims for their ostensibly pansophic 
teaching would be to systematically present and analyze these teachings. Such an 
approach, however, would be tedious beyond belief and ultimately unproductive. 
Why do I  say this? It would be tedious because “Buddhism” is the name of a 
two- and- a- half millennia amassing of ideas, beliefs, rituals, worldviews, texts, 
theories, art, architecture, music, fashion, practices, universities, monasteries, 
lay communities, virtually ad infinitum. And all of this in the cauldron of cultures 
spanning Beijing and Boston. Although this baroque assortment bears the shared 
name of “Buddhism,” the commonalities across time and space are mostly of the 
family resemblance variety, wherein the self- identity of each lies in its difference 
from the others. Like the proud factions of a venerable and extremely large 
clan, Buddhists seem to be particularly sensitive to this matter of difference. 
This sensitivity, furthermore, informs the reason that a doctrinal analysis of 
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Buddhism would be as unproductive as it would be tedious. Contemporary 
Western Buddhists commonly respond to criticism with an appeal to exception. 
This tendency parallels what I call a detail fetish among Western Buddhists, a 
kind of exemplification reflex.31 Providing a particular example in order to make 
a finely calibrated point is, indeed, not unusual in complex systems of thought. 
Heidegger has his hammer; Wittgenstein, his slabs. Spinoza has his hatchet, 
and Descartes, his wax.32 If you have ever read even the first page of a book on 
classical Buddhist philosophy, you will almost certainly have come across “the 
pot.” Buddhists, in the written word and in dialogue, have always been quick at 
the draw with their own mechanism of ideological damage control: the hyper- 
specific doctrinal detail. Apparently, there is no criticism of a given Buddhist 
concept that cannot be decisively dismissed with an added detail, an overlooked 
facet, an ever- so- slight shifting of the dharmic goalpost. The detail is taken from 
this teacher’s meticulous interpretation, from that pinpointed textual passage; or, 
failing its intended effect, from the hidden sphere of wisdom known as personal 
experience. The detail corrects, alters, refines, and reshapes. And along the way, 
it inevitably derails any criticism, rendering it irrelevant.
If Buddhism is in equal measure elusive and unassailable, how is an evaluation 
of it possible? If the term “Buddhism,” or for that matter “Western Buddhism,” 
is a catchall for such a wide diversity of phenomena, what is it exactly that is 
being critiqued? And even if we can say, if every particular instance that is 
offered up for critical analysis is countered by a supposedly more salient yet 
resistant instance, on what foundation can a critique be raised? To indicate more 
about my approach to these matters in A Critique of Western Buddhism, and to 
convey a sense of the book’s spirit, I would like momentarily to band together 
the Buddha and the bearer of such ad rem wisdom as “Where there is a stink of 
shit/ there is a smell of being.”33
The Buddha did not write books, but if he had, I can imagine him thinking, 
along with his scatological comrade, Antonin Artaud: “I would like to write a 
Book that would drive people mad, that would be like an open door leading 
them where they would never have consented to go; in short, a door that 
opens to reality.”34 In the terms that I introduce in Chapter 2, what Artaud calls 
“reality” is better understood as “the Real.”35 In one of its uses, the concept of 
the Real gives us a way to talk about disavowed features of reality that threaten 
to sunder our constructions of order, sense, and meaning. In another usage, the 
Real names a facet of existence presupposed, yet unaffected, by human symbolic 
systems, such as language and ideology. So, I will accordingly adjust Artaud’s 







marked by “cruelty.” It is, in fact, the definitive cruelty. The very purpose of 
theater, Artaud believed, is to refract this cruelty: theater should be coextensive 
with the Real. It should ensue from the Real, thus operate alongside it. And 
yet the theater of his day aspired to be little more than a melodramatic retreat 
from the threats of modern life. It sought to protect its audience from the cruel. 
Artaud had a different vision. He saw in theater a practice that “inspires us with 
the fiery magnetism of its images and acts upon us like a spiritual therapeutics 
whose touch can never be forgotten.”36 With this aspiration, he was up against 
no less than a popular institution that served, like the church and the police, the 
creation of a public submissive to an oppressive status quo. Artaud thus made 
it his mission to transmute this theater of complacency into an “immediate 
and violent”37 maelstrom, one that exposed its viewers to the primal truths of 
their lives. Only a theater that wakes up its audience’s “nerves and heart,”38 he 
believed, is worthy of the name. Such a theater must be built on the cruelty that 
is the Real, on those eschewed features of reality that, to evoke Artaud’s wise 
words from above, stink. Such a theater must not shrink from the possibility that 
“extreme action, pushed beyond all limits”39 must ensue from its feral process. 
For, if not pushed with such intentional zeal, the machinations of delusion 
and self- satisfaction will overwhelm the vitality that is catalyzed by the lucid 
acknowledgment of the cruel Real.
What do the fiery dreams of a bona fide madman like Artaud have to do 
with the cool and eminently sane Buddha? To suggest a parallel, let’s turn to the 
primal scene of their respective spheres of action. We see demented revels of 
the Dionysian maenad dancing and drinking themselves into orgiastic frenzy, 
shredding, with their phallic thyrsoi, then ecstatically devouring, the raw flesh of 
the sacrificial beast. Out of this appetite, the theater is born. Buddhism’s myth of 
origin is hardly less dramatic. Revisiting the locus of its founding scene, the seat 
of the Buddha’s awakening, we are in the presence of overwhelming elemental 
power: trees, water, sky, fire, earth, bodies beautiful and decaying, lust, passion, 
storms, death, swirling cosmos, occult powers, animals, sprites, spirits, gods. 
Sitting against the trunk of a massive ficus, the Buddha, as Gilles Deleuze says 
of writers, uses all the resources of his athleticism to “dip into a chaos, into a 
movement that goes to the infinite.”40 By engaging in extreme contemplative 
experimentation, the Buddha enters into a “Dionysian space of undoing” within 
which he enacts “not a system of demonstration, but an ordeal in which the 
mind is given new eyes.”41
Each of these spheres represents a literal theater, a theatron, a space of violent, 
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of human awakening, the Theater of Buddhism, like that of Artaud’s France, 
lapses into a refuge of comfort, into an institution of sleepy, complacent social 
conformity, into thought so sluggish as to mope its way into the desert of the 
Western New Age. That, at least, is one of two major premises of this book. 
What creates this breach is that the progenitors of Buddhism and of the Theater 
of Cruelty presuppose a “Real” of which their particular forms are crucial 
recoveries. This fact, the positing of a relationship to the Real— indeed, the 
very evocation of the notion— permits a corollary to the premise. In the case of 
Buddhism, this corollary is that its conceptual materials may, despite its lapses, 
offer valuable resources for radical reformations of thought and practice and 
of self and society in the contemporary West. But now a shadow of this first 
premise appears; namely, the noun “Buddhism” indexes an historical failure 
to unleash the force of its very own thought. “Buddhism,” that is, names an 
obstinate containment of potentially vital human goods. The end result is that 
Buddhism everywhere functions as a conservative protector of the social status 
quo, however toxic, and as an ideological fortress spawning subjects whose 
treasured goal certainly appears to be to remain unscathed— in some sense 
or another— by life’s vicissitudes. Paradoxically, therefore, we cannot look to 
Buddhism— to its teachers and defenders, to its commentaries and explications, 
to its communities and organizations— to assist us in removing its auto- erected 
bulwark of resistance.
The second major premise of this book derives from this paradox. It holds 
that certain critical procedures must be performed on and with the Buddhist 
material if Buddhism is to avoid complete absorption into the Western self- 
help industry. The question twice posed in this introduction— What are we to 
make of Buddhism?— is thus intended in the most literal of senses. What, if 
anything, might we do with Buddhism, with Buddhist materials, in our present 
circumstances? Committed Western Buddhists will be perplexed by the very 
question. It entails an assumption that, I doubt, would ever occur to them, much 
less be acceptable. For, to its adherents, Buddhism is nothing if not an exemplary 
inventory of what we should do in our present circumstances. This inventory is, 
furthermore, nothing if not wholly sufficient. It encompasses the entire cosmos, 
in fact, including, for instance, what we should do with our minds, our bodies, 
our speech, and in comportment to others and to the environment. It makes 
pronouncements on the workings of causality, past, present, and future. It 
holds the codes to the cosmic vault of meaning and value. So, first, perhaps, 
among a host of other difficulties that I discuss in this book is that a critique 
will have to avoid the snares of the principle of sufficient Buddhism. Echoing 
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Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason (all things, according to reason, have a 
reason) as well as François Laruelle’s critical principle of sufficient philosophy 
(all things, according to philosophy, are philosophizable), this principle holds 
that Buddhism can be universally applied to its object. Given that Buddhism’s 
overt object is reality, or indeed, the Real, Buddhism’s sufficiency knows virtually 
no bounds. That being the case, any critique of Buddhism that uses Buddhist 
materials is setting itself up to be absorbed back into the fold as yet one more 
iteration of Buddhism. A critique will thus have to be nimble and will have to 
hit hard.
Here, I would like to mention four basic features informing my critique. The 
details will be found in the chapters that follow. First, I am borrowing elements 
from the prodigious theoretical apparatus of the contemporary French thinker 
François Laruelle. The most succinct definition of the aim of Laruelle’s critique is 
that it is “the simplification of transcendence.”43 Laruelle holds that philosophy— 
the topic of his own critique, which he terms “non- philosophy” or “non- standard 
philosophy”— suffers a condition whereby it is “intended by necessity to remain 
empty but which necessarily evades this void with objects and foreign goals 
provided by experience, culture, history, language, etc.”44 Philosophy must remain 
empty because of its “intention” of filling the role of an explicator of immanent 
reality or indeed of a kind of science of the Real. That means that philosophy 
identifies itself as an organon, as an unmediated instrument of knowledge, 
rather than as co- author of the reality it explicates. Instead, what we find is that 
philosophy habitually affixes its own postulates concerning reality and the Real 
onto the very instrument of its ostensible science, thereby inevitably mixing 
these with the object to be known. Through this mixture, philosophy “evades” 
the immanent Real that it endeavors to think and know, and instead erects a 
transcendental mirror reflecting philosophy’s mixture back onto the world, and 
into the Real. This circularity entails the failure of philosophy to function as the 
rigorous organon it so aspires to be. It thus becomes instead a “rumor . . . which 
is transmitted by hearsay, imitation, specularity, and repetition.”45 As I will show, 
Laruelle’s recognition of philosophy’s identity transfers uncannily well to that of 
Buddhism. In part, this shows the protean nature of his theory. Indeed, he holds 
that “ ‘non- philosophy’ is the generic term for the enterprise which takes on 
other names locally according to the materials to which it relates.”46 It is a theory 
that is simultaneously a practice, whereby the practitioner uses it to do something 
with the local material. I will say more about this facet in Part 3. In any case, 
I know of no theory more capable of resisting the reappropriating sufficiency 
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Second, it should be clear by now that a conviction running throughout my 
critique will be that an orientation toward immanence is a vital human value. 
I would hope to convince my readers that thinkers of immanence— whether 
in the sciences, medicine, economics, psychology, philosophy, even the arts— 
offer the most promising models for social and personal clarification and, 
where desired, transformation. This is because, like Heidegger’s “hardness of 
fate” premise, their promise is rooted precisely in a transcendentally minimized 
assessment of human experience, one that moreover opens up the possibility 
for “authentic action” in our world.47 This conviction has a corollary: systems 
of transcendence, namely, those that posit autonomous yet immanently absent 
orders of truth and reality, must be forcefully countered. If for no other reason, 
they must be countered because they are alienating to human beings. Buddhism 
is a fascinating and rare instance of a system of thought that adamantly 
posits a version of radical, non- alienating immanence yet aggressively staves 
off the consequences of its own productive insights via transcendental 
mixtures of its own making. My critique thus takes seriously those insights of 
Buddhism (e.g., subjective destitution, phenomenal dissolution, contingency, 
nihility, etc.) concerning reality in relation to the Real. My hypothesis is that 
Buddhist materials might contribute to serious, immanental models of human 
transformation, but only in ways that would be unrecognizable to Buddhists. 
Put in apt if somewhat dramatic terms: we might, after all is said and done, 
discern the afterglow of liberating human thought in the ruins of “Buddhism’s” 
destruction.
Third, this critique serves as both a theory and a performance. I don’t mean 
only that a text like this one is “performative,” that it does, or at least aims to 
effect, something. I am more interested in the performance associated with the 
reading of the text. I hope to stimulate a reading, thinking, living subject, one 
who regards the Buddhist conceptual material alongside of, hence profoundly 
affected by, what Laruelle calls “radical immanence.”48 Theory- practice therefore 
seems like a fitting term here. Theory, like its etymological relative, theater, 
positions us to gaze on the spectacle of Western Buddhism. As Sruti Bala writes, 
the two closely related terms “deal with orders of perception and meaning- 
making of reality.” Performance, however, in contrast to theory, “foregrounds 
action as opposed to perception.” It is thus “connected to the legal act of 
executing a will or promise, as opposed to the emphasis in the terms ‘theater’ 
and ‘theory,’ on considering and speculating.” So, one implicit claim made for A 
Critique of Western Buddhism is that it at least endeavors to execute the promise 




“Placed together,” to paraphrase Bala, theory and performance “span a range of 
investments, from aesthetic and formal to the political and social.”49
Finally, I  want to reiterate that I  am not critiquing Western Buddhism 
as a flawed deviation from a pure “original” Buddhism or as a corruption of 
traditional eastern forms of Buddhism. Neither am I  putting Buddhism on 
trial and conducting an inquest into the truthfulness of its claims. The fact is 
that it is impossible to evaluate “Buddhism’s claims” because, as I have already 
mentioned, “Buddhism” is too slippery a term. Its very fluidity, however, is a 
richly instructive fact, one that provides a clue to its identity and thus to how to 
construct a consequential critique. In brief, I am employing a method that bears 
no resemblance to approaches such as the history of ideas, the philosophy of 
religion, or doxography. While readers might excuse me from following either of 
the first two methods, I can imagine they will be disappointed if I don’t base my 
critique on the evaluation of actual doctrines. I am following Laruelle here. He 
writes, “There is a frivolity of doxography from which ‘the history of philosophy’ 
does not always escape. It is not a matter here of objects, authors, themes, 
positions or texts; it is solely the matter of a problematic and of the reconstruction 
of this problematic.”50 I will work out later what I think this problematic is for 
Western Buddhism. The point that I wish to make here— and it is a crucial point 
overall— is that whatever Western Buddhist “objects, authors, themes, positions 
or texts” I could name would amount to little more than indices. That is, names 
of specific texts, doctrines, teachers, etc., are but “indications of problems that 
we are striving to demonstrate and analyze in their coherence and functioning; 
guiding threads for penetrating into a [buddhistic] environment that exceeds 
them, but the extent, the possibilities and also the limitations of which they have 
made perceptible.”51 I  am interested in the “environment” that both exceeds 
and precedes any Buddhist text, figure, and so on, that we might name. This 
environment constitutes the problematic because it, and not specific doctrinal 
details, is the incubator of the countless phenomena that comprise “Western 
Buddhism.” The general, Laruellen, term for this problematic is “decision.” Very 
briefly, decision involves cutting knowledge off from its immanent- material- 
empirical given in order to ground that knowledge in a transcendent- ideal- 
hallucinated supplement. Such a move is, of course, not a problem for avowedly 
transcendental forms of thought, such as theistic religion. Decision is, however, 
a problem for self- declared phenomenologically verifiable systems like biology 
and Buddhism. I  argue that, given its specific practice of decision, Western 
Buddhism exposes itself as a visionary form of knowledge. In any case, this is 
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it means that these instances will only be viewed— to use a famous Buddhist 
trope— as fingers pointing to the moon of buddhistic decision. The purpose of 
this approach, indeed of this entire critique, is, once again, not to annihilate the 
finely wrought edifice of Western Buddhism, but to view that edifice in the glow 
of a stranger, more creaturely, light.
1
The Snares of Wisdom
Lurking throughout this book is the query: delivered from its onerous regency 
of Wisdom, what might Western Buddhism offer us modern mortals? Given 
that this is a book on Buddhism, the question itself, I  imagine, packs enough 
polemics to put off all but the most forbearing reader. For, why read a book on 
Buddhism if not to drink from its effusive fount of Wisdom? The promise of 
Wisdom certainly appears to be what draws people to Buddhism today. As a 
recent book offering Wisdom from the Early Teachings suggests, Buddhism is 
attractive— and effective, of course— because its “approach to awakening is so 
simple and free of adherence to any kind of ideology.”1 With his use of “ideology” 
here the author seems to imply something like merely concocted notions about 
the constituents of “awakening,” the kinds of fantastical notions that we find in 
sectarian texts, doctrines, and religions. The author apparently wants to set off 
these inferior sorts of contrived, approximate forms from that which “points to 
a direct and simple approach . . . without requiring the adherence to doctrine” 
or resting on “their authority as scripture.” He wants to set “ideology,” that is, off 
from “Wisdom.” Wisdom is the unconcocted Truth that floats free from any sort 
of contingency— linguistic, doctrinal, historical, subjective, and beyond. That 
is why its truths pertain “not only to Buddhists, but also to the ever- growing 
demographic of spiritual- but- not- religious, who seek a spiritual life outside the 
structures of religion.”
It is with this idea— namely, that “spiritual” Wisdom blooms eternal, and 
eternally pure, untainted by the muddy materiality of religious or any other kind 
of ideology— that we know we have been coaxed into the pristine regency of 
the philosophia perennis. A  critique of Western Buddhism could amble along 
this perennial pathway of Wisdom, each step of the way pointing out the abject 
failure of Buddhism, and even of “the Buddha before Buddhism,” to avoid the 
supposedly disqualifying evidence of contingency. The critic, that is, could with 
ease garner example after example that renders implausible the essentialist and 
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universalist conceits of Perennialism. The astute critic could go even further, 
and illuminate for us exactly how the authors of books on Western Buddhism, 
me included, betray in their treatments of the Buddhist material— selections, 
omissions, translations, interpretations, evaluations, etc.— their own ideological 
commitments. To do such work here is far beyond the scope of my purpose. 
Somewhat ironically, however, this point can be summed up in devastating 
succinctness with reference to the Buddhist concept of dependent origination, 
which holds that there is precisely no “simple and free” existence of anything 
whatsoever, whether object, concept, person or event; and, on the contrary, 
that everything emerges due to a variety of entangling causes, conditions, and 
influences.2 In any case, it is because of the demonstrable implausibility of 
avoiding “adherence to any kind of ideology” that Wisdom bears an impossible 
burden: its protectors simply cannot fend off the cruel intrusion of contingency 
into its Edenic domain.
Hence, again, my query: delivered from its onerous regency of Wisdom, what 
might Western Buddhism offer us modern mortals? Anticipating the failure of 
Wisdom to deliver on any sustainable promises, as I explore below, might we 
find any other reason to engage Buddhist materials? I propose that we may, and 
that the reason is “the Real.” The strength of this reason is that it is derived from 
classical Buddhist postulates themselves, from terms that entail a “Real” notion 
of something like that which is excluded from symbolic representation or, in a 
more Buddhist idiom, that which obtains unaffected by the delusions of conceptual 
proliferation. Terms intimating the Buddhist Real come in varying degrees of 
obliqueness, such as (to give the standard English translations) things- as- they- 
are (yathābhutam), truth (satya), ultimate truth (paramārthasatya), emptiness 
(śūnyatā), impermanence (anicca), no- self (anātman), dependent origination 
(pratītyasamutpāda), and extinction (nirvāṇa). Implicitly or explicitly, these 
classical postulates remain active ingredients in Western Buddhist discourse. 
Still, this reason for engagement— “the Real”— is by no means obvious to 
contemporary readers of books on Buddhism. It is in fact doubtful that any 
such reader has ever encountered in a book or talk on Buddhism the very term 
“Real” as I employ it. An obvious rebuttal to my proposition here is that this 
notion of the Real does not occur in Western Buddhist discourse because it is 
not a Buddhist notion to begin with. The goal in the following chapters is thus to 
establish that foundational Buddhist postulates do indeed entail a consequential 
notion of “the Real.”
Why is this initial goal important for my critique? There are several reasons. 
First of all, I think it is the absence, or perhaps disavowal, of such a “Real” concept 
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that makes possible the correspondence between Western Buddhism and New 
Age self- help or, more broadly, of Buddhism and “Wisdom,” in the minds of 
present- day observers. To those observers who seek in Western Buddhism 
practical and ideological means to ends such as happiness and wellbeing, and 
meaning and purpose, this absence must be reassuring. After all, destinations 
such as those are surely at odds with the cognitive and affective hammer blows of 
the likes of nihility and contingency. To those observers who, on the other hand, 
seek in Western Buddhism conditions for thought and practice on par with 
sophisticated philosophical or rigorous scientific practice, it is surely this very 
disavowal that is a hindrance. For, again, it is this lack or denial of a Real concept 
that enables Western Buddhism to remain locked in its orbit of Wisdom. So, my 
first task is to explain what I mean by “Wisdom.” After all, Western Buddhism 
is nothing if not a self- professed instrument of human wisdom. This chapter 
therefore explores the basic logic of Wisdom, along with its contemporary 
motivating force, “wellbeing.” Finally, I  briefly consider the confluence of 
Western Buddhist Wisdom and wellbeing rhetoric and that of contemporary 
neoliberal subjectivity.
Wisdom
“Wisdom is the most disgusting thing you can imagine,” deadpans the ever- 
provocative Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek in a conversation with Paul 
Holdengräber hosted by the Danish Royal Library in Copenhagen.3 A visibly 
confounded Holdengräber can only counter, “But it’s so interesting that a 
philosopher should be against wisdom.” Žižek doubles down, “We all are.” 
Varying definitions of “wisdom” are obviously in play in this miscommunication. 
Holdengräber assumes the colloquial— and classical— sense of possessing an 
uncannily discerning insight into worldly and cosmic matters, together with 
virtues such as prudence and judiciousness. Žižek does not. Žižek is naming 
as Wisdom the “tautological emptiness . . . exemplified in the inherent stupidity 
of proverbs.”4 Many readers, I  imagine, find in Western Buddhism plentiful 
examples of wisdom in Holdengräber’s sense. What about in Žižek’s sense? 
Does Žižek’s characterization apply to Western Buddhism? To find out, we 
can take as our examples a few proverb- like statements by figures popular in 
Western Buddhist circles. Let’s consider, for instance, the currently popular 
trope of the present moment:  “Life is available only in the present moment. If 
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life deeply.”5 Like much of the content of Western Buddhism, that statement 
is meant to point to an elusive feature of reality, one that must be grasped if 
life is to be properly lived and fulfilled. That is to say, the statement is intended 
as a profound truth concerning human existence. But, we might ask, is the 
statement not tautological; is it even coherent? Is it even conceivable to live 
at some moment other than the present? Then wouldn’t “not abandoning the 
present moment” just be another expression for “being alive”? Conversely, if the 
present moment ceases to be available to me or if I choose to abandon it, is that 
not just another way of talking about death? Nonetheless, a reader might see in 
this statement certain reasonable, if trite, claims, such as: the present moment 
must be inhabited for life to be lived. “Wisdom,” though, is more than just a 
pseudo- profound platitude. It has the ability to shapeshift into its opposite while 
retaining its resonance of profundity. Here is another popular Western Buddhist 
teacher:  “We find that the term ‘present moment’ is just a label denoting the 
interface between the tenses ‘past’ and ‘future.’ We cannot actually pinpoint the 
present. Just a fraction of a second before the supposed present moment lies 
the past, just a fraction of a second after lies the future.”6 In other words, in 
this reversal from the first statement, there really is no present moment either 
to inhabit or to abandon. “The present moment” is a kind of necessary fiction 
here. It is an empty signifier that helps us to make sense of temporal experience. 
We can, of course, also inquire into the coherency of this statement and ask, for 
instance, whether or not all of language ultimately fails to “pinpoint” its abstract 
object. Beginning with Plato, at least, the very question “what is x” (justice, love, 
time) opened up a Pandora’s Box of meaning and signification. So, thus far we 
have two contradictory statements: first, the present moment is hyper- real; to 
miss it is to be less than fully alive, and second, the present moment is unreal; to 
believe in it is to be hopelessly naïve, perhaps even deluded, about the relation 
of language to reality. Significantly, Wisdom does not stop at contradiction. It 
soldiers on, seeking resolution. Thus, another teacher proclaims: “All that exists 
is the present moment, yet we cannot point to it.”7 It both is and is not. At some 
point, in other words, the law of noncontradiction obstructs reality and so must 
be abandoned. As Žižek noticed, however, Wisdom does not even end with the 
hyper- logical resolution of contradiction. Even after all of this conceptual twisting 
and turning, he says, “one again obtains a wisdom: ‘the ultimate, unfathomable 
mystery of [the present moment] resides in its very simplicity, in the simple fact 
that there is [the present moment].’ ”8 The linguistic enigma, the representational 
void, the ontological mystery, the logical conundrum, and the lived experience 
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For, in the unintentionally ironic words of Wisdom from yet another popular 
Western Buddhist teacher: “No thinking, no mind. No mind, no problem.”9
Wisdom is a shapeshifting zombie. It is the ever- mutating persistence of an 
idea in the face of even the most lethal of objections. Let’s look more closely at 
that last proverb. “No thinking, no mind/ No mind, no problem” is a flagrant, if 
absurd, tautology. For, we use the term “mind” precisely to denote the faculty of 
thinking: to change my mind about going to the party is to change my thinking 
about going to the party, and vice versa. To be devoid of thinking is the very 
definition of being devoid of a mind. So, finally, to have no mind is to abide 
no longer among the living, and thus, it follows, is to have no problem. The 
tautological nature of such statements alone should put an end to the discussion 
of their perspicacity. But it does not. Wisdom soldiers on. At this point, for 
example, the Master admonishes me for taking the statement too literally. It 
might be true that in everyday speech the statement is tautological. Wisdom, 
however, dictates that the Master engage a practice that is unbeholden to the 
conventions of mere everyday speech. As we learn from one of the preeminent 
shapers of Western Buddhism:
Language deals with concepts and therefore what cannot be conceptualized is 
beyond the reach of language. When language is forced, it gets crooked, which 
means that it becomes illogical, paradoxical, and unintelligible from the point of 
view of ordinary usage of language or by the conventional way of thinking. For 
instance, the waters are to flow and the bridge is to stay over them. When this is 
reversed the world of the senses goes topsy- turvy . . . This [reversal] is intelligible 
only from the inward way of seeing reality.10
Wisdom must persist interminably. And it must, by design, do so in a topsy- 
turvy fashion. It must do both precisely because the profoundest truths of 
human existence are impervious to human language. The Master sees reality 
from within. So seeing, the Master has license to speak to us unenlightened 
worldlings in ways that contravene the stultifying effects of our conventional 
language. The Master’s unrelenting task— to embody and proclaim Wisdom— 
requires the incessant contortion of language in order to free us from the 
benighted delusions engendered by our linguistic conventions. The statement 
just above, from such a Western Buddhist Master, unintentionally, I  think, 
broadcasts the fundamental problem with Wisdom as a whole. The “tautological 
imbecility,” as Žižek puts it, that we have been witnessing “points toward the fact 
that a Master is excluded from the economy of symbolic exchange.”11 Imagine an 
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patient makes an anxious inquiry into the mammogram, and the doctor replies 
with “No thinking, no mind/ No mind, no problem!” How should the patient 
respond? “The economy of symbolic exchange” entails robust give and take. It 
means that, for our purposes, the patient may not only challenge the coherency, 
even more so the wisdom, of her physician’s remark, but may decisively do so. 
Spoken from the lordly seat of the Master, however, the statement insists on 
profundity, the correctness of which is “intelligible only from the inward way 
of seeing reality.” In that case, what would it mean to challenge the statement? 
The reader may object that the wise statement is not intended to be applied to 
my example, or any others like it. But that objection is precisely a feature of 
the Wisdom shell game. The precise context wherein Wisdom operates eludes 
everybody but the Master. Wisdom is exempt from all specific contexts. It applies 
only to life as a whole, a mysterious whole that only the Master can behold. 
That means that you might indeed challenge it, but not effectively; for Wisdom, 
to paraphrase Laruelle, plays with loaded dice. Wisdom’s exclusion from the 
economy of linguistically symbolic exchange enables it to generate an endless 
stream of unassailable, if discordant, statements. Wisdom never fails to win 
the day.
A critique of Western Buddhism that took the path of discourse analysis, and 
particularly of Wisdom discourse analysis, would discover an embarrassment 
of low- lying fruit along the way. That critique would show that the examples 
I  gave above are indicative of general, widespread patterns in Western 
Buddhist discourse. It is a pattern woven with the fraying threads of truisms, 
commonplaces, reductionism, and clichés, and framed with the hooks of 
unchallenged dogmatic certitude. And it doesn’t make for a very consequential 
critique. So, let’s move on.
Wellbeing
Wisdom may be as old as the ages, but the motives for seeking it blossom 
perennially. Quaint motives from traditional Buddhism, past and present, 
include, for example, ensuring a favorable rebirth, attaining enlightenment, 
and exiting the brutalizing rounds of birth and death. If we dig further down 
into the contemporary Western Buddhist discourse on Wisdom, we find its 
current motivating force: wellbeing. In what sense, wellbeing? Are we talking 
about the kind of social and personal wellbeing that ensues from the fair 
distribution of wealth, from shared access to educational opportunity, from 
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universal healthcare? No. A  recent title sums up nicely the general sense of 
wellbeing in Western Buddhism:  The Buddha’s Way of Happiness:  Healing 
Sorrow, Transforming Negative Emotion, and Finding Well- Being in the Present 
Moment.12 As the author elaborates:  “The light and radiance are in you. 
Happiness and peace are in you. Don’t go running after it. Open to it— right now, 
right where you are.”13 The title and blurb capture the crux of what “wellbeing” 
signifies in Western Buddhist usage. As this comment and the title intimate, 
Western Buddhist wellbeing involves a complex collusion between positive ego- 
psychology, New Age idealism, Mindfulness fetishism of “the present moment,” 
and an appropriation of traditional Buddhism. Other Western Buddhist teachers 
may word it differently, but if it is sold in the Western spiritual marketplace, you 
can be all but certain that their version of wellbeing will hew closely to the spirit 
of that title’s language.
Interestingly, the last several years have seen a backlash against the near 
universal celebration of Western Buddhist interventions in what another 
recent book calls “the happiness industry.” Since a major identifying mark 
of Western Buddhism is this presentation of itself as an ally in the quest for 
wellbeing, it should be instructive to consider the wellbeing link to Wisdom. 
Doing so, furthermore, ultimately enables me to bypass another feasible if, for 
my purposes, divergent path to a critique of Western Buddhism.
“What was a Buddhist monk doing at the 2014 World Economic Forum 
in Davos lecturing the world’s leaders on mindfulness?”— ponders sociologist 
and political economist William Davies in The Happiness Industry:  How the 
Government and Big Business Sold Us Well- Being.14 The book opens with “the 
happiest man in the world,” Frenchman Matthieu Ricard, a Buddhist monk in 
the Tibetan tradition, lecturing leading international financial figures and others 
at the Davos World Economic Forum in Switzerland. To get a quick read on who 
these “Davos people” are, consider for a moment that the price of attendance 
at the conference for a company of five exceeded $622,000 in 2011.15 That sum 
can potentially be earned back many times over in business deals struck at 
Davos; for in attendance are national presidents, government ministers, heads 
of national banks, too- big- to- fail bank presidents, billionaires, corporate CEOs, 
economists, currency regulators from bureaucracies like the Fed, captains of 
industry from chemicals and big oil to media and entertainment, and even rich 
pop stars. The Forum, founded in Geneva, Switzerland in 1971 amid calamitous 
economic stagnation in the West, engages these “leaders of society to shape 
global, regional and industry agendas.”16 One hopeful solution to economic 
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other neoliberal economic policies were widely credited for having enabled 
the protracted humming of the global economy well into the early 2000s. Thus 
granted a certain reprieve from economic preoccupations, the Davos conference 
finally “began to admit a range of more ‘social’ concerns.” Then, suddenly, in 
2008, the same laissez faire policies that had increased productivity and wealth 
throughout the 1990s contributed to— some say caused— a worldwide financial 
meltdown. Primed by its foray into social issues, the Forum came out of the 
crisis with a newfound perspective that threats to economic stability are as likely 
to involve upheavals in the social sphere as in the financial sector. In previous 
years, issues like derivatives and mortgage- backed securities were the talk of 
the day at Davos. These days the Forum’s agenda is just as likely to highlight 
socially aware concerns like gender equality, human capital, social inclusion, 
and LGBTQ rights.17 Significant for our purposes is the fact that, at Davos, the 
social is wedded firmly to the financial. For instance, the Forum’s policy paper 
on LGBT rights opens with the question, “Why is LGBT equality still such a 
burning issue in the workplace?”18 The World Economic Forum is principally 
concerned, in other words, with “how to get the old show back on the road.”19 
And the pivot point to this return to the good old days of a humming market- 
driven global economy is where the social meets the financial: the workplace.
Enter Matthieu Ricard, Western Buddhist monk extraordinaire. “You are not 
the slave of your thoughts— just gaze at them, like a shepherd sitting above a 
meadow watching his sheep go by,” Ricard tells assorted billionaires, hedge fund 
managers, and A- list celebrities every morning to kick off the day’s program. 
(Incidentally, Davies’s gloss of the variety of meditation taught by Ricard, 
“mindfulness meditation,” reads like a recipe concocted in the kitchen of Western 
Buddhism:  “a relaxation technique formed out of a combination of positive 
psychology, Buddhism, cognitive behavioral therapy and neuroscience.”20) 
Ricard’s presence at the 2014 Davos conference, Davies reports, was a sign of a 
significant “shift in emphasis” from past meetings. All of a sudden “the forum was 
awash with talk of ‘mindfulness.’ ”21 Ricard’s morning mindfulness meditation 
sessions were just a sampling of the day’s wellbeing offerings. In 2014, twenty- 
five sessions at Davos “focused on questions related to wellness, in a mental and 
physical sense, more than double the number of 2008.”22 Among the decision- 
making, agenda- driving, capital- investing class, it seems, happiness— happiness 
of all things!— is in.
This is now what preoccupies our global elites. Happiness, in its various guises, 
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money, or some new age concern with those with enough time to sit around 
baking their own bread. As a measurable, visible, improvable entity, it has now 
penetrated the citadel of global economic management. If the World Economic 
Forum is any guide, and it has always tended to be in the past, the future of 
successful capitalism depends on our ability to combat stress, misery and illness, 
and put relaxation, happiness and wellness in their place.23
This newfound embrace of wellbeing among the world’s corporate elite can only 
augur a better world for all of us, right? Maybe something like trickle down 
happiness is on the horizon. After all, more and more corporations now have, 
alongside of their CEOs and CFOs, a CHO: “Chief Happiness Officer.”24 Well, 
Davies’s argument disabuses us of any such hope. That argument is complex and 
serpentine, so I can only briefly summarize a few points relevant to the path of 
my wellness critique not taken.
Davies’s quest to chart the contemporary landscape of wellbeing begins with 
Jeremy Bentham’s eighteenth- century utilitarian dream of a science of happiness, 
one based not on the fuzzy idealist fantasies of his forebears, but on the exact 
methods of the new sciences:  empirical data and concrete measurement. 
Happiness, reasoned Bentham, unlike, say, goodness and justice, is an actual 
entity. Happiness is, namely, pleasure in distinction to pain. Significantly, argued 
Bentham from naturalistic assumptions, pleasure and pain have a basis in human 
physiology: they are felt experiences. That means that they can be triggered and 
measured. Once measured, they can then be regulated and increased. The task of 
monitoring people’s pleasure/ pain quotient, moreover, falls to the government. 
“The business of government,” proclaims Bentham, now becomes “to promote the 
happiness of society, by punishing and rewarding.” As an enthusiastic supporter 
of the free market, Bentham believed that the invisible hand of capitalism would 
unfailingly guide people to the pleasurable rewards they sought— happiness, it 
turns out, is both felt and bought— while the state would become the agent of 
pain and punishment. The fork in the citizenry’s path was thus simple and stark. 
And a society in which maximal happiness for the maximum number of people 
obtained lay on the horizon.
If this story sounds like a philosophical pipe dream from our more innocent 
past, Davies shows that Jeremy Bentham in fact “set the stage for the entangling 
of psychological research and capitalism”25 that so enthusiastically hailed 
Matthieu Ricard to Davos. In Davies’s telling, business leaders, indeed even 
unwitting middle managers, have become latter- day Benthamites. The classic 
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for the greatest number of citizens, becomes, in the hands of these modern bosses, 
something like the most productive business is the one that procures the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of employees. Clearly, the classical Utilitarian 
ethical principle, a thing’s value is measured by its usefulness, remains valid. The 
value of wellness procedures like Matthieu Ricard’s mindful meditation is to be 
determined in the measured increase in employee productivity. More important 
for our purposes, this ethical principle renders perfectly rational the prominent 
if quirky presence of an aging French monk of an ancient Tibetan Buddhist 
order before a group of ultramodern if somewhat staid capitalists in the Swiss 
Alps. Simply put, Davos people are no longer fearful of insurgent hordes of 
workers violently seizing the means of production. Davos people are, however, 
terribly fearful of the diminishment of capital, of their capital. And of course 
Davos people are aware of the hit their capital incurs because of “employees who 
are regularly absent, unmotivated, or suffering from persistent, low- level mental 
health problems” as well as from apathy, stress, and anxiety.26 What is the cost 
of unhappy workers? According to a recent Gallup poll, a dissatisfied workforce 
“costs the US economy $500 billion a year in lost productivity, lost tax receipts 
and health- care costs.”27 While evidence from the field of social epidemiology 
points to the fact that Western business leaders and government officials created 
this problem of infectious employee malaise in the first place, evidence from 
Davos shows that these same agents are now trying to solve it. They created 
the problem by erecting a brutally competitive work environment staffed by a 
fundamentally insecure, unequal, underpaid, yet enthusiastically materialistic, 
populace. They are solving it by injecting the ideology of the happiness industry 
into the workplace.
The key message of that ideology is that workers’ unhappiness lies inside 
themselves. As Google’s Search Inside Yourself (SIY) program for corporate 
leaders puts it, fusing a classical Buddhist premise to a Nike slogan, “The 
mind is the root of all things” and “greatness comes from within.”28 Thus, SIY 
“bridg[es] age- old practices of mind training with modern neuroscience and 
technology, [to] help people in organizations bring out the best in themselves, 
from the inside out.”29 The goal of SIY’s inward- turning techniques, namely, 
“to grow in self- mastery,”30 is, of course, consistent with Western Buddhism’s. 
The contemporary twist in this “unexpected path to success and happiness”31 
is that it aims at worker productivity; the path is to be found specifically “at 
work,” and its sole destination is to meet work challenges “with more resilience, 
more engagement, and more happiness.”32 As one satisfied participant of an 
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overall noise in a high- speed environment and get things done without feeling 
too stressed about it.”33 The obvious beneficiaries of such an inward- oriented 
solution to productivity are people who have the most to gain from maintaining 
the social and economic status quo:  the super- wealthy together with their 
corporate lieutenants and political pawns. If people can be convinced that the 
way to ease and success at work lies within, that it requires that they only alter 
their perspective or attitude, that they, in the language of an influential Western 
Buddhist figure, cultivate non- judgmentalism, non- reactivity, and letting- go,34 
then there is obviously no compulsion to change the very material conditions 
that made necessary such a destressing practice in the first place. Search inside 
yourself, worker, but certainly not into the nature and conditions of your work, 
and certainly not into the backroom maneuverings and ulterior motives of 
the company. And by all means do not search into the farther- reaching social 
practices that produce the soul- crushing malaise that drives your longing to “let 
go” in the first place.
It is perhaps not surprising that the new spirit of Davos is now animating 
none other than Koch Industries and its multibillionaire owners, Charles and 
David Koch.35 The Koch brothers and their “Toxic Empire” are much maligned 
in the American press as “dark and plotting oilman [right- wing libertarian] 
ideologues” who, in coordination with a secret “small circle of ultra- wealthy 
conservatives,” are currently launching a plan to spend nearly nine hundred 
million dollars on political campaigns and special interest advocacy.36 Desiring 
to change their public image as American Svengalis, the brothers are now 
engaged in a carefully calibrated project of rebranding. The “grand strategist” 
in charge of this plan is the Koch brothers’ long- time political advisor and 
a New  York University economics Ph.D. named Richard Fink. In a leaked 
audio recording of a closed meeting of wealthy donors, Fink laid out the 
basic problem facing Koch Industries. It is, namely, that the company’s own 
research shows that Koch Industries advocates for precisely the opposite 
of what most Americans desire for their country. For instance, Americans 
want a clean environment, health care across class and economic lines, and 
opportunity not only for themselves but for those who have been historically 
disadvantaged. The Koch brothers “and their network,” on the other hand, 
“opposed environmental regulation and government action on global warming, 
and supported privatizing Social Security and health care.”37 Fink knew that 
his solution would “sound a little strange” to the antiregulation free- market 
devotees before him. “So,” he implored them, “you’ll have to bear with me.” 
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hyper- capitalist ideology “as an apolitical and altruistic reform movement to 
enhance the quality of life”— as, to be precise, “a movement for well- being.” The 
network has to convince Americans that the invisible hand of the free market 
“forged paths to happiness, whereas big government led to tyranny, Fascism, 
and even Nazism.” As one previously anti- Koch liberal political scientist put 
it to his eventual Koch organization donors (and rationalized it to himself?), 
“Who can be against well- being?” A speaker at a recent summit at the Koch’s 
“Inaugural Well- Being Forum” was a bit more expansive. Speaking next to a 
sign that blared “H- A- P- P- I- N- E- S- S,” he argued, “The earned- success system 
that brings you happiness is the system of free enterprise that lifts people out of 
poverty.” There should have been another sign reading: “Not The Onion.”
The point here, of course, is that Western Buddhist teachers, wittingly or not, 
have positioned their practices and doctrines to be used as strategic elements 
in a corporate- driven social vision that is demonstrably harmful mentally, 
physically, and financially to many people, and environmentally to us all. It is a 
vision that addresses the unhappiness of workers in a way that keeps intact the 
very business models, corporate structures, and economic systems that create 
the class divisions, income inequality, and opportunity imbalance that, in large 
part, drive that unhappiness to begin with. Western Buddhism, however, also 
replicates the schizoid character of this business logic. It does so by offering 
a cure along with the disease. Slavoj Žižek has argued, for instance, that the 
problem with Western Buddhism and its meditation practices is not that it is 
some kind of bogus capitalist con. The problem is not, in other words, that it 
does not really work. The problem is that it does work, and indeed that it works 
in the precise manner that it claims. In presenting us with a “remedy against the 
stressful tension of capitalist dynamics,” and “allowing us to uncouple and retain 
inner peace and Gelassenheit” (letting be, composure), Žižek argues, Western 
Buddhism “actually functions as its perfect ideological supplement.”38 Matthieu 
Ricard’s meditation instructions at Davos— just learn to gaze at your passing 
thoughts “like a shepherd sitting above a meadow watching his sheep go by”— 
encapsulates Žižek’s larger point that Western Buddhist doctrines, coupled with 
practices such as mindfulness and meditation, truly do enable the practitioner to:
“let oneself go,” drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference 
toward the mad dance of accelerated process, a distance based on the insight 
that all this social and technological upheaval is ultimately just a non- substantial 
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In an idiom even more conventionally Buddhist than Ricard’s, Žižek’s 
comment might sound like this: “All dualities come from ignorant inference/ 
They are like dreams, phantoms, hallucinations— / it is foolish to try to grasp 
them.”40 We might ask, of course, why we should desire to live thus distanced 
from the very stuff that makes up our lives, as in a kind of spiritualized state 
of pathological dissociation. In any case, ameliorating this hallucinated 
condition and offering strategies for soothing the tensions of daily life is one 
of the current big- ticket promises that keep the Western Buddhist factory 
humming. And as Žižek says, who can dispute the fact that it fulfills this 
promise?
Implicit in this promise, however, is another, more insidious one. When 
Žižek argues that Western Buddhism is the “perfect ideological supplement” 
to rabid consumerist capitalism, he is implicitly suggesting that learning to “let 
go” is not the result of a mere practice or technique. It is the imperative of an 
ideology, and thus the result of becoming a particular kind of subject (more 
about this point in the following section). Žižek links Western Buddhism’s 
strategy of unbinding to its ideological complicity in the very capitalist 
dynamics from which it seeks to unbind. It does so by serving as a fetish, as 
an object that effectively holds some “unbearable truth” at bay. For Žižek, the 
term “Western Buddhist” names a subject who preserves that fetish in his or 
her effort to remain blissfully “unaware that the ‘truth’ of his existence is in 
fact the social involvement which he tends to dismiss as a mere game.” Again, 
this stance is not intended to deny the effectiveness of Western Buddhist 
tactics for survival in a trying world. On the contrary, as Žižek puts it, “The 
‘Western Buddhist’ meditative stance is arguably the most efficient way for us 
to fully participate in capitalist dynamics while retaining the appearance of 
mental sanity.”41 Davos people, the Koch brothers, Matthieu Ricard, and an 
ever- growing host of Western Buddhist teachers and practitioners would no 
doubt agree.
A critique of Western Buddhism that followed the path of wellbeing 
would discover sprawling vistas of corporate collusion along the way. Such a 
critique, for instance, would reveal the often symbiotic historical relationship 
between Western Buddhism and big pharma’s medicalization of sadness, 
positive psychology’s hyper- affirmationism, and even the military’s embrace 
of emotion (and trigger finger) steadying mindfulness practices. But, again, 
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Neoliberal subjects are us, wise, and well
The final dimension of Wisdom that I would like to explore in this chapter is that 
of subjectivity. Like the previous two sections, this exploration also represents a 
potentially rich path of critique not taken in this book, and helps clear the way 
for the more considerable critique that I wish to offer.
Whatever else they may be, the raw materials with which contemporary 
Western Buddhist figures work are ancient teachings that were forged in 
conscious retreat from commerce and otherworldly toil. So, why would these 
figures frame those teachings in a manner that is so attractive to corporate and 
financial moguls such as the “Davos people”? I might be forgiven for suspecting 
that some of these teachers are simply savvy opportunists who spy an opening 
in the marketplace of spiritualized wellbeing, and just go for it. It takes a rare 
person indeed to resist the lucrative lure of the American military– industrial 
complex or the God- like reach of Google.43 I would wager, however, that most 
Western Buddhist teachers by far are unaware that they are engaged in doctrinal 
alteration, much less alteration influenced by the capitalist shell game. I take as 
evidence the casual ease with which they transmute their ancient ascetic materials 
into instructions for full- on engagement in the modern age. We can look 
further at an example already touched on. The foundational Buddhist concept 
of “dependent origination” (pratītyasamutpāda) signified the claustrophobic, 
imprisoning, freedom- crushing mechanism of phenomenal interconnectivity. 
Such interconnectedness was considered to be “a binding chain, a web of 
entanglement.” Somehow, our Western Buddhist teachers have transmuted this 
dark feature of reality into a bright, wide open “world- affirming wonder,” a joyous 
“celebration of this interwoven world, of intimacy and oneness with the great, 
interconnected living fabric of life.”44 I can find little evidence that contemporary 
Western Buddhist teachers are even dimly aware of their performing such 
convoluted feats of conceptual gymnastics. They seem to assume reflexively the 
self- evident naturalness of their contemporary understanding. This example of 
dependent origination is but one small instance of the wholesale repurposing 
of Buddhism for contemporary usage. It is, of course, a repurposing that points 
to the workings of an ideology, rather than to the faithful transmission of “the 
dharma” for our age, as is typically claimed. It is crucial to keep in mind that 
my concern here or anywhere else in this book is not to rectify the errors of 
the present in relation to the Buddhism’s pristine past. The interesting question 
for this critique is not “what was the original meaning,” but rather, “why now 
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teacher desire to create a “secular re- formation” of traditional Buddhism? What 
lies behind such a desire? A  clue might be found in that particular teacher’s 
proposition “that instead of thinking of awakening in terms of ‘truths’ to be 
understood one thinks of it in terms of ‘tasks’ to be accomplished.” It does not 
take a Max Weber to suspect that the invisible spirit of the capitalist taskmaster 
might be lurking behind this shift from “the belief- based metaphysics of classical 
Indian soteriology (Buddhism 1.0) to a praxis- based, post- metaphysical vision 
of the dharma (Buddhism 2.0).”45 It is a shift that, in its apparent naturalness, 
normalizes the arguably buddhistically counterproductive motto of Google’s 
SIY leadership program: “We Put Mindfulness to Work.”46 Why are we seeing, in 
Western Buddhism, this shift from a metaphor of healing to a metaphor of labor?
One way to get at an answer to that question is to ask: what kind of subjectivity 
are we dealing with when we deal with contemporary Western Buddhists? That 
is, what conditions have given shape to the people who in turn give shape to 
Western Buddhism? It should be obvious that the conditions are not, and could 
not be, creations of fifth century B.C.E. India. That fact should be obvious, but 
it is often obscured by the pervasive rhetoric of Buddhist figures as transmitters 
of “the eternal and timeless dharma.”47 In any case, giving thought to that matter 
goes a long way toward explaining why Western Buddhist figures fashion ancient 
and medieval Buddhist teachings in the particular manner that they do.
“Subjectivity,” of course, refers to the fact that human beings are formed 
“before the law,” as in Franz Kafka’s parable of that title. To shed light on 
subjectivity, we have to understand the term “before” in a spatial sense here. 
If we take it in a temporal sense, then we will have the opposite meaning of 
“selfhood.” The distinction is worth exploring not only for my immediate 
purpose of saying what I mean by “subjectivity,” but also because it points to a 
central theme in Western Buddhism, namely, that of anātman, or non- selfhood. 
My contention, however, is that while anātman points firmly in one direction 
(toward subjectivity) Western Buddhist teachers repurpose it to point in the 
opposite direction (toward selfhood).48
In Kafka’s story, a man from the country has made his way to a gatekeeper 
who stands guard at the entrance to “the law.” The man asks to be granted entry 
“into the law.” The gatekeeper informs him that that is indeed a possibility, 
“but not now.” The fact is, the gate to the law is already open; it is always open, 
so the man tries to look past the gatekeeper directly into the law itself. The 
gatekeeper is amused at this effort, and invites the man to continue trying. “But 
take note,” he warns, “I am powerful. And I am only the most lowly of all of 
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will encounter increasingly powerful gatekeepers from hall to hall. The narrator 
informs us that “the man from the country did not expect such difficulties; after 
all, the law should be accessible to everyone at all times, he thinks.” Realizing 
the impossibility of forcing entry into the law, the man eventually takes the seat 
offered by the gatekeeper. For years and years he waits for permission to enter. 
Permission never comes. The man grows old. Just before he dies, waiting, still, 
before the law, the gatekeeper closes the gate.49
The man from the country is an effect of outward conditions, in this case, 
of the law and of the law’s guardian. He willfully accepts the call of the law, 
and, in responding as he does, establishes his identity as a subject of the law. 
Kafka’s parable implicitly abjures any function of a “self,” of, that is, an entity that 
comes before the law in the temporal sense. The man from the country is not a 
prefigured agent causing his circumstances; he is not the driving force behind 
the mysterious causal matrix that has led him to stand now before the law. He 
is, rather, the lived effect of that matrix. He is driven by his voluntary, though 
largely unconscious, responsiveness to the norms, values, and demands of his 
social situation. He is recruited as a subject by the call of those demands. And he 
is established as a subject— subjugated— in his response to those demands. This 
is, of course, precisely the lesson of Althusser’s classic example of subjugation, 
which also speaks of a man before the law. Althusser’s parable unfolds in the 
street. What takes place is an explicit “interpellation” by “the most commonplace 
everyday policeman (or other) hailing, ‘Hey, you there!’ ” The individual 
reflexively turns around and, “by this mere one- hundred- eighty- degree physical 
conversion, he becomes a subject.”50
A crucial feature of these two parables is that the protagonists, that is to 
say we, self- interpellate before the law. We go about our business day to day 
as seemingly free and unique individuals. We do so until we find ourselves 
face to face with the law— with the codes, mores, unspoken rules and explicit 
laws of our society. It is then, in our seemingly natural, unrehearsed, response 
to those codes that we recognize ourselves (and are recognized by others) as 
subjects of a particular social formation. In its concept of anātman, Western 
Buddhism offers us material for a similar analysis of the human subject. That 
concept, too, rejects the necessity of an integral agent to account for actions 
in the world. It, too, suggests that the person is formed by external material 
forces to be the kind of person that he or she is, to be, that is to say, a particular 
subject. The primary force of subject formation is, of course, ideology. This is 
what Althusser means when he claims that “ideology has a material existence” 
because it “always exists in an apparatus, and its [the apparatus’s] practice, 
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or practices.”51 The question in this section is:  what might that apparatus 
and practice be for us today? It is a relevant question to this critique since 
the answer sheds light on certain features of Western Buddhism— such as 
I have been discussing in this chapter and in the introduction— that would be 
otherwise inexplicable.
As we saw above, Žižek characterizes the Western Buddhist as a person who 
is “unaware that the ‘truth’ of his existence is in fact the social involvement 
which he tends to dismiss as a mere game.” Practitioners see their engagement 
in the social sphere as a “mere game,” recall, because Western Buddhist teachers 
have constructed a subject who, through mindfulness or meditation, eventually 
wins the insight that reality, whether conceived as resplendent display or as 
catastrophe, is “ultimately just a non- substantial proliferation of semblances 
that do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being.” It is this insight 
that enables the practitioner “to fully participate in capitalist dynamics while 
retaining the appearance of mental sanity.” This manner of participation and 
this façade, however, come with a consequential price, namely, a repressed 
or deluded disavowal that in truth the practitioner is fully and inextricably 
embedded in, formed by, and perpetuated by the very social dynamics for which 
Western Buddhism aims to serve as a revolutionary antidote. Žižek is claiming, 
in other words, that there is no circumvention of social coding. Like Kafka’s man 
from the country, we are compelled by the law to stand before the law, waiting 
in vain for the final liberating insight into the law. We discover instead that there 
is and never was an outside to the law. To stand thus before the law is to stand 
already within the law’s domain of authority. Lacking a genuine way around this 
predicament, or, in Buddhist parlance, lacking a refuge, there are only strategies 
of social engagement. As Freud already taught us, repression and disavowal are 
two common strategies of such engagement. As the Buddha taught us, delusion 
is another common one. Žižek sees the Western Buddhist as someone who is 
in possession of one super- strategy combining all of these forms: meditation. 
Meditation provides a virtual digression around the predicament of being 
embroiled in our hyper- accelerated techno- corporatist world against one’s ideals 
and desires. Importantly, Žižek generously allows that the Western Buddhist 
strategy “definitely works better than the desperate escape into old traditions.” 
But, “works” has a Pyrrhic quality here.
Although “Western Buddhism” presents itself as the remedy against the stressful 
tension of capitalist dynamics, allowing us to uncouple and retain inner peace 
and Gelassenheit, it actually functions as its perfect ideological supplement . . . 
Instead of trying to cope with the accelerating rhythm of technological progress 
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and social changes, one should rather renounce the very endeavor to retain 
control over what goes on, rejecting it as the expression of the modern logic of 
domination.52
Or, in the words of a contemporary Western Buddhist teacher, “When we reach 
out to what is unknown to us, we let go of the notion that we can control what 
we experience.”53
Why does Žižek consider this meditative strategy of relinquishing control to 
“unknown” external forces while pursuing an inner remedy of “Gelassenheit” 
to be the “perfect ideological supplement” to contemporary capitalism? 
He considers it so, I  think, because it involves a type of reasoning, or, as he 
says, “logic,” that aligns it precisely and unerringly to the dominant form of 
subjectivity in our time, that of neoliberalism. This collusion between the 
ideology of neoliberalism and Western Buddhism is not a mere theoretical 
conjecture. Perhaps more accurately, it may indeed be but a spirited conjecture 
for Žižek, but when Matthieu Ricard gives mindfulness instructions to the 
behemoths of world finance at Davos, it is spirit come to flesh. (The World 
Economic Forum at Davos, recall, arose out of the same conditions that would 
eventually usher in full- fledged neoliberalism under Reagan and Thatcher.) 
Born from this union is a quite particular type of neoliberal subject. It is a 
subject who is able to function, and function well, within the dream- like 
frenzy of modernity. How? In one popular version, he does so by perpetually 
self- calming before voluntarily releasing himself back into the frenzy, and 
by ostensibly remaining in this nonreactive condition throughout the day. 
There are numerous other Western Buddhist strategies. They all involve 
either a psychological (radical acceptance, letting go, non- judgmentalism) 
or affective (loving kindness, compassion, deep empathy) adjustment on 
the side of the subject. We should not be surprised that it is a subject whose 
actualization warms the hearts of the Davos people. For, their Big Question 
for the twenty- first century is, after all, “what if contemplative practices can be 
made beneficial both to people’s careers and to business bottom lines?”54 And 
for that reason alone, you would think that the more politically astute among 
Western Buddhist figures would want to further investigate the consequences 
of this collusion.
“Neoliberalism,” of course, is typically understood as designating a theory 
and practice of political economy. It is a strange, often confusing, term in that, 
as Noam Chomsky famously observed, it names something that is neither new 
nor liberal. Neoliberalism has its roots, of course, in classical nineteenth- century 
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argued that trade markets are governed by an “invisible hand” that knows better 
than any actual, socially situated human agent what is good for the whole.
Every individual . . . is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part 
of. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.55
Similar to the Western Buddhist teacher I  cited above, Smith dismisses our 
conceit that we are capable of controlling experiences or outcomes in the face 
of such an unknowable force: “I have never known much good done by those 
who affected to trade for the publick good.” In both cases, it is thus advisable to 
leave that force largely free of interference. For the Western Buddhist in Žižek’s 
example, this is accomplished through “letting go.” Our Western Buddhist 
teacher is more explicit: “We leave behind the conceptual mind and the mind of 
emotional reactions. And we may end up exactly where we wanted to be: face- to- 
face with what is beyond ordinary understanding.”56 For Smith, too, the trader’s 
conscious intention is impotent in the face of the invisible hand. If he would but 
stop thinking (as a trader with self- interest, with the conceit of intentionality, 
etc.) and just let the market forces be, he will come face- to- face with that which 
is beyond his ordinary understanding: the invisible hand’s mysterious movement 
toward wholly unintended social good.
The spirit of this laissez faire dogma will eventually be revived by the 
predecessors of today’s Davos people. In the intervening years, liberalism 
developed into several distinct traditions. The tradition that most readers 
are familiar with is the social liberal variety. Social liberalism shares with 
neoliberalism an appreciation for a market economy. It differs, however, in 
denying the invisible hand premise. Where neoliberalism is focused on the 
growth and expansion of markets, social liberalism is attuned to the conditions 
that impede personal liberty. It holds, moreover, that these conditions are 
exacerbated or even caused by an excess of unchecked market capitalism. Such 
conditions include many of the issues that we hear from those groups that we 
generally associate with the term “liberal” today, such as poverty and low wages, 
lack of access to quality education and health care, institutionalized racism and 
discrimination, and various forms of inequality. The social liberal solution to 
such ills is precisely the opposite of the neoliberal dream of unregulated market 
capitalism; it is, namely, state intervention. Most readers, for instance, will 
associate the many social service and public funding programs of contemporary 
Europe and North America with liberalism.
 
 
40 A Critique of Western Buddhism
Significantly, however, social service remedies and the like are now considered 
the province of progressives and leftists. One long- term consequence of the 
economic stagnation of the 1970s was an inexorable shift toward so- called 
pragmatism of the once genuinely liberal Democratic party in the United 
States. Under Tony Blair, even the British Labour party officially reneged on its 
commitment to “common ownership of the means of production.”57 It may be 
true that “neoliberalism has been discredited as the global economy built on 
its principles has been shaken to its core” by the financial meltdown of 2007.58 
Nonetheless, neoliberal “reasoning” has exerted a ubiquitous totalizing effect on 
the lives of everyone reading this book, not exempting, of course, those who 
fashion and consume Western Buddhism today. And with this I  come to my 
main point. In a crucial sense that is rarely if ever addressed, Western Buddhists 
stand before the law of neoliberal subjectivity believing it to be the law of “the 
dharma”— of timeless Buddhist teachings. Or, stated slightly differently, they 
stand before a dharmic law that has been mercilessly contorted by its neoliberal 
master, operating from the shadows. I want to stress yet again that it has never 
not been the case that Buddhism is refracted through the ideological prisms of 
its time and place. My point is that, for us today, the refracting master prism is 
neoliberalism.
Several recent studies even make an explicit connection between neoliberal 
governmentality and contemporary self- development discourse.59 Western 
Buddhism is, of course, just such a discourse. These works are particularly 
relevant for our purposes in this section because they extend the scope of the 
neoliberal matrix beyond that of politics and economics to include human 
subject formation. Since these works typically draw from Michel Foucault’s 
foundational lectures at the Collège de France in the 1970s and early 1980s, it 
is useful to quote him at length at the outset.60 In short, Foucault argues that 
the very notion of governmentality, of controlling people, presupposes an all- 
encompassing homology between “techniques of domination”— for instance, 
the apparatus of state and the economic market— and “techniques of the self,” 
including subjectivity.61 To be an effective medium of control, there must be a 
single rationale or logic determining the convergence of these techniques. This 
form of reasoning, moreover, must be embodied by the subjects being controlled 
such that the forms of domination are voluntarily enacted in their lives (hence, 
Foucault’s terms “biopolitics” and “biopower”).
I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western 
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but also techniques of the self. Let’s say:  he has to take into account the 
interaction between those two types of techniques— techniques of domination 
and techniques of the self. He has to take into account the points where the 
technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to 
processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to 
take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into 
structures of coercion and domination. The contact point, where the individuals 
are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we 
can call, I think, government. Governing people, in the broad meaning of the 
word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor 
wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts 
between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self 
is constructed or modified by himself.62
Neoliberalism’s ability to function as a global enterprise cannot be separated from 
the manner in which we conceive of ourselves today. What do we believe our 
capacities as human agents to be? Do we feel capable of effectively influencing 
the political sphere? Do we even feel capable of carrying out meaningful 
dialogues for change in the more immediate public sphere? A common lament 
on the left today is that Margaret Thatcher’s TINA— “there is no alternative”— 
has decisively won the day.63 Not only does there appear to be no alternative 
to a market economy, there also appears to be no alternative to conceiving of 
ourselves as a “resilient, humble, and disempowered being that lives a life of 
permanent ignorance and insecurity” as a result of that Golem- like economy:
The account of the world envisioned and constituted by neoliberalism is one that 
presupposes the unknowability of the world, and likewise one that interpellates 
a subject that is permanently called upon to live in accordance with this 
unknowability.64
What about Western Buddhism? Does it enable its practitioners somehow to 
counter this subjectivity? It would be too easy to collect Western Buddhist 
material that, in fact, not only countenances this useless, powerless, and ignorant 
neoliberal subject, but even recommends these qualities. Take these recent 
“Daily Dharma” entries from Tricycle, a popular Western Buddhist magazine:
The Zen I know . . . blissfully blows away dangerous moments of intelligence and 
understanding. (Thomas Moore)
I had thought the point was to pursue happiness and flee misery . . . But now 
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In the very act of sitting, we actualize the completeness of the act itself and 
we actualize our own full completeness as a useless human being, another name 
for which is Buddha. (Barry Magid)65
Contemporary Western Buddhist discourse is, of course, bound to a tradition 
that, sensing the futility of trying to control or find security in an inflamed 
world, opted for a quasi- ascetic retreat from that world. For some Buddhists, 
that retreat was, and is, literal. For many, however, it also was, and is, figurative 
or virtual, involving precisely the mental retreat that Žižek describes. Perhaps 
the popularity of Buddhism in the West from the 1960s onward can be ascribed 
in part to the shared sense of deluge that our world has with the various worlds 
that gave shape to classical and later Buddhism. Now, as then, the solution that 
Buddhism offers us drowning creatures is a retreat into the mind’s refuge. The 
ancient version went something like:  It is not possible/ To control all external 
events/ But, if I  simply control my mind/ What need is there to control other 
things? Modern versions are inevitably along the lines of:  When we cultivate 
an equanimous mind, even the most extreme external circumstances do not 
hold sway.66 The most crucial of all neoliberal operations is in play here, namely, 
the emphasis on what Foucault calls “technologies of self.” Western Buddhist 
figures, like their neoliberal masters, agree that change for the better can and 
must occur. So, we might ask, do they recommend far- reaching reformation 
of our social institutions? Do they propose direct action against patriarchy, 
racism, inequality, and predatory capitalism? Rarely. Both Western Buddhism 
and neoliberalism typically propose that we change ourselves. Ultimately, this 
reasoning goes, the world is simply as it is; that being the case, the crucial issue 
becomes the manner in which each of us governs himself or herself within that 
world. Such self- development reasoning thus “instills stronger individualism in 
society, while constraining collective identity” by invoking personal rather than 
social culpability, “and thus provides social control and contributes to preserving 
the status quo of neoliberal societies.”67 Western Buddhist teachers typically 
express the same idea along the lines of: “This is the key point. You must have 
your own body and mind. Everything should exist in the right place, in the right 
way . . . When we have our body and mind in order, everything else will exist in 
the right place, in the right way.”68 Western Buddhism and neoliberalism agree, 
furthermore, that the surest means to such “stronger individualism”/ “having 
our body and mind in order” is a strategy of self- development. Whether self- 
development is conceived in general terms, such as improving self- esteem, 
practicing self- care, increasing personal responsibility for life’s outcomes, or 
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of meditation or mindfulness, the reasoning is the same. This reasoning holds, in 
brief, that the only domain of effective change available to our influence is “the 
inner life”; hence, it is there that we must direct our efforts.69
[In neoliberal societies] the area of the individual’s transformative activity is 
essentially reduced to a disciplining of the inner self . . . The psychic inner life of 
the subject, and the social milieus through which it is seen to be constructed and 
influenced, become the sphere of transformation in order to develop the faculties 
of resilience and adaptive efficiency held to be necessary to respond to external 
environments more securely. In this way, neoliberal frameworks reduce the 
cognitive and psychic life to a domain of insecurity. In effect, human subjectivity 
itself, the ideational, cognitive, and practical contexts of its reproduction and 
the psychic life of the subject especially, become problematized as dangerous.70
A critique of Western Buddhism that attempted to trace its complicity with 
current neoliberal reasoning would find an abundance of corroborating 
evidence. Standing on its own— as the quoted material in this section hints at— 
this evidence likely sounds like the universal Wisdom that it is intended to be. 
Juxtaposed to neoliberal ideology, however, a facet of Wisdom is drawn out that 
is most surely at odds with the intentions of the dispensers of that Wisdom. Yet, 
given the influence of neoliberalism on Western Buddhism’s current formation, 
this result should not be surprising to anyone.
As intriguing as detailed investigations of Western Buddhist Wisdom, 
wellbeing, and subjectivity may be, I think that these approaches always fall short 
of constituting a decisive critique. I do find it necessary to mention these features 
because they comprise a significant area of the current “environment” of Western 
Buddhism that I evoked in the Introduction. Ultimately, I am asserting that it 
is its vexed relationship to the “Real” that makes possible the correspondence 
between Western Buddhism and contemporary self- development discourse or, 
more broadly, between Buddhism and “Wisdom,” in the minds of present- day 







The most consequential reason for establishing that Western Buddhism contains 
concepts of the Real is that it permits us to consider Western Buddhism as a viable 
form of thought. That is to say, doing so eliminates the need to take account of 
the arguably facile self- help, Wisdom- oriented character that has come to define 
Western Buddhist ideas and practices under neoliberalism in contemporary 
popular culture. Simultaneously, it positions Western Buddhism as a contributor 
to a human concern— namely, the identification of an ultimate determinant of 
human existence— that has persisted from the very dawn of Western thought 
in ancient Greece to the present. So positioned, we can fruitfully ask whether 
Western Buddhism offers us material for giving thought to our contemporary 
situation. Specifically, we can ask whether Western Buddhism, true to its rhetoric, 
does indeed offer potent resources for imagining radical reformations of self 
and society in the contemporary West.1 Human liberation (mokṣa, nirvāṇa)— 
whatever that means— is, after all, Buddhism’s very reason for being. And yet, 
whatever positive qualities we might want to claim for it, there is a strong case 
to be made that the noun “Buddhism” indexes a historical failure to unleash 
the force of demanding thought, much less of emancipatory thought. Currently, 
“Buddhism,” from its superstitious metaphysical traditionalism to its myopic 
self- help modernism, names an obstinate containment of potentially vital human 
goods. I  am making a generous assessment of potential here, derived as that 
assessment is from Western Buddhism’s own self- understanding. Considering 
whether or not the claim has merit beyond New Age platitudes and spiritualized 
relaxation exercises is a goal of this critique. And for that, I believe, we need an 
investigation into the Buddhist Real.
There are, however, difficulties with this approach. Not least of all is the fact 




46 A Critique of Western Buddhism
Western Buddhism is obviously haunted by the threat of something like a Real 
lodged in its teachings. It is a specter that, from all evidence, repulses Western 
Buddhists to the very extent that it animates their creation, Western Buddhism. 
In order to explore this contention further, we can take Terry Eagleton’s gloss as 
but one, and preliminary at that, working definition of the Real:
The Real is . . . the pure meta- sign or empty element in any semiotic system whose 
function is to indicate the truth that it cannot be totalised. From one perspective, 
this cipher is the human subject itself, the void at the heart of the symbolic order. 
This void is the precondition for the order’s effective functioning, but can never 
fully be represented there.2
This definition will have to be supplemented later on. It will be of help here, 
however, because it captures a basic function of what I  argue are Western 
Buddhist “first names,” as Laruelle calls them, for the Real.3 I mentioned these 
terms at the beginning of Chapter 1: no- self, suffering and desire, contingency, 
and so on. These terms could hardly express more directly the importance of the 
empty element for Western Buddhist thought. Indeed, śūnyatā, which literally 
denotes zeroness or nihility, is a major Buddhist signifier, one that resounds like 
heavy metal thunder rolling through the peaks and valleys of Buddhist doctrinal 
history. Yet, true to its function as a pure meta- sign, in Buddhist exegeses śūnyatā 
never means quite what it means. Sometimes it means something obscurely 
mystical, like tathāgatagarbha, the “Buddha embryo” embedded in all sentient 
beings. Sometimes it means something that is, one would think, self- evident, 
like svabhāva, the lack of an atomistic “own being,” of, that is, intrinsic nature 
or essence of entities. Sometimes it means something painfully obvious, like 
pratītyasamutpāda, the interdependence of phenomena. Sometimes, it is the 
main attraction of a naïve phenomenology, “a mode of perception” that “adds 
nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental 
events,” as one prominent Western Buddhist figure puts it.4 We could go on and 
on. The reason that we could go on and on is precisely that we are dealing with 
a cipher, one that, qua cipher, enables the production of numerous “emptiness” 
postulates while simultaneously preventing the full consequences of actual or 
generic emptiness for the system of postulates itself. More will be said about 
this point in Chapter 3. Here, we can, finally, note that the Western Buddhist 
“emptiness” signifier extends, as in Eagleton’s gloss, to “the human subject itself.”
It is said that the world is empty, the world is empty, Lord. In what respect is it 
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self or of anything pertaining to a self. Thus it is said, Ānanda, that the world is 
empty.5
What clearer account of the self as a cipher, as a void at the heart of the world, can 
we get? As a first name for the Real, as Eagleton reminds us, “emptiness” also points 
to the potentially devastating conclusion that the “semiotic system” that constitutes 
Buddhism contains a conceptual black hole. Buddhism presents us with a (w)hole. 
The totalizing network of meaning that Buddhism claims for itself contains the 
very element that cancels out that totality. Indeed, not only does that element cancel 
out totality, it announces the cancellation. The Buddha’s pronouncement about the 
emptiness of the world is intended, of course, as an assertive truth statement. In 
what sense would it not then also point to a truth about the humanly configured 
semiotic system called “Buddhism” itself? “Emptiness” is thus simultaneously a 
Buddhist master signifier and a Buddhist name for the Real. As a master signifier, 
it gathers into itself numerous other Buddhist signifiers in order to announce an 
ultimate truth about our human situation. As a name for the Real, it announces 
the incompleteness of its Buddhist signification, and thereby signals an even more 
pertinent and penetrating human truth.
What does Western Buddhism do with such an account? When I said above 
that the concept of emptiness points to a potentially devastating conclusion, 
I meant that it is devastating to the integrity of the system itself. But I also mean 
to suggest that it is devastating to the subject of Western Buddhism, to the 
implied believer inscribed within the system and to the empirical person who 
subscribes to such an integral system. Responses to this potentiality, of course, 
extend over the entire span of Western Buddhism, from the secular left, with 
its roots in humanistic psychology and globalism, to the traditional right, with 
its roots in canonical scripture and nationalistic affiliations. So it should not be 
surprising that their responses can be jointly summarized by a figure who was at 
home in both of these worlds:
Emptiness . . . is not a nihilistic emptiness but rather a fullness of particular things 
and individual persons functioning in their full capacity and without mutual 
impediment. In Emptiness everything is realized as it is, in its total dynamic 
reality. This radical realism involves . . . the overcoming of an active nihilism.6
Emptiness, in short, gathers within it other signifiers, such as nirvāṇa, that 
point “beyond nihilism” to unqualified freedom and abundance. The trope of 
emptiness as fullness is as old as Buddhism itself.7 But my purpose here is, again, 




48 A Critique of Western Buddhism
give thought to the possibility that what we have here is— whatever else it might 
be— Buddhist repulsion toward the full articulation of its own self- intimated 
Real (at least in the sense that Eagleton gives the term above).
The roots of the intimated Real as well as the repulsion toward it run long and 
deep in Western Buddhism’s history. We catch our first glimpse of it at the very 
moment of Buddhism’s scriptural blossoming. In the Pali canon we find numerous 
references to what are held to be two “extreme views,” dubbed “eternalism” 
and “annihilationism.”8 The first view holds that entities persist interminably. 
The second view holds that entities eventually break up and dissolve. Western 
Buddhists will eventually apply these analytical terms to all entities, from 
subatomic particles to the universe itself. In the early texts, though, the subject 
under investigation is typically “the self ” or “a being.” We are told to avoid the 
view that the person or an essential aspect of the person (soul, consciousness, 
integral self, subtle body, etc.) persists in some form after death. But we are also 
told to avoid the opposite view, namely, that the person is completely nullified 
at death. Famously, the Buddha refuses to answer pointed questions concerning 
the actual postmortem status of beings, particularly of someone like himself, 
a tathāgata, one who has arrived at thusness/ the Real. He does so, we are told, 
because he finds such questions irrelevant to his goal of enabling dispassion, 
cessation, calming, and nirvāṇa. Presumably, the problem is that both positions 
presuppose the existence of a self- contained entity; and this is a premise that the 
Buddha is determined to disallow at all costs. What he wished to posit in the 
place of such an integral being was, of course, a kind of “non- self ” (anātman), 
a perpetually changing psycho- physical or mental- material process, a process, 
crucially, devoid of any inhering determinate structure or agent.
The Buddha’s self- described “middle way” here, his pointed avoidance of 
the two extremes of eternalism and annihilationism, obviously raises countless 
questions, even the simplest of which entangle us in a proverbial “thicket of 
views.” What, to take an easy example, could disembodied postmortem survival 
of a process, or of some minute element of a process, possibly mean in real terms? 
It is presumably no longer contained in a bodily vessel; so where in space would 
this process occur? Since it no longer makes sense to speak of faculties such 
as will, desire, and intention, and since it obtains in a cosmos devoid of God, 
who or what would direct it? In short, what kind of inventive science- fictional 
counterintuitive features of cosmic reality must we conjure up for it to appear 
plausible? And what is this “it” anyway? It could not be a material phenomenon 
or event since, according to Buddhist teachings, being so would subject it, as a 
compounded object, to ultimate cessation. Is “it” then immaterial? How can we 
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conceive of an immaterial no- thing that persists in time and space? Or is “it” an 
unconditioned something that exists “outside of time and space,” whatever that 
old trope of the mystics might mean? The linguistic and conceptual gymnastics 
required for this alleged middle way to be at all coherent seem endless. Maybe 
that is the point. Maybe in denying eternalism and annihilationism within his 
ancient Brahmanical context, the Buddha was refusing to play a certain ever- 
looping linguistic game, as Steven Collins has suggested.9 In this game, the very 
formation of the question traps the interlocutor into a suggestive form of answer 
that is already predetermined by the frame of the question (e.g., “yes or no: do 
you still beat your dog?”). Yet all games aside, assuming, as tradition would have 
us do, that something of great significance is at stake in denying both eternalism 
and annihilationism, it is a fair question: What, in real terms, is this “middle,” this 
third way, between existence and nonexistence? Anyone who tries to get a clear 
view on the question, much less a satisfactorily coherent answer, will, I would bet, 
reach the age- old conclusion of the doggedly clear- headed thinker: obscurum 
per obscurius, one obscure matter is being explained by an even more obscure 
matter. Yes, you will get the common stock of Buddhist ripostes: for instance, 
those that resemble the “tautological imbecility” of Wisdom, such as “If we 
are caught in the notion of being we will also be caught in the notion of non- 
being”10; those that refuse to participate in the economy of shared linguistic 
exchange, such as the Buddhist eschewal of the law of noncontradiction11; those 
that sing in perfect harmony with New Age pseudoscience, such as the ever- 
proliferating trite, spiritualized applications of quantum physics12; and those 
that are in equal proportion obscurantist and dogmatic, such as the insistence 
that the ontological status of an extinguished fire— an ancient Buddhist trope for 
nirvāṇa— “is indescribable, even in terms of existence or nonexistence, because 
words work only for things that have limits.”13
One thing is clear:  the protagonist of the Pali canon, the literary figure we 
call the Buddha, is made to show a great deal of anxiety in being accused of 
annihilationism.14 He protests too much, I  think. For instance:  “As I  am not, 
as I  do not proclaim, so have I  been baselessly, vainly, falsely, and wrongly 
misrepresented by some ascetics and Brahmins thus: ‘[the Buddha] is one who 
leads astray; he teaches the annihilation, the destruction, the extermination 
of an existing being.’ ”15 That a wrong has been done the Buddha is hardly as 
obvious as he makes it out to be. The accusation of these ascetics and Brahmins 
is really not surprising. After all, with perhaps a few exceptions, such as the 
ethical force of intentionality in the interplay of action and result (karma and 
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Indian thought was his battery of concepts which, I contend, indicate precisely 
a Real, whether as the specter of a void at the heart not only of reality or as a 
foreclosed a priori, as I will discuss later. Apart from the typical “eel- wriggling” 
of the kinds of responses above, it is difficult to see how the Buddha, armed with 
such a teaching, could have avoided the charge of annihilationism.16
My purpose is certainly not to sort all of this out. If the history of Buddhist 
exegesis is any indication, it cannot be sorted out. My point is that we are 
observing here a genetic inheritance of Western Buddhism. To evoke our 
earlier psychoanalytic metaphor: burrowed within the celebratory life- affirming 
discourse of contemporary Western Buddhism is the destabilizing presence 
of “the rhetorical unconscious.”17 Like Freud’s unconscious, this term can be 
understood to name an action rather than a place, as the topographical image 
might suggest. It names an act of repression or disavowal. What gets repressed 
is some articulation of meaning that, to the disinterested observer, appears as a 
viable, if not outright obvious, alternative to the officially articulated meaning. 
It is a sense that “withdraws from immediate promises of transparency or 
meaning.”18 An example would be that, along with the traditional Buddhist 
attributions of emptiness as ultimate plenitude, “emptiness” also must be allowed 
to mean, or at least be allowed to approach, emptiness per se, actual, generic, 
emptiness or nullity. Although disavowed, repressed significations nonetheless 
have real effects. We might, for instance, read in the labyrinthine maneuverings of 
Wisdom an active symptom of this repression. We might begin to see tradition’s 
anxious denials of anything approaching nihilism, put in the mouth of the calm, 
confident Buddha, as the same. We might even begin to suspect that the seeming 
innocence of contemporary Western Buddhism, an innocence that makes all- 
too- easy bedfellows of facile positive psychology, gullible New Age self- help, and 
optimistic American- style consumerism, masks a serious intimation of a less 
celebratory, if more vital, human truth. In this chapter, I hope to at least raise 
that suspicion. The question remains, though:  why would Western Buddhists 
eschew such a vital element of their tradition? What apparently unthinkable 
aspect of Western Buddhism is at risk such that this abandonment is deemed 
justified? The following section addresses this issue.
The principle of sufficient Buddhism
Western Buddhism presents an extravagant, seemingly endless, inventory of 
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Buddhisms it inherits intimate knowledge of the human being. The inventory 
of this inheritance includes such intricate and consequential matters as the 
machinic flows of mind, thought, and consciousness; the interior moral physics 
of mental, corporal, and verbal action; the rhizomatic movement of desire; 
the dark dissembling of self- delusion; the mirage- like being of the subject; the 
flammable bundled constituents of subjective experience; the bountiful void at 
the heart of phenomena; the quantum unspooling of space and time; and the 
accursed interdependence of all that is. Its modernist benefactors have added 
to this prodigious inheritance by bequeathing Western Buddhism expertise that 
encompasses the most prosaic of concerns, like love and relationships, work 
and career, exercise and health, nutrition and diet, even sleeping and dreaming. 
A reader of a contemporary book on Buddhism can but wonder:  is there any 
aspect of human existence that confounds Western Buddhism?
This is but a current version of a question that has vexed Buddhists from 
the earliest days. That question— is the Buddha omniscient?— was answered in a 
variety of ways. At one point the Buddha denies such a possibility outright: there 
exists no person “who knows all, who sees all, simultaneously; that is not possible.” 
At another point, in the well- known parable of the leaves, the Buddha is sitting 
in a forest grove thick with fallen leaves. He picks up a handful, rhetorically asks 
his gathered disciples which is more, the leaves in his hand or the leaves in the 
grove, and then draws a parallel: “the things I have directly known but have not 
taught you are numerous, while the things I have taught you are few.” What he 
has taught is that which is necessary for the path of liberation, that’s all. Given the 
magnitude and abundance of what he did teach, in the image of a forest blanketed 
with remaining leaves, this parable suggests that the Buddha is knowledgeable 
far beyond ordinary comprehension, if not quite omniscient. Finally, as if tired 
of the tedious hemming and hawing around the issue, Buddhists composed a 
text at the end of the early canonical period in which “the Buddha’s omniscience 
is extremely far ranging and includes knowledge of all conditioned and 
unconditioned things; knowledge of everything past, present, and future; and 
knowledge of everything that has been seen, heard, sensed or thought by gods 
or humans.” Sarah McClintock argues that the notion of “capacity omniscience” 
eventually gained acceptance in Buddhist circles. Here, the Buddha is capable 
of knowing whatever he wants to know simply by directing his attention to the 
matter or object at hand. The Buddha thus becomes “all- knowing” in the same 
way that a fire may be “all- consuming.”19 Even stronger versions of the Buddha’s 
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This fixation on totality is in Western Buddhism’s DNA. No form of 
Buddhism of which I am aware has ever claimed for itself a mere regional or 
limited knowledge, such as, say, culinary arts and evolutionary psychology do. 
Rather, Buddhisms claim for themselves a shared oracle- like apparatus with 
which to divine any feature of crucial human knowledge. This oracle is known as 
“the dharma.” I will come back to this term in more detail later. Here, it suffices 
to note that Western Buddhism, as inheritor of “the dharma,” is the guarantor 
of “capacity omniscience” in the absence of an actually existing all- knowing 
Buddha. Such capacity eliminates the requirement that all things be known 
simultaneously— that Western Buddhism represent a fully recorded catalogue 
of knowledge. The production of critical knowledge requires, rather, only 
that “the dharma” be directed toward the issue at hand. As with their ancient 
and medieval ancestors, contemporary Western Buddhists posit both a weak 
and a strong version of this capacity omniscience and its outcome. The weak 
version is that the knowledge produced has always to do with some aspect of 
“overcoming suffering.” The strong version is that “the dharma” is, in the words 
of two leading lights of contemporary Western Buddhism, a “translation of a 
universal understanding” and a “universal set of values” applicable to all things 
under the sun.21
We are encountering here the crux of the problem that this critique intends 
to address. In Chapter 1 I mentioned the premises driving my argument. It may 
be useful to repeat those here: like other nontrivial forms of thought, Western 
Buddhism contains materials that posit a concept of “the Real”; but the history 
of Western Buddhism, like that of Buddhism generally, is one of evading the 
consequences of its own thought (hence, the drift toward either quasi- magical 
ritualism or pseudo- scientific medicalism, to coin a term, in both the East and 
the West); to recover the autonomy of the Real is to recover the organon, the 
rigorously scientific instrument of thought, that certain Buddhist concepts 
entail; simultaneously, however, to do so depotentializes Western Buddhism as 
Western Buddhism, as that is, an integral and oracular network of postulates, 
and renders it instead a mere contributor to a democratized— plainly human— 
variety of thought. This depotentializing of Western Buddhism begins with a 
challenge to its sufficiency.
The first critical observation we make about Western Buddhism to this end 
is thus that it is “regulated in accordance with a principle higher than that of 
Reason.”22 Following François Laruelle’s investigation into philosophy’s identity, 
we call this regulatory function the principle of sufficient Buddhism. This principle 
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that all that is or occurs must have an explanation (the principle of sufficient 
reason), but because it determines the nature, function, and boundaries of 
what constitutes a reason, or even of “reason” per se. If reason, as it is ordinarily 
understood, had priority over Western Buddhism, then Western Buddhism 
would be a quite different species of practice than it is; it would be, for instance, 
more akin to something like a phenomenological science, a psychological theory, 
or a rigorous (thus nonsufficient) philosophy. As it is, the principle of sufficient 
Buddhism ensures Western Buddhism’s “absolute autonomy, its essence as self- 
positing/ donating/ naming/ deciding/ grounding, etc.”23 Among other things, this 
autonomy provides an explanation for Western Buddhism’s insistent trajectory 
toward Wisdom, even in the face of reasonable objections. For, the principle 
dictates that Western Buddhism, in every inquiry into or contestation of 
knowledge, intractably posit itself, its own premises, values, recommendations, 
conclusions, and so on. Such self- positing disqualifies Western Buddhism as the 
kind of “naturalism” and “empiricism” that its Buddhism- as- Science proponents 
so ardently claim for it.24 The principle, however, has even more scope and 
force than this perpetual, circular self- grounding. It establishes, namely, the 
primacy of Western Buddhism over all regional knowledges. That is, Western 
Buddhism can not only provide superior insight into the subject matter of non- 
Buddhist disciplines such as psychology or ethics, it commands knowledge of 
such disciplines overall. Indeed, Laruelle’s claim for the principle of sufficient 
philosophy is remarkably similar to the Buddhist proposition of capacity 
omniscience. Laruelle’s principle yields the theorem:  “Everything is virtually 
philosophizable.” He circumscribes this theorem, however, as follows:  “Not 
‘everything’ is philosophizable, but if one or some phenomena present themselves, 
they necessarily do so through and within philosophy.”25 Unlike merely regional 
forms of knowledge, various philosophies are “fundamental forms of knowing,” 
whose task is “to realize a more or less open encyclopedic form” of knowledge. 
The principle of sufficient Buddhism conforms to this description. It, too, yields 
the theorem that “everything is virtually buddhistizable,” to coin an ungainly but 
apt term. In other words, Buddhist knowledge can be uniformly applied to its 
field. Buddhism, that is, possesses postulates and concepts that may be applied 
to virtually any other domain of inquiry, thereby bringing that domain into 
Buddhism’s own field of vision. Twelve- step addiction recovery, for instance, 
is fully convertible into Buddhist practices and principles because the Buddha 
was “a radical psychologist and a spiritual revolutionary” who discovered that 
the very source of human suffering was “uncontrollable thirst or repetitive 
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interweaving of factors stemming from physiological, chemical, genetic, 
interpersonal, and social realities that stump our most highly skilled and well- 
funded researchers:  the ancient teachings of Buddhism provide a sufficient, 
indeed, superior, account of the matter. Such sufficiency should not surprise us 
since ultimately, of course, Buddhism’s overt “field” is the whole of reality itself; 
and its covert field is nothing less than the Real. It is this facet of command over 
regional disciplines that raises the suspicion that Western Buddhism, contrary 
to more rigorous modes of knowledge, labors under a principle of sufficiency.
I want to make one final point about the principle of sufficient Buddhism 
before considering the concept of the Real. Laruelle argues that the principle, 
as it applies to philosophy, “articulates the idealist pretension of philosophy as 
that which is able to at least co- determine that Real which is most radical.” As 
shrewdly adroit as philosophy is in projecting its idealist articulation of the Real 
as material or ontological fact, Western Buddhism is even more so. Whereas 
philosophies proudly proclaim their respective concepts of the Real, thereby 
opening themselves to interrogation, Western Buddhism’s Real is that which 
dare not speak its name— not, in any case, as Real. The investigator must thus 
patiently knead an extra layer of “pretension.” In any case, as I  have already 
indicated, the cost to Western Buddhism of maintaining this pretension of 
sufficiency is considerable. In Laruelle’s words27:
The counterpoise for this pretension, the price of this sufficiency, is the 
impossibility for [Western Buddhism] to constitute a rigorous, non- circular 
thinking of itself, one which would not beg the question, that is to say, a theory. 
[Western Buddhism] is self- reflection, self- consciousness; it thinks, or in the 
best of cases, feels that it thinks when it thinks; this is its cogito. [Western 
Buddhism] never goes beyond a widened cogito, an immanence limited to self- 
reflection or to self- affection. It is a practice of thought, or a feeling and an affect. 
[Western Buddhism] thereby manifests through this nothing more than its own 
existence and does not demonstrate that it is the Real to which it lays claim, nor 
that it knows itself as this pretension. Implicit in its existence is a transcendental 
hallucination of the Real, and in [buddhistic] ‘self- knowledge’, a transcendental 
illusion.28
A rigorous account of its Real might permit a conversion of Western Buddhist 
materials from those of an unacknowledged productive ideology of human 
existence into a theory of such production. This conversion will depend on 
whether or not that account can be uncoupled from the principle of sufficient 
Buddhism. As it is, Western Buddhism remains firmly regulated according to 
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this principle and is therefore unable to “think” beyond its own self- reflection. 
Laruelle’s claim that the principle ensures that we are dealing with “hallucinated” 
and “illusory” forms of knowledge will no doubt strike many readers as strange 
and excessive. We will revisit such claims throughout this text. Now, we turn 




First Names of the Buddhist Real
In this chapter, I present more specific examples of what I take to be a practice and 
style that is not only characteristic of Western Buddhism but is both definitive and 
constitutive of its very identity. A word of warning: I say “Western Buddhism,” 
but that term is, of course, a synecdoche for the many people, past and present, 
Asian, European, and North American, who inflect Buddhist teachings in the 
distinctive accent that we call “Western.” Occasionally reminding ourselves of the 
fact that we are dealing with the ideas of people will be of help in several regards. 
It enables us to see through the veneer of inevitability that overlays presentations 
of Western Buddhist teachings. After all, what hope for innovation is there for 
a teaching that is irreversibly “universal, eternal, and unchanging”?1 Being but 
the voicings of mere mortals, the signification of Western Buddhist concepts and 
practices is not inevitable; it can be, or can actively be made to be, something 
quite different from what it currently is. This fact throws wide open the door of 
possibility. It also explains, however, why a certain chaos of contestation reigns 
throughout the world of Buddhism. It reigns because, contrary to the claims of 
any given Buddhist community, the door has always been wide open. That is 
why we have “the bubbling and apparently amorphous dynamism of [Buddhist] 
proliferation.”2 I  will say more about this proliferation later, when I  discuss 
what I call “x- buddhism.” The point here is that the prolific nature of Buddhism 
renders any given instance of Buddhism suspect to all those who hold dear some 
other instance. I am reiterating the point I made in the Introduction about the 
common Western Buddhist strategy for deflecting criticism, namely, the appeal 
to exception. Perhaps that claim, made fresh to the reader’s mind, will serve as 
an antidote to the reflexive dismissal endemic to Western Buddhist engagement 
with criticism. Having said that, I provide examples from what I  take to be a 
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First names
Among the concepts that Western Buddhist figures routinely invoke as essential 
to the Buddha’s teachings, I  consider the following to be indicative of the 
Real: no- self (anātman); suffering- desire (dukkha- taṇhā); emptiness (śūnyatā); 
dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). The English terms, translated 
from the Pali or Sanskrit in parentheses, are commonplace renderings in 
Western Buddhist writing. I  will eventually offer different translations. These 
terms constitute what François Laruelle calls first terms or first names. In brief, 
Laruelle defines these as:
Fundamental terms which symbolize the Real and its modes according to its 
radical immanence or its identity. They are deprived of their philosophical sense 
and become, via axiomatized abstraction, the terms— axioms and theorems— of 
non- philosophy.3
This difficult statement contains not only a definition of “first name,” but essential 
elements of my critique as a whole. So, before proceeding, let me unpack it a bit.
I doubt that many Western Buddhists would contest the claim that emptiness 
(śūnyatā), in whatever version they may understand it, “remains at the heart 
of the Buddhist system.” As a teacher who bridges traditional Buddhism and 
Western Buddhism tells us, emptiness is not only “the most important subject of 
philosophical study for its soteriological, doctrinal, ontological and hermeneutic 
significance, but is also the pivotal topic of meditation.”4 What makes emptiness 
so important is that it is held to index (that is, to name or to point to) a feature of 
reality so fundamental to human existence, so determinate of human experience, 
that ignorance of it constitutes a debilitating delusion, one that causes us to violate 
our most essential interest. Because it eludes capture by speculative thought 
(philosophical, buddhistic, etc.) yet inexorably affects thought, we can— in a 
different register from Eagleton’s definition above— call this feature “the Real,” 
and describe it as being “radically immanent” to that experience. It is this brute, 
unadorned approximation of the term “emptiness” to the instance or principle 
that it indexes that marks it as a “first name” of the Real. The crucial question for 
us is whether the Western Buddhist first term remains content to serve as such a 
symbol of the Real, or whether it instead attempts to determine the constitution of 
the Real. To enable “emptiness” to function in the latter sense is to overwrite the 
radically immanent import of the first term emptiness with the buddhistically, or, 
in Laruelle’s case, philosophically, self- referential representation of the Real that 
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It is in the latter case that Laruelle believes we are dealing with “hallucinated” 
and “illusory” forms of knowledge. He goes further. He terms such knowledge 
“violent.” The violence done to the human is precisely the usurpation of his or 
her interest in the name of a speculative, visionary form of knowledge that poses 
as a science of the Real. A discussion about what might constitute our “interest” 
as human beings will be taken up later. As usual, it is easier to say what it is not. 
So, by way of introduction, we can cite Katerina Kolozova writing about Marx’s 
notion of workers’ interest: It “is not an idea in the sense of ‘causa finalis.’ It is 
not a purpose. It does not have a ‘meaning’ per se. It does not require ‘wisdom,’ 
‘superior knowledge,’ or education to know what one’s interest is.”5 We can add, 
with Laruelle, that determining our interest does not require philosophical or 
buddhistic systems of thought. Finally, it is when such systems endeavor to 
reclaim the Real, via precisely their penchant for wise meaning- making, that 
“axiomatized abstraction”— a practice that eliminates the “intuitiveness and 
naïveté” of sufficiency— becomes necessary.6 Since I am employing his method, 
this and many other Laruellean terms become increasingly clear as we proceed.7 
Parallel to Laruelle’s “non- philosophy,” in the case of Western Buddhism, such a 
practice may, when all is said and done, entail a “non- buddhism.”
Self- void (anātman)
I stated in Chapter 1 that while anātman can be shown to point in one direction, 
toward what we might think of as socially constructed selfhood, or subjectivity, 
Western Buddhist teachers ultimately point it in the opposite direction, toward 
what, in the history of ideas, is considered essentialized selfhood (ātman). 
Which direction it takes has real- life consequences for thought and action. The 
latter leads to an idealism in which what ultimately matters is the recuperation 
and preservation of our “innermost kernel of being.”8 The former leads to a 
materialism in which the idealist’s “non- substantial proliferation of semblances”9 
are, on the contrary, recognized as the paramount sphere of activity operating on 
the self- void (anātman). Given that Western Buddhism prides itself on nothing 
so much as its anti- essentialism, my claim must sound outright wrongheaded to 
many readers. It is true that Western Buddhist figures argue something like the 
former. They speak of anātman as indicating, for instance, a “lack of inherent 
existence,” or an “unfindability.” They further argue that this lack nonetheless 
has force as a “moral agent.”10 In speaking like this, these figures are indeed 
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what we think of as an integral person is, to recall Terry Eagleton’s words, merely 
a “cipher,” a “void at the heart of the symbolic order.”11 It is, furthermore, a cipher 
whose existence must be postulated if we are to account for what actually occurs 
in reality, such as a continuity of subjective experience and the apparent force of 
personal agency. (Perhaps we can think of dark matter as a rough parallel: it itself 
is invisible to the entire electromagnetic spectrum but can be inferred from its 
effects on the visible matter surrounding it.) As such, Western Buddhist figures 
do indeed present anātman as what Lacan calls an impossible Real.
The Real is the impossible. Not in the name of a simple obstacle we hit our 
heads up against, but in the name of the logical obstacle of what, in the symbolic, 
declares itself to be impossible. This is where the Real emerges from.12
There is, of course, a venerable tradition of Buddhist figures invoking the 
impossibility of capturing this void within their own symbolic system. Being, 
precisely, a lack, this “non- self ” can never be adequately signified. In ancient 
texts and contemporary Zen clichés alike, this first name is never intended as 
more than a “convenient designation,” a “mere name,” or a “finger pointing to 
the moon.”13
It is, however, equally true that these same Western Buddhist figures eventually 
disable the consequences of this first name by reinstating, in some form or 
another, the essentialized selfhood that the first name was created to counter. 
Self- described “professor, writer, and Zen teacher” David Loy, for instance, is 
clear about the cipher- like quality of selfhood when he writes, “Fundamentally, 
Buddhism is about awakening, which means realizing something about the 
constructedness of the sense of self and the nothing at its core.” He also alludes 
to the uncanny operations of this Real- void and, in so many words, suggests the 
impossibility of its symbolic articulation.
Deconstructing the sense of self involves directly experiencing its emptiness. 
Usually that void at our core is so uncomfortable that we try to evade it, by 
identifying with something else that might give us stability and security. Another 
way to say it is that we keep trying to fill up that hole, yet it’s a bottomless pit. 
Nothing that we can ever grasp or achieve can end our sense of lack.14
As the subtitle of Loy’s book suggests, Notes for a Buddhist Revolution, the 
realization of constructedness amounts to a “social awakening,”15 since, one 
would think, it places the awakened one nakedly “before the law,” before the 
reality of the forces that do give shape to, do construct, our “sense of self.” 
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throughout his book Money, Sex, War, Karma. On virtually every page we come 
across analytic terminology that would make Marx proud: commodification of 
attention; institutionalized delusion, greed, and ill- will; corporation- dominated 
economic system; alienation and separation; critique; deconstruction; ideology; 
liberation. On virtually every page we are confronted with the massive, 
seemingly intractable social problems that are giving shape to our current 
subjectivity:  corporate malfeasance; war mania; the rape of the environment; 
deification of money; the pervasive stranglehold of advertisement; the brain- 
altering seduction of technology, and so on. Loy notes on several occasions 
that it is precisely the insubstantiality of form that not only makes change and 
“reconstruction” possible, but “allows and indeed obliges this adaptability.”16 As 
we should expect, then, his analysis points out the ways in which the empty, 
hence malleable subject is currently being constituted by these considerable 
social forces (we are attention starved, we are seduced by wealth and fame, we 
love war, and so on). The crucial question is what happens next? Does Loy work 
through the implications of our “social awakening” into the constructedness of 
the self, among other things, for robust social change? Since the subtitle invokes 
revolution, we might expect so. Or does Loy instead suggest an eventual retreat 
into our “innermost kernel of being”? Has he, perhaps, somehow found a true 
“middle way” between these two poles?
As an “engaged Buddhist,” Loy represents an interesting limit case. Like most 
varieties of Western Buddhism, engaged Buddhism begins with the teachings on 
phenomenal and self insubstantiality. However, unlike the numerous Western 
Buddhist traditions that hastily start reciting some version of the idealist’s world- 
surrendering mantra— “you can’t stop the waves but you can learn to surf ”— 
engaged Buddhism tarries in material reality, in, that is, the decisive point where 
“Social systems impinge on our lives and relate us to our fellow beings.”17 Perhaps 
it is this engaged Buddhist reflex that permits Loy to express doubts, rhetorically 
if not genuinely, about the ultimate efficacy of Buddhist teachings to formulate 
solutions to the vexing social issues that his book addresses. At one point, for 
instance, he responds to his own litany of intractable social conundrums by 
admitting, “I do not think that Buddhism has the answer to these questions.” 
At another point he offers this piqued assessment: “If [Buddhist teachings] do 
not work for understanding and addressing the global crises we face today, so 
much the worse for those teachings; maybe it’s time to replace them.” In several 
instances, he even poses some version of the potentially destructive critical 
question, “what is distinctively Buddhist about socially engaged Buddhism?”18 
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the expense of Buddhism itself? Will considerable Western Buddhist resources 
such as anātman be placed in the service of ideological formation or, as Loy’s 
analytic categories might encourage us to believe, in the service of an organon 
of formation?
In what I  would like to call a Western Buddhist parapraxis, Loy, after 
convincingly explicating “the constructedness of the sense of self and the 
nothing at its core,” informs us out of the blue that “Some Buddhist sutras talk 
about paravritti, a ‘turning around.’ ” Why is this a parapraxis? A  parapraxis 
is, recall, saying one thing but meaning a mother . . . or, no, I  mean, another. 
More precisely, it is “the product of mutual interference between two different 
intentions, of which one may be called the disturbed intention and the other 
the disturbing one.”19 (In the joke above, “another” is the disturbed intention 
and “mother” is the disturbing one.) Loy’s engaged Buddhist analysis, generally 
as well as specifically of anātman, is taking him into dangerous territory. It is a 
territory that is arguably wholly bereft of the very need for, much less relevance 
of, the Buddha’s Wisdom. One intention of Loy’s, indeed of all of engaged 
Buddhism’s, analysis, is to bring Buddhist teachings to bear consequently on 
real- world problems. Another intention is to uphold, in no uncertain terms, 
the relevance of these teachings to our current catastrophe. As Loy’s book 
exemplifies, no Buddhist argument, qua Buddhist argument, can bear this 
tension. Haunting Loy’s expressions of doubt, real or feigned, is the suspicion 
that the history of ideas has ample and robust tools enough without Buddhism. 
All such Buddhist arguments thus progress only up to a point before “fleeing, 
taking flight, recoiling, not taking effect, reversing judgement.” These are all 
meanings of the Sanskrit term that Loy employs, namely, paravritti (parāvṛtti).20 
This is not intended as a display of philological braggadocio. I  cite these 
meanings as evidence that we are dealing with a form of conceptual parapraxis 
that is definitive of Western Buddhism as an authoritative system of thought. 
Specifically, Loy invokes paravritti to indicate a:
“turning around” that transforms the festering hole at my core into a life- healing 
flow which springs up spontaneously from I- know- not- where. Instead of being 
experienced as a sense of lack, the empty core becomes a place where there is 
now awareness of something other than, something more than, my usual sense 
of self. I can never grasp that “more than,” I can never understand what it is— 
and I do not need to, because “I” am an expression of it. My role is to become 
a better manifestation of it, with less interference from the delusion of the ego- 
self. So, our emptiness has two sides: the negative, problematic aspect is a sense 
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We can dub this “turning around” a misturning.22 The “disturbed intention” is 
the establishment of Buddhist resources as “transformative, razor- sharp insights 
into the causes behind worldwide troubles.”23 The “disturbing intention” is the 
ultimately debilitating reassertion of the principle of sufficient Buddhism. In 
turning our conception of self- void back into the mystical effusion from “I- 
know- not- where,” Loy is “essentially switching emptiness to fullness” as Tom 
Pepper says regarding a similar move by Thich Nhat Hanh:
He is guarding against the dangerous awareness that our practices, right down 
to the content of our minds, our perceptions, might be socially constructed. 
Instead, they become a part of the seamless web of the entire universe, so that we 
couldn’t possibly hope to change them— it would require altering the cosmos!24
Loy is turning us from thinking through the consequences of what he himself 
calls a “social awakening,” back toward the only real contribution that Buddhism 
ostensibly makes, namely, “the liberation of our collective attention” from the 
places it has become “trapped.”25 Whatever that may mean, it has the effect of 
performing a “reversal of judgement” (paravritti/ parāvṛtti) concerning the 
social- revolutionary consequences of self- emptiness. Loy’s reversal functions as 
a parapraxis because it “adds a second sense to the one intended.”26 He wants 
to argue that Western Buddhist concepts like anātman can influence Western 
social thought in decisive ways. Yet, he must ultimately admit that:
The basic limitations of all such arguments is that Buddhism is really about 
awakening and liberating our awareness, rather than prescribing new 
institutional structures for that awareness . . . [S] olutions to our collective dukkha 
cannot be derived from any ideology.27
In Loy’s hands, Western Buddhist anātman, having faltered on the slippery 
surface of the social, is now returned to the firm dry ground of that ideology- 
free socially unconstructed sphere known as “the spiritual.” It turns out that 
since “the root of the problem is spiritual, the solution must also have a spiritual 
dimension.” Fortunately, Buddhism is the perfect supplement to this now, 
suddenly, spiritualized project, for “the Buddhist path involves understanding 
how our minds work.”28 Loy has completed his paravritti. Having unleashed 
anātman as a terrifying social- revolutionary consequential self- void, he calls it 
back, pats it on the head, and releases it into the service of a spiritually pure “life- 
healing flow” inscribed, of course, with the principle of sufficient Buddhism.
In The New Social Face of Buddhism, fellow engaged Buddhist Ken Jones 








64 A Critique of Western Buddhism
“The Social Construction of the Self,” is one titled, “The Social Fallacy.” Jones 
invokes the social fallacy to repudiate Marx’s famous contention that “it is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their 
social being that determines their consciousness.”29 Marx’s intention here is, of 
course, to turn Hegel’s idealism on its head and assert the primacy of material 
productive forces in shaping what Hegel, invoking his own anātman, famously 
called “this Night, this empty nothing” that is the human being.30 Eschewing 
idealist accounts of human subjectivity, Marx instead offers this materialist 
explanation:
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which 
correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. 
The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure 
of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.31
A book that aims to turn Buddhism’s face away from its claustrophobic, quasi- 
ascetic “personal and private” concerns, in order to stare directly at “modernity’s 
humanistic project of social emancipation,” will, one would think, find common 
cause with Marx’s analysis.32 Yet, Jones does not permit such a sustained 
encounter. Like Loy, he eventually shores up against the full implication of the 
fact that once we awaken to “the social construction of self,” we see that it is the 
social all the way down. Jones writes:
The social fallacy, as I call it, is the belief that human well- being is to be achieved 
primarily or solely through social development. It is deeply ingrained in social 
theory, and seeks to explain social phenomena (and remedy its ills) exclusively 
in social terms— particularly economic and political terms . . . It is the belief that 
most afflictions can sooner or later be fixed “out there.”33
Jones’s own parapraxis is on display here. He intends to turn us toward (what 
he wants us to view as) the indispensable contribution of Buddhism to social 
transformation, namely, its role in enabling the “inner work of radical personal 
change [that is] essential for creating [favorable] social conditions.”34 Jones’s 
social fallacy premise has, of course, rendered such inner work “essential” 
because, pace Marx, “No social system can by itself create a revolution in human 
consciousness.” So, how do we pursue this path to ending social injustice and 
political oppression? How do we make our “mark on samsara”? By, of course, 
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based on the core tenets of the Dharma.”35 Jones’s attempt to turn us from 
the socially awakened “Dharma” back toward the spiritualized “Dharma” is a 
misturning. Jones does not turn us toward the ostensibly natural conclusion that 
his Buddhism is an inevitable feature of today’s pressing “call to action.” He turns 
us toward the fact that the new social face of Buddhism is identical to the old 
social face of the very state of affairs that requires changing. In Marx’s language, 
it is just another attempt to alienate the human through abstraction. In Laruelle’s 
even stronger language, it is just another attempt to persecute the human- in- 
human via a subjugating hallucination.
I will say more about this aspect of Western Buddhist teaching later. The point 
here is that the “turns” performed by Loy and Jones depotentialize the force 
of no- self (anātman) as a first name, as, recall, one of the “Fundamental terms 
which symbolize the Real and its modes according to its radical immanence or 
its identity.” In this instance, the Real’s radically immanent identity, as articulated 
by our two Western Buddhist thinkers themselves, is that of self- void, that of, to 
paraphrase Loy, the uncomfortable bottomless pit of lack that enables the social 
constructedness of self.36 An obvious consequence of this Western Buddhist 
no- self premise is, to turn Jones’s comment back around, not only that social 
“afflictions can sooner or later be fixed ‘out there,’ ” but that the self itself is 
equally to be found and operated on “out there.” This consequence is obvious, 
but it is also apparently unacceptable. Loy and Jones must in the end reassert 
the principle of sufficient Buddhism. In doing so, they are paying the price that 
Laruelle warned us about earlier: “the price of this sufficiency is the impossibility 
for [Western Buddhism] to constitute a rigorous, non- circular thinking of itself, 
one which would not beg the question, that is to say, a theory.” Let us consider 
another example.
Suffering- desire (dukkha- taṇhā)
The Buddhist understanding of suffering (dukkha; also pain, unpleasantness, 
distress, unease, etc.) is that it is inextricably bound up with desire (taṇhā; 
also grasping, attachment, craving, thirst, etc.). So, I think it will be of help to 
consider these two concepts as one: suffering- desire. Where there is suffering, 
there is desire. Where there is desire, there is suffering. We do not merely desire, 
we suffer desire. We do not merely suffer, we suffer (from) desire. How might this 
two- fold Buddhist concept be a first name for the Real? As “dynamic lecturer, 
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translators of Tibetan Buddhism,” B.  Alan Wallace reminds us, suffering is 
Buddhism’s very point of departure. This point, in fact, represents a significant 
deviation from theistic traditions, which, he says, “all begin with the declaration 
of an article of faith based on divine revelation.” Instead, Buddhism embarks 
from “a pragmatic and empirical analysis of the reality of suffering.”
Rather than presenting a worldview with a metaphysical belief in a supernatural 
creator, the Buddha encouraged his followers to explore their own experience, 
with a primary emphasis on something that is a major concern for everyone: the 
reality of suffering and how we might be free of it.37
We have here, then, an authoritative statement about both the Real expressed 
by dukkha and the conditions that would degrade this “truth” to the status of an 
ideological article of faith. That is, we are told that since pain is verifiably endemic 
to human experience, no revelation from on high is required. Wallace’s traditional 
threefold elaboration on types of pain increases our confidence that pain is 
indeed a pervasive feature of human experience. The first type is the “suffering of 
suffering,” which is simply the presence of physical or mental pain. Because this 
type of suffering operates on a spectrum from “subliminal malaise to searing pain,” 
it is, to some degree, ever- present. The second type is the “suffering of change.” 
We seek stability and permanence, homeostasis and wholeness, yet  all things 
invariably follow the trajectory of arising, lingering, dissolving, and disappearance. 
Given the relentlessness of flux, this type of pain is also unavoidable. The third 
type is the “ubiquitous suffering of conditioned existence.” In a sense, this type 
of pain is the internal corollary to the previous, external, type. Not only is the 
world undergoing perpetual change, grating against our tendency toward secure 
attachment, but so are we. Thus, “egoistic identification with our bodies and 
minds as being truly ‘I’ and ‘mine’ makes us fundamentally vulnerable.”38 This 
deluded self- identification is, in fact, the “taproot of all suffering.” The delusion 
of a reified self creates a “radical separation of subject and object” whereby all 
objects are experienced as potential sources of either pleasure or displeasure. 
Thus, from delusion springs the other two “root mental afflictions,” craving and 
aversion.39 It should not be difficult to see these three afflictions or “poisons” as 
the spawn of insatiable desire. For, even wanting- not is a form of wanting, and 
its animus toward the unwanted is inflamed in defense of the desire of deluded 
“egoistic identification.” And with this, pain’s primary accomplice, desire, makes 
its inevitable appearance in the Buddhist scheme.
Wallace’s explication, which is standard fare for a Western Buddhist teacher, 




 First Names of the Buddhist Real 67
immanent in the fold of material being.”40 Suffering- desire is thus sounding 
increasingly like an autonomous “lust for life or will to live” secreting its noxious 
poison from deep within the very “core of existence.”41 This “intense cluster 
of reactive feelings” (i.e., delusional self- reification, object attachment, object 
antipathy), being, as it is, “locked in the body” and forming our “energetic 
core,” is, moreover, a most worthy candidate for an originary trauma.42 Let us 
consider this possibility for a moment. As psychoanalytic theorist Ellie Ragland 
reminds us, “Trauma does not automatically mean literal abuse or incest, 
but the confrontation of the body . . . with the internal excitations that Freud 
called drives.”43 Surely, suffering- desire in the Western Buddhist presentation is 
nothing if not a “drive” in this basic, classical sense. As Wallace reminds us, 
the features that constitute the complex of suffering “lie at the root of all other 
mental imbalances” and “endlessly perpetuate dissatisfaction and misery in 
all the vicissitudes of life and death.”44 This is the language of drive as trauma 
in at least two regards. First, as a “root,” it is that which generates further 
(imbalanced) mental states, thereby continually reproducing the complex. 
(Western Buddhism’s notion of karma, in fact, can be understood as a theory 
of personal continuity that is grounded precisely in this repetition compulsion.) 
Second, as the instigator of endless dissatisfaction, it is that which “enacts the 
failure” of the very drive; for the drive, recall, is an impulsion toward satisfaction. 
The complex that Wallace outlines is constituted as “structurally traumatic” 
precisely because of this failure.45 The trauma of suffering- desire in this Western 
Buddhist presentation is thus a first name for the Real. That is, what we have 
here is “the subject’s point of failure and impasse . . . which persists as a kind of 
horrific hard core within the subject . . . a disfiguring medium into which we are 
plunged at birth . . . and from which desire flows unstaunchably.”46 Desire also 
flows eternally ungratified, for, as we saw in the previous section on anātman, 
this core (or root) is grounded in the abyss of delusional “egoistic identification.” 
Another way of saying the same thing is that the core/ root suffering- desire 
is pure self- grounding; it itself, and not some other desired object, is the only 
possible terminus of its longing. We are, moreover, dealing here with a Real in 
that all of this remains unconscious to the subject. For, the Western Buddhist 
subject, recall, is constituted precisely through the primordial delusion of self- 
reification. It is this delusion which generated the suffering- desire effusing 
“radical separation of subject and object” in the first place.47 We are dealing here 
with a Real in one final, crucial, sense: its very unconsciousness or “repression 
constructs reality around the misrecognition of its own basis in fantasy.”48 
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constructed selfhood, the repressed Real of suffering- desire is as unremittingly 
productive of our experience as it is delusional.
The Western Buddhist concept of suffering- desire is thus clearly a first 
name for the Real. Let’s review. It constitutes a serious, far- reaching analysis of 
subjective human formation and experience. It identifies a “register closely allied 
with our bodily drives” yet simultaneously alienating us from the fulfillment of 
our deepest yearnings. It reveals a “stain of senseless material contingency” that 
is as trenchant and efficient as it is symbolically inarticulable.49 And with this, we 
have arrived at the inevitable “divided pathway to cultivation and decline”50: does 
Western Buddhism permit this Real to faithfully serve its function through to 
the end or does it cancel its warrant in the very midst of things? We can pose the 
question in Wallace’s own terms: is suffering pain permitted to hew closely to 
our “own experience” or does it get co- opted into a “worldview” as a mere article 
of faith? Suggesting the former in both cases, Wallace gestures toward the same 
psychoanalytic tradition that I have been referring to here. He cites the “giant 
of twentieth- century science,” Sigmund Freud himself, whose “insights on the 
nature of consciousness are consonant with the most advanced contemporary 
neuroscience views.”51 The passage from Freud that Wallace quotes articulates 
the psychoanalytic view of the Real of suffering- desire:
We are threatened with suffering from three directions:  from our own body, 
which is doomed to decay and dissolution and which cannot even do without 
pain and anxiety as warning signals; from the external world, which may rage 
against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction; and finally 
from our relations to other men. The suffering which comes from this last source 
is perhaps more painful to us than any other.52
The final source, which Freud calls “the social source of suffering,” is so painful 
because it is alterable. That is, we can come to terms with the natural and bodily 
sources of suffering precisely because they are immutable:  we recognize, if 
begrudgingly, that nature is always too powerful against our desire for happiness 
(security, satisfaction, etc.) and the body is ultimately too weak. Social relations 
are different. We observe that they change over time. And yet we cannot 
deny that we remain unsuccessful at eliminating these relations as a source of 
dissatisfaction. Recognizing this situation, Freud expresses his “astonishment” 
at a certain, indeed astonishing, fact:
in whatever way we may define the concept of civilization, it is a certain fact that 
all the things with which we seek to protect ourselves against the threats that 





 First Names of the Buddhist Real 69
Part of that very civilization! Schelling’s “veil of despondency that spreads itself 
over nature” is spread even farther by Freud, over even that continent of human 
security called civilization. And so, with Freud, “a suspicion dawns on us that 
here, too, a piece of unconquerable nature may lie behind— this time a piece of 
our own psychical constitution.”53 There is hardly a better characterization of the 
psychoanalytic Real than as a piece of unconquerable nature. And there is hardly 
a better example of protecting the integrity of Real thought. What about Wallace 
and the tradition in whose authority he speaks?
The paravritti, the refusal of the identified Real and the concomitant reversal 
of judgement, the conceptual parapraxis that, I am arguing, is constitutive of 
Western Buddhist discourse as a whole, is already present in Wallace’s statement 
concerning “the reality of suffering,” namely, the part about “how we might be 
free of it.” The parallel to trends in psychoanalysis is instructive here. Freud 
decried the influence of the “American way of life” on psychoanalysis. He saw 
the development of American psychology as “a child of its time . . . designed 
to accelerate the tempo of analytic therapy and suit the rush of American life.” 
This, despite the fact that all evidence shows that “psychoanalytic therapy— 
the liberation of a human being from his neurotic symptoms, inhibitions, and 
abnormalities of character— is a lengthy business.”54 In this regard, Freud’s 
criticism is echoed by Žižek’s claim that Western Buddhism, whatever bright 
light it might throw on human existence, functions to accommodate its 
Westerner practitioner to the hyper- accelerated technological pace of modern 
life. If, in doing so, it effectively functions as a fetish— as “an embodiment of 
the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth”— so much the better 
in terms of its “working.”55 The Western Buddhist “Lie” here, in Wallace’s own 
terms, is twofold. It involves the usurpation of one’s “own experience” (the 
intractable pervasiveness of suffering- desire) by “worldview” (the doctrinal 
claim of ultimate transcendence of the merely human).56 Implicit in that move 
is the further “Lie” that worldview is not worldview: it is rather precisely one’s 
very “own experience.” The “unbearable truth” that is sustained in assuming 
this embodiment is, of course, the ineradicable fact of suffering- desire in one’s 
“own experience.” If, for Lacan, psychoanalysis is the theory and practice of 
bringing to articulation the very “essence of the human being”— desire— and 
if, as Terry Eagleton tells us, psychoanalysis is “the science of that which fails 
to find satisfaction,” then what are we to call Western Buddhism?57 What 
is the name of a system of thought that, like a theory or science, ruthlessly 
identifies a Real aspect of human being only to perform a reversal that offers 
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emotionally and cognitively against the full implications of its very own 
self- articulated Real?
We will return to this question in Chapter  4. In anticipation of that 
discussion, we can consider Anthony Paul Smith’s contention that “what is 
most immanent to us is also most alien precisely because of the hallucinatory 
transcendent structures of thought developed in philosophy and theology.”58 
Should we add to that couple “Western Buddhism”? It might be too soon to say. 
But what is being suggested here is a crucial distinction between something 
like a science and something like an hallucination. The former pinpoints 
what Wallace calls “own experience.” This is precisely the feature of Western 
Buddhism that allows its promotion as an immanent practice. The latter hoists 
what Wallace calls “worldview.” This is what constitutes it, on the other hand, 
as an hallucinatory imposition on an individually lived life or, indeed, as “own 
experience.” Put in Smith’s terms, the question darkens:  what do we call a 
system of thought that, via its authoritative construction of a world, alienates 
us from that which it itself tells us is in fact most immanent, and thus most 
intimate, about that world?
Nihility (śūnyatā)
As I suggested in Chapter 2, where emptiness is treated in some detail, śūnyatā is 
perhaps the Buddhist master signifier par excellence. From Buddhism’s earliest 
days, to brook no delusions about the empty quality of phenomena is extolled as 
extraordinarily consequential.59 In a canonical Pali text, for instance, the Buddha 
teaches us how to view all phenomena, whether objective (form) or subjective 
(sensation, perception, conceptions, and consciousness), namely, as “empty, 
hollow, and insubstantial.” We are told, moreover, that to view phenomena in 
this manner is not an end in itself. Crucially, it sets in motion a sort of Buddhist 
subjective destitution, passing through disenchantment and dispassion and 
culminating in the clear awareness of the “superlative practitioner” that “what 
had to be done was done”: nirvanic liberation is realized.60 This dual aspect of 
the ontological- perceptual and the soteriological- cognitive accompanies the 
concept of emptiness throughout Buddhist history. Candrakīrti (600– c. 650), 
for instance, tells us that:
The thorough extinguishment of attachment is the cause of attaining nirvāna, 
and, except for the view of the lack of inherent existence, there is no other 
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The basic equation here between emptiness and liberation is important. It is richly 
suggestive of what Laruelle means when he reminds us that “Man really exists 
and he is really distinct from the World.” That is, the human being embodies 
a radically immanent lived experience that is inaccessible to the authoritative 
demands and machinations of any intervening system of representation, or 
of what Laruelle calls a “World.” Such immunity implies a human capacity to 
struggle against such Worlds and an attendant capacity for liberation. Similarly, 
the Buddhist coupling of emptiness with a conception of liberation offers a 
powerful instrument for clearing a pathway that, being historically encumbered 
by endless configurations of “the World,” obscures our vision and infects our 
thinking in relation to our “real existence.” This feature is, in part, what makes 
emptiness a candidate for a Buddhist Real. Yet, as I said earlier, a crucial question 
always appears at this juncture: does this Western Buddhist first term remain 
faithful to the Real, or does it instead maneuver to usurp and determine the 
constitution of the Real? Another way of asking this question is whether the 
Buddhist concept serves the “generic” human or whether it serves the self- 
referential form of human representation called “Buddhism.” More will be said 
about these Laruellen ideas below. Here, let us simply reflect on the seemingly 
nonnegotiable requirement that “emptiness,” of all conceivable notions, 
remain empty.
As we saw in Chapter 2, if, throughout Buddhist history, emptiness as lack 
is emphasized, so, too, is emptiness as plenitude. The Pali sutta cited above 
concludes with a verse exhorting the practitioner that, although “no substance 
is found here,” he should nonetheless “live . . . yearning for the way that is never- 
vanishing,” that latter term being synonymous with nirvāṇa. In fact, positive 
terms for nirvāṇa as the soteriological fruit of “concentration on emptiness” 
include such apparent idealist absolutes as the unconditioned (asaṅkhata), the 
deathless (amata), the permanent (dhuva), and the truth (sacca).62 Contemporary 
Western Buddhist figures protect this positive inheritance by insisting, as we 
saw above, that emptiness is “not a nihilistic emptiness but rather a fullness of 
particular things and individual persons functioning in their full capacity and 
without mutual impediment,” and that “emptiness has two sides . . . lack . . . and 
fullness,” or in simply declaring “the fullness of emptiness,” and so on.
What are we to make of such a turn regarding emptiness? Is it performed 
as a compassionate, skillful Buddhist effort to allay our fears in the face of 
this terrifying Real, this infinite void coldly named zeroness, cruelly named 
nihility?63 Does this name not announce, like Nick Land, the fact that “If there is 
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remind us of the drastic consequences of this conclusion that there is no such 
thing as stabilizing inherent existence?: “particles decay, molecules disintegrate, 
cells die, organisms perish, species become extinct, planets are destroyed and 
stars burn out, galaxies explode . . . until the unfathomable thirst of the entire 
universe collapses into darkness and ruin.”
We are made sick by our avidity to survive, and in our sickness is the thread 
that leads back and nowhere, because we belong to the end of the universe. The 
convulsion of dying stars is our syphilitic inheritance . . . Matter signals to its lost 
voyagers, telling them that their quest is vain, and that their homeland already 
lies in ashes behind them. If there is a conclusion it is zero. Silence.64
This unpleasant Nietzschean vision is a clear- eyed reminder that in the end, 
after nature draws just a few more breaths, when our sun has finally cooled 
and collapsed into a bloodless husk, after all of us “clever beasts” have died, 
emptiness will take its rightful place in the cosmic whole and . . . “nothing will 
have happened.”65 Yet, in the face of such dark talk about “the ultimate heat death 
of the universe,” Anthony Paul Smith reminds us of an equally crucial truth: “We 
are here, fragile creatures that we are, and, regardless of any future death, that 
fact of existing matters in both the physical and moral sense, regardless of how 
finite or limited that mattering is.”66 Is it for reasons along this compassionate 
line that, in “The Fullness of Emptiness,” Buddhist master Thich Nhat Hanh 
takes pains to reassure us that “The word ‘emptiness’ should not scare us”? “It is,” 
in fact, he cheers us to recognize, “a wonderful word.” For, while it is undeniably 
the case that form is empty of essence, “it is full of everything else.” He goes 
on to speak about “the cloud floating in this sheet of paper,” and challenge us 
to “point out one thing that is not here, not in this paper— time, space, the 
earth, the rain, the minerals in the soil, the sunshine, the cloud, the river, the 
heat.” Indeed:  “Everything coexists with this sheet of paper.” And so all of us 
“have always been here,” transcending birth and death— mere empty forms 
themselves— and will be here again after we die:  “I will be a flower, or a leaf. 
I will be in these forms and I will say hello to you. If you are attentive enough, 
you will recognize me, and you may greet me. I will be very happy.”67 So, what 
is there to fear?
In a decisively less consoling and more philosophical vein, Timothy Morton, 
too, addresses our supposed fear of emptiness. For him, by contrast, this fear 
appears to be justified. Morton points out that in today’s West we are consumed 
by fear. But Morton is not speaking of the fears that are stoked on the nightly 
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bees, and various food products. He speaks of easily disavowed, because 
more subtly present, fears. We fear physicality, we fear consumerism, we fear 
narcissism, passivity, intimacy, ambiguity, inwardness, subjectivity. If this book 
is giving you the heebie jeebies, it’s because we even fear theory. We fear recursive 
loops, Morton argues, and we fear the uncanny gaze of spiritualized statues and 
the very status of things in general. But most of all, today in the West, Morton 
informs us, we fear Buddhism. Why? Because Buddhism is the bugaboo of 
nothingness, the spooky avatar of emptiness. Our contemporary anxieties about 
emptiness or nothingness find their ideal object of projection in Buddhism, 
prompting Morton’s neologism “Buddhaphobia.”68 Like Thich Nhat Hanh, 
Morton asks “What is to be feared?” Absolute nothingness is simply nonexistent, 
so there is literally nothing to fear. What frightens us is a nothingness that is “not 
absolutely nothing,” but rather a something- or- other. And Buddhist nothingness 
is just such an nonabsolute nothingness. The frightful truth, Morton tells us, is 
that “Substantiality underlies nothingness.” Where Thich Nhat Hanh asks us to 
look past emptiness to see sky and sunshine, Morton suggests we would see “a 
spectral, shifting presence of absence: shimmering substantiality,” a “flickering” 
something that “is unlocatable yet real and palpable.” It is this palpable quality 
that renders buddhistic nothingness so “disturbing” to us.69
In many ways, Morton’s discussion seems to lend support to śūnyatā as a 
faithful first name for the Real. His nothing as an unfindable yet consequential 
physicality sounds similar to the Real as a symbolically inarticulable yet 
profoundly productive “stain of senseless material contingency” affecting the 
human, as we saw earlier. Yet, there is something more to Morton’s buddhistic 
nothingness than the substantiality underlying it. “Shimmering agency,” namely, 
“underlies substantiality.”70 With the particular notion of agency that Morton 
invokes, we arrive yet again at the classic Buddhist conceptual parapraxis, the 
“turning around” and away from the full force of emptiness toward a productive 
fullness that, however inconstant and “shimmering,” is somehow even fuller, or 
more persistently full, than the veiled superabundance of Thich Nhat Hanh’s 
empty forms.
It is not total opaque inertia that Buddhaphobia fears . . . It is something more 
like what Freud calls the nirvāṇa principle, otherwise known as the death 
drive:  the way in which a lifeform, down to a single- celled organism (for 
Freud) and quite possibly below that, is an inconsistent entity that is trying to 
wipe out that inconsistency. This attempt at self- cancellation (nirvāṇa means 
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As Morton alerts us, it appears that we have come up against the law of 
noncontradiction, whereby the aim of life, driven as it is toward brute 
reproduction of itself, is yet a near- death stilling of internal tension. “Unless, of 
course,” Morton adds, “there is an object- like entity at the core of human being, 
an entity felt as an object precisely because it is inhuman, a- human:  what is 
called Buddha nature.” The Mahāyāna idea of “Buddha nature” is glossed in the 
index of Nothing as “the inherent identity of each living being as a buddha; a fully 
awakened state as the basis of ordinary mind.” It is, as Morton tells us, “a not- 
me that is in me.” Like God, I suppose, who is closer to me than my own breath, 
this “not- me is more ‘me’ than myself, which is only a confused perception.” 
Thus, like the devout seeker of the face of God, progress on the spiritual path of 
Buddhism is “a matter of faith in an entity.” Eventually, this “not- me (confused, 
sentient being) realizes that it is also a not- me (totally enlightened Buddha).”72
What are we to make of this move? Do we have here anything other than yet 
another tautology of Wisdom? Do Morton’s and Thich Nhat Hanh’s emptiness 
talk indicate anything other than the fact that such master discourse is “excluded 
from the economy of symbolic exchange”? Whatever might result from bringing 
Wisdom to bear on such an understanding of emptiness, we are once again 
confronted with a misturning. The pivotal point of the turning really amounts 
to a repulsion. Having bored perhaps too far into emptiness for ideological 
comfort, our teachers bound too quickly and too easily in the opposite direction, 
toward the fullness of some- thing along with its incumbent idealist cure. The 
cure is this: The no- thing that so disturbs us is not in itself an object to be feared. 
Fear of it arises only at that point where it, this object at our “core,” is met with 
resistance by the “narcissistically wounded subject” that each of us is. If only, 
like Thich Nhat Hanh’s flowers and clouds, we could stop clinging to that which 
we never were in the first place, we might finally come to know the freedom and 
happiness of the earth and the sky.
Of all ideas, one would think, emptiness must surely remain empty; 
nothingness must remain nothing; zero must remain zero; lack, lack; void, 
void. Yet, in the hands of Wisdom, buddhistic emptiness somehow perpetually 
“evades this void by its repopulation with objects and foreign goals provided 
by experience, culture, history, language, etc.,” as Laruelle says of philosophy. 
In permitting, indeed in aiding and abetting, this evasion, Western Buddhism 
abdicates its function as an organon of awakening— awakening to the Real of 
no- self, of suffering and desire, of emptiness— and instead assumes the “shape of 
the World” fashioned in its own image.73
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I could examine several additional candidates for a Buddhist Real. In doing 
so, I could be mercifully brief. The reason is that I have no further task than to 
reveal at what point in some Western Buddhist concept, text, or teaching the 
turn occurs. Many readers, no doubt, find my assertion preposterous. After 
all, you may be thinking, Buddhism is a venerable and complex tradition, and 
arguments like Loy’s, Morton’s, Wallace’s, and every other figure’s I have referred 
to up to now, are nuanced and thorough. However, I make the assertion based 
on several convictions. For instance, I  hold that what I  am highlighting here 
amounts to a discovery, one that, moreover, will be replicated by readers of 
Western Buddhist material who employ this heuristic of the turn (or, really, this 
parapraxis of the misturning). To be clear, I hold that the reader will make this 
discovery himself or herself with every single Western Buddhist instantiation. 
No author writing under the signifier Buddhism, including its numerous 
subsignifiers, such as Western Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Secular Buddhism, 
Mindfulness, and so on, is exempt from my assertion. The reason, which I will 
detail later, is that the misturning is, it turns out, endemic to the very identity 
of “Buddhism.” Along with the principle of sufficient Buddhism and what 
Laruelle calls “decision” (also discussed later), the parapraxis of misturning is a 
sine qua non of Buddhist teaching, thought, and practice. Speaking of practice, 
I mentioned in the Introduction that this critique should serve as both a theory 
and a performance or practice. The theoretical aspect in the present case is the 
analysis of the contradiction, the report on the discovery. The performance 
unfolds around one’s reading of the text. Confronted by the discovery, the reader 
is challenged to no longer read as a subject of liberal humanism, who reads the 
Western Buddhist text with an eye to the timeless truths contained therein, and 
who seeks therein the unchanging answer to the mysteries of our unchanging 
human nature.74 Confronted in this manner, the reader is challenged to no 
longer read as a subject of neoliberalism, a Gelassenheit- yearning consumer of 
Wisdom, a well- behaved auto- governed connoisseur of the self. I said that I am 
hoping to stimulate a reading, thinking, living subject who regards Buddhist 
material alongside what Laruelle calls “radical immanence.” More, too, will 
be said about this point later. For now, the reader has only to pose a stark and 
simple question: at what point does a Western Buddhist first name recoil from 
functioning as a theory (of subjectivity, of desire, or whatever) and lapse back 
into the auto- referential question- begging that constitutes the principle of 
sufficient Buddhism? For, in identifying the presence of such a turn, the reader 
is recognizing that the first name ceases to “symbolize the Real and its modes” 
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and instead attempts to usurp the Real by determining its (always Buddhist) 
constitution and then importing it back into Buddhism.
What kind of vital human practice, Buddhist or otherwise, might we wrest 
from such a refusal? Can such a practice, in thought and action, really be a party 








Buddhism is a magnificent creation. It is truly (to say it in a Buddhist idiom) 
a brilliant mandala wrought of the most precious jewels, exuding a healing 
fragrance, distilling a pain- dispelling nectar. Buddhism is a juggernaut of 
compassion, thundering throughout the world, crushing the endless sorrows 
that consume sentient beings. Ever since the Buddha set it in motion two- and- a- 
half millennia ago, Buddhism has been trumpeting the warning that our world, 
like our minds, is an inferno. It has never ceased to marshal its considerable 
apparatus of concepts and practices in the human struggle to quench that fire. 
More recently and closer to home, Western Buddhism has continued this grand 
project, skillfully calibrating its firehose to target more effectively our lives and 
our times.
And yet, as we have seen, something is amiss. Something is at work within 
Western Buddhism not only to hinder but to pervert its course. In Part 1, I made 
several points about this perversion or reversal: (i) it occurs at the micro level 
of foundational Buddhist concepts; (ii) it is intrinsic in that it is constituted (as 
reversal) by values posited from within Buddhism itself; (iii) it alters Buddhism’s 
identity as a science or theory of immanent and materialist “own experience” to 
that of a conjurer of a transcendent and idealist “worldview”; (iv) it transforms 
Buddhism from a bold bearer of the good (?) news about the human Real into 
an apostle of a New Age apocalypse1; (v)  as such, the reversal constitutes a 
misturning, a maneuver performed in the spirit of enlightenment, of, that is to 
say, a deeper and fuller clarification of its ostensible discoveries about human 
being, only in the end to have us stand face to face with a contradiction or a 
platitude posing as wisdom.
I called this reversal a conceptual parapraxis for reasons that bear on the 
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psychoanalysis. Why not just use a Buddhist term, such as paravritti (parāvṛtti), 
as David Loy did earlier? After all, the two terms, connoting as they do 
something like the reversion of an action, are similar enough. The reason that 
I use the psychoanalytic term should be clear with a quick review of how the 
Buddhist term functioned within Loy’s argument. Recall that he employed it 
to mark the transformational reversion from no- self as “the festering hole at 
my core” toward “a life- healing flow which springs up spontaneously.” From 
where might it spring? Bear in mind, too, that Loy is illuminating the Buddhist 
Real of subjectivity without essence, substance, or any other stabilizing basis; so, 
unlike Morton, he is cautious not to posit some Thing, however shimmering and 
ephemeral, as the source of the life- healing flow. Thus, all he can really offer is 
that it springs from “I- know- not- where.”
While such language of an unknowable- x- that- the- teacher- nonetheless- 
knows is a standard authoritarian move in obscurantist mystical rhetoric, it does 
not in itself disqualify the move. From Plotinus to Freud, from Hegel to Beckett, 
the discourse of the Real is permeated by a mood of impossibility. Lacan, for 
instance, speaks of the Real as “the essential object that isn’t an object any longer, 
but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail.”2 
Does a statement like this differ all that much from Nansen’s famous teaching to 
the wandering Joshu that while “not knowing is most intimate,” ultimately “the 
way is not a matter of knowing or not knowing”?3 Alenka Zupančič refers to this 
seemingly “inherent impossibility” of either knowing or not- knowing (which is 
still dualistically coupled to knowing) the Real/ way as “immanent inaccessibility.” 
She continues:
The point of Lacan’s identification of the Real with the impossible is not simply 
that the Real is some Thing that is impossible to happen. On the contrary, the 
whole point of the Lacanian concept of the Real is that the impossible happens. 
This is what is so traumatic, disturbing, shattering— or funny— about the Real. 
The Real happens precisely as the impossible.4
With the examples I gave of Western Buddhist treatments of no- self, suffering- 
desire, and emptiness, I tried to show that there, too, the impossible happens. The 
decisive difference, however, is that in Western Buddhism it happens through the 
banishment of the Real— the very Buddhist- appointed Real— itself. The Real- 
concept once installed is ordered to about face, to double back, to reverse course 
and retreat posthaste. In its place is installed a more consoling, cooperative, 
affirmative— if even more impossible— happening, such as “a life- healing flow,” 





draw a contrast, the Real as productive non- object, the Real as that “lacking any 
possible mediation,” is “the object of anxiety par excellence.”5 The difference is 
consequential. Where Western Buddhism flinches and shores up against the full 
implications of its thought, psychoanalysis follows the evidence farther into its 
murky circuit. For Western Buddhism, the flinch entails a healthy adaptation 
to reality, the alleviation of stress, and even the end of suffering. Of course, 
it also means collusion with a political and economic status quo that, like it, 
places the blame for success or failure, happiness or misery, on the degree to 
which the individual is able to recognize his or her vulnerability, adapt to the 
circumstances, and master resilience through an internalized practice of mindful 
letting go. For psychoanalysis this means the perpetuation of the disease. For our 
capacity for enlightened living is forged not within the furnace of an individual 
consciousness, but within the severe circuitry of the social nexus. Whereas 
Western Buddhism shares with psychoanalytic practice the belief that it is “a 
search for truth,” only the latter admits: “and the truth is not always beneficial.”6
As Loy highlighted, the Western Buddhist result does indeed follow from 
a paravritti, from a reversion or a turning around. The turning, along with its 
result, however, is of the nature of a parapraxis because it constitutes a recoiling 
that concludes in a reversal of judgement such that the original state of affairs 
does not take effect.7 What does take effect is that the critical reader, like the 
astute psychoanalyst and, perhaps, the attentive meditator, suspects that a 
second, undesired, sense is being added to the intended one.
To explain the purpose of Part 2, I would like to emphasize several points 
here. These points will be elaborated on in Chapter 5.
 1. Western Buddhism thinks. Western Buddhism represents a momentous 
effort, sustained over centuries and in multiple cultural contexts, to 
understand and improve our human condition.
 2. Its thinking, however, is not sufficient. It is not merely the case that 
Western Buddhist thought exhibits the kinds of contradictions, aporia, 
parapraxes, and so on, that I have been attempting to demonstrate. 
All grand systems of thought arguably do so; and that is not in itself 
invalidating. The fact of insufficiency, however, in the case of a unitary 
authoritarian form of thought like Western Buddhism, is, in a quite 
particular sense, seriously disabling.
 3. This is good news! Not only does this fact not spell the doom of Western 
Buddhism, it augurs a form of thought that corresponds more closely to the 
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 4. It is crucial to bear in mind, however, that this new form of thought is 
not a new iteration of Buddhism. It involves, rather, an attempt to answer 
the question posed at the very outset of this book: What are we to make 
of Western Buddhism? Toward this end, we leave Western Buddhism as 
it is and take it seriously, but in both cases treat it as raw human cultural 
material rather than on the (sufficient) terms that it itself demands.
 5. As Marjorie Gracieuse warned us, such an endeavor is not easy. Like 
forcefully unarming a hostage- taker, it requires a “wresting.” As my usage, 
however cursory, of ideas from philosophy, psychoanalysis, literature, and 
so on, were intended to demonstrate, what is required for our wresting 
is an extra- Buddhist supplement, a form of thought outside the sphere of 
Buddhism’s overly determinate, self- positing, influence.
As I  mentioned in the Introduction, I  have found that the work of the 
contemporary French thinker François Laruelle offers unusually effective tools 
for dismantling authoritative forms of thought, excising their motherlodes of 
sufficiency, and depotentializing their subjugating force. Equally, however, 
Laruelle offers tools for reconstituting humanly useful “fictions” or “fabulations” 
from this dismantled material. It is to those tools that I now turn to.
François Laruelle and non- philosophy
I think it is safe to say that anyone who has read him will agree: François Laruelle 
(born 1937) is exceedingly difficult. Starting with its enigmatic name— for “non- 
philosophy” means neither not philosophy nor everything but philosophy nor 
anti- philosophy— Laruelle’s thought “sticks out, like an unwanted tangled root or 
an unmovable stone waiting for philosophers and theorists to trip up on.”8 His 
general strangeness is a stump well enough for this tumble. If that doesn’t get 
them, his audacious experimentation in formal and methodological invention 
and conceptual innovation probably will.9 But what trips them up without fail 
is the unclassifiable nature of his thought— unclassifiable, that is, “within the 
now familiar and moribund debates.”10 Laruelle is not interested in dethroning 
prior philosophical systems and installing his own, superior version. He is not 
maneuvering to outflank the generals of philosophy arrayed on the battlefield of 
contested thought. Neither is he a guru, enrapturing us with gnomic utterances 
on the meaning of life or compassionately pointing out the mysterious presence 
of primordial consciousness. This is disorienting because the normal procedure 






kinds of things. Fortunately, Laruelle is also exceptionally insightful and, pardon 
the pun, inciteful. Certainly, for anyone struggling to defuse the hidden munitions 
ticking beneath authoritative systems of thought, his work proves to be a toolbox 
of surgical concepts and practices. And it is to that end I employ them here.
It is futile if not outright absurd to offer a summation of Laruelle’s massive, 
complex, and ever- mutating oeuvre; and it is well beyond the scope of this book 
to present the substantive introduction that his thought deserves.11 Instead, 
beginning in this chapter and culminating in the final section of Part 3, I  use 
certain Laruellen concepts in conjunction with the problematic of Western 
Buddhism (I already did this to a degree in the previous three sections). To say this 
in a Laruellen idiom, I conjugate the two forms of thought, Western Buddhism 
and non- philosophy, but do so “outside their disciplinary incarceration as terms 
in themselves.”12 Or, even more descriptively, I crash these two disciplines together 
as in a quantum particle collider for knowledge. The first, somewhat staid, 
image suggests the emergence of a new, enriched grammar, one that enhances 
thought and enables fresh resonances, metaphors, sounds, and utterances. As we 
progress, the neologism “non- buddhism” will prove a useful term for this new 
syntax. The second image also suggests that some new, previously inconceivable, 
material appears in the world. This image works in ways that are instructive for 
further understanding Laruelle’s, and my, basic objective. First, we must admit 
that this is a violent image:  two objects colliding with such savage force that a 
hitherto unmanifest entity emerges from the opaquest alluvium of space into our 
world. It is not incidental or a mere tic of style that Laruelle’s work is permeated 
by such a vocabulary of violence and power: collision, insurrection, victims, the 
philosophical arsenal, one blow without remainder, vengeance, resistance, weapons 
of last defense, amputation, defensive ultimatum, invalidation in a single blow, the 
persecuted heretic, the Murdered, the hypothesis of murdered men, eye for an eye, 
wholly burnt humans, ideal cadavers, black universe, the black substance that flows 
through the veins of history, the end of the world. The reader may be muttering to 
herself: for God’s sake, man, could any language be less applicable to Buddhism? 
Is employing such ideas not, well, overkill? For readers acculturated to the benign 
countenance of Western Buddhism it must indeed appear so. Yet, bear in mind 
that Laruelle himself derives this language not from an investigation into world 
history or radical politics, but from one into philosophy, a fairly docile subject. 
So, what is it about philosophy— and Buddhism— that justifies such language? We 
can turn again to Marjorie Gracieuse for the short answer. Recall her image of 
wresting vital potentialities of humans from the artificial forms and static norms that 




84 A Critique of Western Buddhism
it is never anything but a human construction. This fact should be obvious. And 
it is obvious to anyone who does not subscribe to its unitary program. The point 
here is that Buddhism does not offer itself as yet another option in the crowded 
supermarket of human knowledge. It offers itself as a singularly enlightening 
presentation of preeminent human knowledge per se. It is therefore as a matter of 
necessity that Western Buddhism institute its “artificial forms and static norms” as 
sufficient to that end of preeminent knowing. A central task of such institutions, 
as discussed earlier, is the formation of particular kinds of subjects who interact 
with the world in quite particular ways. The task, in other words, is ideological 
interpellation, capture, subjugation. This is not to suggest bad faith or foul play. In 
the case of Western Buddhism, it is typically a matter of being interpellated into a 
supposedly natural, empirical, phenomenologically verifiable cure: “The teaching 
of Buddhism is nothing special. It is just our human way.”13 It is this seductive lure 
of a natural remedy, this conjuring of a curative fantasy, that prompts Laruelle to 
declare that his practice of non- philosophy is “an act of defense, not of intolerance; 
the defense of a certain human universality against . . . a tradition that is believed 
to place it in danger.”14 The danger, as we will see, involves the shrouding of a 
transcendental hallucination over the inalienable in- human, as Laruelle names the 
person without adventitious metaphysical representations— a concept that is, one 
would think, mightily appealing to Western Buddhists. A project of suspending 
the authority of dangerous, subjugating thought, of unmasking it as but an alluring 
hallucination, of acting always from the side of the generic human and against 
that of worldly authority— is this not equally the project of Western Buddhism? 
Western Buddhism is nothing if not a practice for human liberation. It is, 
moreover, always performed, as Laruelle says of non- philosophy, ad hominos, with 
its sight set on humans. The Buddha himself said that he attained emancipation 
not in some transcendent state or realm but “in this six- foot body, with its mind 
and its conceptions.”15 And next to its vocabulary of violence, non- philosophy, 
like Buddhism, speaks of liberation, freedom, and emancipation. At times, in 
fact, it speaks with an almost embarrassingly religious exuberance: resurrection, 
salvation, justice, grace, gnosis, the Future Christ, peace, and utopia.
On this incongruous note, I  now affix the harmonious airs of Western 
Buddhism to the atonal clash of non- philosophy.
A science of Buddhism
I mentioned in the Introduction that I  see Western Buddhism as a critique 






manner, I am in line with a certain strain of Western Buddhist rhetoric, if not 
intention. We saw, for instance, that B.  Alan Wallace distinguishes between 
“a worldview with a metaphysical belief ” and the exploration of one’s “own 
experience.” This is a distinction between forms of knowledge and practice 
that encourage a (rationally) ungrounded faith in transcendent efficacy, and 
forms that offer an organon, an immanent means or instrument, for arriving at 
knowledge. Classically, an organon consists of, individually or in combination, a 
set of mathematical or logical principles, rigorously rational inquiry, or properly 
scientific investigation. Laruelle, who seeks to establish with his method “a 
universal organon of thought, more than a simple hypothesis,” insists that this 
device possess a “double fecundity:  theoretical and practical.” As a theoretical 
device, the organon of non- philosophy, for instance, enables knowledge of “the 
functioning and the dynamic of a philosophy or the philosophical tradition.” 
Crucially, it does so only after having paid the “ransom” of abandoning what 
Laruelle calls “decision” (discussed below). This simple payment ensures that 
non- philosophy never confuses its description of philosophy for philosophy 
itself. As this prohibition suggests, the organon “is in a perpetual state of 
producing novelty; of opening and rectifying a specific space of knowing.” This, 
the practical function of the organon, means that the organon becomes an 
instrument for the transformation of philosophy’s usage. So, an organon is an 
instrument of thought that enables a critical intervention into an object, event, 
reality, etc., yet leaves that object as it is. As a theoretical device an organon 
exposes the workings of the object. As a practical device it modifies the ways in 
which the object might be used.16
Although it does not use this nomenclature, Western Buddhism clearly 
views itself as an organon. In fact, an argument with ample textual evidence 
could be made that a defining feature of Western Buddhism is precisely this 
self- identification as an organon par excellence. Interestingly, however, it 
sees itself as an organon that rejects each of the senses just given. The locus 
classicus of this identity for Western Buddhists is the Kesamutti Sutta, better 
known in contemporary Western Buddhist circles as the Kālāma Sutta after the 
Buddha’s interlocutors in the text, the people know as the Kalamas. The oft- cited 
passage reads:
I have advised you as I  have not to go by unconfirmed reports, by tradition, 
by hearsay, by scriptures, by logical reasoning, by inferential reasoning, by 
reflection on superficial appearances, by delighting in opinions and speculation, 
by the appearance of plausibility, or because you think This person is our teacher. 
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On the face of it, this statement can be understood as a radical rejection of what 
Laruelle calls the World. That is, the Buddha calls for a refusal of “a tradition that 
is believed to place [the human] in danger” because of its delusory seduction 
and affective capture.18 The Buddha calls, moreover, for a refusal at the very 
root of this danger, namely the coercive views of the community, the consoling 
ruminations on one’s own self- serving interests, authoritative influence, or the 
various doctrinal presentations in which the danger is encoded. The text’s refusal 
goes even further, rejecting the tools that define the great organon of Western 
thought, Aristotle’s own Organon: logical and inferential reasoning. What, then, 
remains as a means, as an organon, of arriving at valid knowledge of the human 
condition? The answer, of course, is to know for yourself.
Nourished by the Enlightenment, Romantic, and Protestant values that 
I  mentioned in the Introduction, the admonishment to know for yourself has 
become for Western Buddhists “the Buddha’s Charter of Free Inquiry.”19 Most 
significantly, it is a charter that warrants the correspondence of Buddhism and 
science. A recent article in Scientific American illustrates the easy logic of this 
relationship. The title of the article asks “Is Buddhism the Most Science- Friendly 
Religion?” (Its answer is yes.)
This teaching [the quote above from the Kālāma Sutta] is widely (and 
appropriately) seen as supporting free inquiry and an absence of rigid dogma, an 
attitude entirely open to empirical verification and thus, consistent with science. 
Moreover, the Kalama Sutra fits quite comfortably into the Western scientific 
tradition: The Royal Society of London, whose full name was the Royal Society 
of London for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge, and which was the 
world’s first and for a long time the foremost scientific society, has as its credo, 
Nullius in verba: “On the words of no one.”20
Nullius in verba, reject dogma, embrace empirical investigation, attanā 
jāneyyātha, and know for yourselves. As theology once did, science currently 
serves as the supreme pontiff of the master discourse on knowledge. In assuming 
Buddhism’s close kinship with modern science, the Western Buddhist logic 
on display here, of course, rejects its affinity to theology.21 My contention that 
Western Buddhism is a critique subsumed within an ideology subsumed within a 
faith, assumes a somewhat more complex situation. Consider, for example, that 
scientific methodology, in fact, embraces nearly all of the strategies rejected by 
the Kālāma Sutta, including the accumulated trials of tradition and experimental 
speculation. Consider also that the Kālāma Sutta glosses knowing for yourself as 






knowing for yourself with meditation or mindfulness is supplanted in the text by 
ethical and affective trainings. Finally, consider that ultimately what you know 
when you know for yourself is precisely the contents of the Buddha’s teachings. 
Considering all of this, how can we avoid the conclusion that what we have 
here is indistinguishable from an over- determining subject- forming ideology 
founded on a faith? Yet, as Donald Lopez observes, the fact remains: “There is 
clearly something about Buddhism that has sustained its long conjunction with 
the word science.”22
What might this “something” be? I have been arguing throughout this book 
that Western Buddhism possesses consequential Real concepts for critiquing 
“own experience,” or, in a Buddhist idiom, for seeing things as they are. I have 
also attempted to demonstrate, on the basis of several concrete examples, how 
Western Buddhist figures exhibit a curious habit of evading the full consequences 
of these concepts. I am arguing that this habit is not merely an occasional lapse. 
It is, rather, a defining feature of Western Buddhist identity. The outcome of 
this habitual evasion is effectively to nullify the concepts’ theoretical or critical 
function, rendering Western Buddhism as little more than a one- dimensional 
self- help fix. This critical function can, I believe, be recovered (if that is the right 
word). But a nonnegotiable requirement of this attempt is that we avoid the 
creation of yet another iteration of Buddhism. To fulfill this essential condition 
we must perform operations on Buddhism that render it unrecognizable 
to Buddhists of any and all varieties. We must, for instance, depotentialize 
Buddhism’s sufficiency as a unitary system of thought, as that is, the integral, 
self- relating network of premises, postulates, and practices called Buddhism. As 
Laruelle says:
We begin by supposing that [Buddhism] does not exist or no longer exists, at least 
in the sufficient and authoritative mode and manner in which it presents itself, 
i.e., as a rational yet transcendental fact that teleologically controls the possible 
operations on it.23
In Part 3 we will explore what happens to Western Buddhist materials once 
we have cancelled this mode and disabled this control. The point here is that 
taking this attitude serves the crucial function of suspending the principle of 
sufficient Buddhism. This suspension, in turn, creates the basic condition for 
treating Buddhism as “a whatever material,”24 to treat it as Buddhism- without- 
sufficiency, or, in other words, as non- buddhism.
In taking this attitude we are producing an effect that Western Buddhism 
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repeatedly fails to realize. (Western Buddhism itself, to repeat, offers concepts that 
tend toward immanence before they mysteriously misturn toward metaphysics 
and transcendence.) Following Laruelle, it is precisely this effect that I  am 
equating with “science.” It is crucial to recognize, however, that the science that 
Laruelle has in mind is not that of, say, biology or physics, per se. Nor is it the 
application of the iterative process of scientific method (observation, hypothesis, 
experiment, etc.). “Science” names for Laruelle, rather, a quite particular 
attitude, both in the sense of a manner or disposition of thought and a position, 
cognitive and affective, in relation to the Real. More specifically, science is “a 
practice of thought,” an experimental practice that operates, like Occam’s razor, 
“in the name of a real simplicity and of a real poverty of thought.”25 I imagine 
that many people who have attempted to follow the tedious tessellation of the 
Western Buddhist dispensation appreciate such an experiment. The necessity 
of such a paring practice is, after all, a familiar theme of that teaching itself. We 
find a pronounced rhetoric of simplification in, for instance, both traditionally 
oriented Zen forms and contemporary secularized meditation and mindfulness 
forms. We will return to this similarity in a moment. I mention it here to provide 
the reader with some contextual footing for Laruelle’s further statement about 
the function of poverty in his concept of science:
Science is in essence a simple and minimal thought. This is not the result of a 
philosophical reduction or a metaphysical ascesis: a simplicity of essence but not 
of structure, which holds in suspense the complexity of division, of abyss, and of 
autoreflection that is [Buddhism’s].26
Science, as a manner of thinking, as a “science- thought,” is valuable to my critique 
in its (science’s) very “essence” rather than in its comprehensive procedural 
particulars. What is this essence? First of all, it is important to note that this 
essence lies within science itself— it is not the result of operations performed 
on science by some ostensibly superior external discipline. Laruelle has in mind 
the numerous “philosophy of science” iterations, in which philosophy and 
philosophy alone possesses the means to think for a mechanically unthinking 
science.27 For our purposes, we might want to bear in mind Western Buddhism’s 
attempts, going back to its formative days in Asia, to reduce science to a servant 
of Western Buddhism’s own need for sufficiency. This need usually revolves 
around a “science of mind” trope in which Buddhism supplies the supplement 
that enables science to think in the manner necessary for a true and truly holistic 
science, namely, “contemplatively.”28 By contrast, Laruelle insists that science’s 






does science think, but it “thinks the Real all- at- once, without dividing it and 
without dividing itself.”29 Science- thought is the means to thinking emptiness, for 
example, all the way through to that for which it but serves as a first name, the 
Real. Such thinking, as practice, moreover, has real- world effects in terms of, for 
instance, subject formation and ideology construction. The far- reaching claim 
being made here is that science- thought is “the pragmatico- theoretical thought 
adequate to the One such as it is according to the One.”30 Most readers recognize 
that this simple essence is in sharp contrast to Western Buddhism’s complex 
essence as Buddhist- thought, to, that is, its interminable dividing of its One (or 
emptiness, no- self, things- as- they- are, the Dharma, etc.) into categories and 
phenomena that inject Buddhism itself back into the Real. So injected, a Western 
Buddhist looks into the One and sees reflected back none other than Western 
Buddhism. This complex mixing of the Real or One with Western Buddhist 
postulates creates the “abyss” and “autoreflection” that Laruelle refers to. We will 
consider this matter in more detail later. The point here is that, like an abyss, 
there is virtually no bottom to this self- reflecting proliferation of Buddhist claims 
on the Real, or indeed on the person and on the world. The result is, again, what 
Laruelle refers to as “the World,” the empirical world seen through the “artificial 
forms and static norms” that constitute Western Buddhism. A “science- thought” 
is thus “at bare minimum the refusal of thinking in accordance with the World.”31
A Western Buddhist practitioner is by definition a person who thinks in 
accordance with Western Buddhism. That may sound like a truism. Recall, 
however, that this same figure claims to speak in the final instance in accordance 
with emptiness, with the self- void, with radical contingency, with the Real. We 
could sum up the manner in which the Western Buddhist thinkers, in the previous 
chapter, failed to fulfill the promise of the first names they cited by pointing 
out that they insisted on thinking about the Real rather than from the Real. We 
know from their examples— examples which I am arguing are symptomatic of 
the principle of sufficient Buddhism— what it is like to think about the Real: it is 
to decide always, and in advance, on Buddhism. The significant contrast between 
Buddhist- thought and science- thought, as well as the formidable stakes that both 
share, should be clear. It should also be clear that the latter, unlike the former, is 
“a thought that moves beyond itself, beyond the vicious circle of deciding upon 
itself to the thought that practices vision- in- One.”32
I said earlier that this scientific attitude, in suspending the principle of sufficient 
Buddhism enables a Buddhism- without- sufficiency. Following Laruelle, we can 
now simply refer to this form of thought- practice as non- buddhism. From this 
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value of such a term is integral to this critique: it enables us to leave Buddhism 
as it is, hence, not pretending to create yet another new, improved product; it 
abrogates the “teleological controls” of the Buddhist masters, who reflexively 
steer Buddhism toward a transcendent World- making; it enables us to reverse 
that trajectory back toward a generic human immanence; and it frees us to 
imagine and formulate new usages for the mutated Buddhist material.
I can imagine that many readers are thinking that the spirit of what I  am 
suggesting already animates Western Buddhism. Clearly, hints of a non- 
buddhism in the sense I am articulating can be spotted throughout Buddhist 
traditions from the earliest days. The Buddha himself might be viewed as a 
figure who mutated rather than abolished Vedic material, thereby inaugurating 
a non- vedic precursor to a possible non- buddhism. A few pieces of evidence that 
suggest such a line of reasoning might be that he reconfigured Vedic cosmogony 
as a twelve- fold chain of dependently originating phenomena; he made figurative 
the literal power of the devas, and transferred its domain from the earthly, 
atmospheric, and heavenly spheres to the consciousness of the meditating 
human; he internalized the sacrificial fire as a potential quality of the mind; he 
bestowed radically new meanings on crucial concepts such as tevijja, karma, 
dharma, brahmin, ārya, satya, and many more. The canonical Buddha even 
inscribes the basic spirit of this non into his own teachings. In the most famous 
instance, he cautions his followers not to attach the raft of the teachings onto 
their backs once they have “attained the other shore,” or realized those teachings 
in their own lives. Doing so, they would merely burden themselves with the 
superfluous weight of Buddhism.33 Zen thought is perhaps the best example of 
the continuation of this non spirit at the root of Buddhism’s founding. Most 
readers may be familiar with the basic tropes, such as if you meet the Buddha 
on the road, kill him; true meditation is non- meditation; a finger pointing to the 
moon; [the Buddha’s teaching is] vast emptiness, nothing holy. Regardless of what 
Linji, Dogen, Huineng, and Bodhidharma/ Shenhui, respectively, intended by 
their utterances, in contemporary circles they are offered as proof of a kind 
of self- deconstructing non- buddhism, in the sense that I have indicated. This 
view is not uncommon in Western Buddhism. It typically serves an attempt to 
present Buddhism as something wholly other than a sufficient (read: a religious 
or philosophical) system, and as something that can only be understood as 
“universal.” Jon Kabat- Zinn, the founder of the Mindfulness movement, offers 
the paradigmatic example of this rhetorical move when he explains that in 
shifting out of an explicit Buddhist framework, he “wanted to offer instead [of 
Buddhism] a kind of translation of a universal understanding or approach that 
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was never really about Buddhism.”34 It would be too cumbersome to offer a more 
detailed evaluation of the merits of this general claim. In place of that, I suggest 
that a ready- to- hand litmus test for readers to apply in all instances of a claim 
to Buddhist self- deconstruction is to ask whether Buddhism thereby forfeits 
its principle of sufficiency. Recall that the price of not doing so, of preserving 
sufficiency, is “the impossibility for [Western Buddhism] to constitute a rigorous, 
non- circular thinking of itself, one which would not beg the question, that is to 
say, a theory.”35
“Theory,” here, is synonymous with “science.” With the rudiments of a science 
of Buddhism in place, we can return to the crucial question of the Real. I hope 
to have demonstrated that Western Buddhism does not permit the full force 
of each Real articulation to which it itself lays claim. I have further suggested 
that while this refusal enables Western Buddhism to maintain its integrity as a 
sufficient system of thought and practice, it simultaneously compromises that 
very integrity by condemning Western Buddhism to a recursive circularity. Yes, 
Buddhism thinks. But in what manner? Based on its treatment of emptiness 
and no- self in the hands of its human representatives, for example, it appears 
incapable of thinking beyond its own self- articulation. Based on the confidence 
of these representatives, “Buddhism” appears unaware that it confuses the 
Real with what Laruelle terms its pretension, with its own concocted mixtures 
(premises, postulates, beliefs, etc.), mixtures, moreover, that Western Buddhism 
is bound, as sufficient thought, to infuse with the Real. Laruelle further argues 
that such thinking ultimately constitutes “a transcendental hallucination of the 
Real.”36 What would it take to avoid this result? Would this not be a result that 
Buddhism, that self- proclaimed organon of things as they are, itself aspires to? 
The first task toward this end is be to interrupt the circular and iterative process 
that, following Laruelle, we call “buddhistic decision.”
Decision
In Twilight of the Idols, Friedrich Nietzsche famously, if enigmatically, declares: “I 
am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.”37 He 
apparently means that when we adopt the World- weaving language of a form 
of thought such as Western Buddhism, “we immediately find ourselves in the 
midst of a system of fetishism.” The fetishism involves the embrace of seductive 
concepts that have metaphysical explanatory power. What they explain, however, 
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Speaking to a readership that holds dear a “stupendous concept of ‘God’ ”— 
itself a fetishistic explanatory concept— Nietzsche implicates “unity, identity, 
permanence, substance, cause, materiality, and being” in the seduction. That is, 
if we hold these terms to name qualities pertaining to actual or potential objects 
in the world, then the Christian notion of “God” becomes rational, and thus 
follows unproblematically. In his theatrical fashion, Nietzsche declares that in a 
future world, “a thousand times more enlightened” than ours, people will resist 
the seduction of the fetish, concluding instead that “these categories could not 
be derived from experience— on the contrary, the whole of experience rather 
contradicts them.” In an even less enlightened world than ours, people believed 
that the sun revolved around the earth. And why should they not have held such 
a view? After all, they saw it with their very own eyes. Similarly, in the matter of 
metaphysical concepts, “it is our language itself that pleads most constantly in 
their favor.” The “error and deceptiveness of things” is thus a result of grammar 
because it follows from being “under an invisible spell” whereby the positing of 
a noun together with a predicate engenders belief in the reality of the object thus 
named as the compelling force, the subject, of that predicate.38 Much like the 
Buddha, Nietzsche attacks this linguistic bewitchment even at the level of the “I.” 
For example, in positing I think, therefore I am as an unassailable bulwark against 
doubt, Descartes’s “belief in grammar,” Nietzsche tells us, forces him into the 
error of taking the subject of the sentence, I, as the true and necessary condition 
of that which is conditioned, think.39 Nietzsche, ever the exemplary psychologist, 
notes that we may indeed feel as though we have willed a thought (and hence 
established the certitude of the I/ soul), but this feeling only occurs in retrospect. 
It follows from our “habit of ignoring and deceiving ourselves about this duality 
by means of the synthetic concept of the ‘I.’ ” This subjective feeling and the 
habit it engenders unleashes “a whole chain of erroneous conclusions, and, 
consequently, false evaluations” about the very nature of “thinking,” such that it 
is compelled by a substance (the subject I) endowed with certain properties of 
agency (the predicate think).40 If an analysis of the mere grammatical function 
of I reveals such serious fissures in the construction of what Nietzsche calls a 
“moralo- optical delusion”41 and Laruelle, “a transcendental hallucination,” or 
simply a “World,” how much more destabilizing will a rigorous investigation 
into the rules and patterns— the general “syntax”— that comprise that World’s 
system be? Note that Nietzsche is not required to investigate the ontological 
status of the concepts that he names (identity, permanence, etc.). He is able 
to raise the specter of implausibility at the very level of “the first conditions of 






burrow into the roots of grammatical reasoning. In providing the example that 
he does (God), Nietzsche signals the enormity of what is at stake. In approaching 
the matter grammatically rather than conceptually, he, furthermore, is able to 
reveal that “the ‘true world’ ” has been erected on a contradiction of the “real 
world.” This, he says, is “a symptom of degenerating life” because it unveils 
our refusal to confront what Althusser called, nearly a century later, “the real 
conditions” of our existence. Nietzsche continues:
There is no sense in spinning yarns about another world, provided, of course, 
that we do not possess a mighty instinct which urges us to slander, belittle, and 
cast suspicion on this life: in this case we should be avenging ourselves on this 
life with a phantasmagoria of “another,” of a “better” life.42
The problem, of course, is that we do possess such a mighty instinct. What makes 
this drive toward the phantasmagoric so delusive is that its trigger is concealed 
in the very structure of our language. In similar fashion, when Laruelle speaks 
of the “transcendental hallucination of the Real” he is not making an ontological 
statement. He is, rather, pointing to a “grammatical” confusion. Like Nietzsche, 
he therefore employs a linguistic concept to capture this confusion: “amphiboly” 
or “amphibology.” This term denotes an ambiguity of meaning arising from 
an uncertain grammatical construction rather than from the import of words 
themselves. A  famous example of an amphiboly is no less than the Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states: “A well regulated 
militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” We know from subsequent commentary 
that that the right to bears arms does not pertain exclusively to state militias; 
it is in fact extended to private citizens. But the grammatical formation of the 
statement arguably invites such a conclusion. A more humorous example comes 
from Groucho Marx:  “One morning, I  shot an elephant in my pajamas.” The 
amphiboly, the unclear referent of “in my pajamas,” sets up the punchline: “How 
he got into my pajamas I’ll never know.” We saw instances of Western Buddhist 
amphibology earlier, where, for example, the Buddhist concept of “no- self ” 
is confused, and thereby seamlessly substituted, for the Real self- void. This 
substitution is a decisive operation in the positing of the specific Buddhist 
World. It is the operation “by which the Real is substituted by the transcendental 
or by thought.” Later, the ubiquitous term The Dharma will be nominated as 
the transcendental pivot on which this syntactical operation turns in Western 
Buddhism. My purpose here is to introduce the amphibology that we term 
“buddhistic decision” as “endless circular intersubstitution,” as an “unstoppable 
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movement of circularity.” As we have seen in our Western Buddhist examples, 
this circularity “is not marked by reciprocity but rather radical asymmetry.” The 
superior term is invariably the Buddhist postulate while the “inferior term in 
this asymmetry is the Real.”43
The simplest sense of buddhistic decision can be gleaned from that last 
statement. In this sense, decision is simply choosing Western Buddhism’s term 
over the Real term. An interpellated Western Buddhist is thus a person who 
always, perhaps even reflexively, decides on the Buddhist term. Again, while this 
statement may appear tautological, it is not at all self- evident from Buddhist 
rhetoric, whereby a Western Buddhist must necessarily decide for the Real 
(as emptiness, no- self, suffering, etc.), of which her tradition’s term is, at best, 
but an inferior first name. We all know the rudiment of decision in this sense. 
The economist H. A. Simon defines it as: “the process at the end of which each 
moment one chooses one [option among] alternatives.” The simplicity of that 
formulation, of course, masks the complexity of decision making, involving as it 
does psychological, economic, and numerous other factors. Yet, this is a process 
in which we all continually engage, and an endpoint at which we continually 
arrive. We know, too, how consequential a choice is both collectively, in the 
continuation or dissolution of a World, and individually, in the creation of a life. 
Simon thus adds that “The series of decisions that determine behavior during a 
given amount of time can be called a strategy.”44 Deciding on Western Buddhism 
is a strategy. It involves desiring the promise of the Western Buddhist term, 
choosing the Western Buddhist resolution of the amphiboly, and speaking and 
acting— living— in accord with that syntax.
We can understand this process as the psychological or affective aspect 
of decision. The personal reasons that drive people to choose the Western 
Buddhism strategy are of course infinitely varied and complex. I just mean to 
suggest that among these reasons is the shared one of an emotionally charged 
desire. Ironically, given its rhetoric of desire, Western Buddhism elicits many 
desires in its subjects. It is in fact a veritable desiring- machine. Some objects 
of its desire- production are explicit, such as enlightenment, awakening, 
happiness, non- judgmentalism, equanimity, and the plethora of neuroscientific 
promises of reduced stress, a healthier brain, increased wellbeing, and so on. 
Some are implicit, covert, or unacknowledged, such as consummate plenitude, 
unscathed transmigration, spiritual superiority, cosmic embrace, and so forth. 
Psychologist Nietzsche, of course, already hinted at this desirous- emotional 





The role of personal desire in deciding on the specific terms and overall 
strategy of Western Buddhism is certainly an interesting and important element 
in considering the nature of buddhistic decision. We have to leave it behind, 
however, in order to discuss an aspect that, being less subjective, is more 
consequential for the present critique. Following Laruelle, we consider this 
aspect to be an “operation” internal to the very workings of Western Buddhism. 
The term “workings,” of course, like its synonyms “structure” and “system,” 
conceals the infinite details that comprise the system. I  address this point in 
a moment. I make it here in order to throw light, once again, on the fact that 
“Western Buddhism” names a matrix of production. Yes, Western Buddhism 
works. But how does it work? It works to effectively produce exactly whatever 
it is programmed to produce,45 for example, concepts that articulate a World; 
anthropotechnical practices that enact and inculcate that World; institutions that 
preserve these concepts and practices and generate a charismatic aura around 
them; interpersonal relations that elicit and sustain desire for the lived effect of 
the World’s promised charism; subjects who embody, fashion, and reproduce 
that World. Decision is the operation that enables all such production necessary 
to erect and preserve the specific World called Western Buddhism. We can 
therefore consider this internal operation to be Western Buddhism’s “Principal 
and formalized invariant or structure.”46 As we will see in Part 3, without this 
invariant “Western Buddhism” will name not, as it in fact currently does, an 
integral system of thought and practice, but a chaos of mere chôra, or of human 
cultural material rendered ideologically inert (and hence interpretively up for 
grabs). Significantly, Western Buddhism itself is unconscious of this operation; it 
could “not indicate it without also simultaneously . . . affecting its own identity.”47 
This is why I  claimed in the Introduction that Buddhism necessarily lacks a 
consequential self- critique. A Buddhism that is aware of its decisional operation, 
is no longer a Buddhism. Such a Buddhism would be a non- buddhism, possessing 
an altogether other identity. This point is important to mention here because it 
gives a sense of the definitive function served by buddhistic decision. Now, with 
these introductory remarks, we can look at one of Laruelle’s technical definitions 
of decision:
The philosophical Decision, variable according to the philosophers, 
corresponds to a certain invariant, explicit, or repressed distribution of 
transcendental and empirical functions. Compared to an ensemble of facts 
known as “empirical,” or a “technico- experimental” work, etc., the philosopher 
reactivates the decision of the question of the essence of phenomena, which he 
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and the a priori, whatever it be; then that of the a priori and the transcendental, 
which is an ascent such that he calls it beginning, origin, substance, Being, etc., 
but which is always presumably authentic reality, equipped with transcendental 
functions (in a broad sense) . . . Decision is an operation of transcendence 
which believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of a unitary 
discourse on reality.
As I mentioned earlier, the term x- buddhism serves to account for that which is 
“variable according to the [Buddhists],” to, that is, those representatives of the 
extraordinarily divergent forms of thought and practice that are burrowed within 
the term “Buddhism.” In order to explicate Laruelle’s definition, it is necessary to 
say more about the meaning of this term.48 The nomenclature that I have been 
using in this book, Buddhism and its major subcategory Western Buddhism, 
denotes an abstract, and abstractly static, whole. An analysis of this whole would 
reveal it to be an assemblage of cultural- doctrinal systems (doctrine, religion, 
philosophy, ritual, mythology, fashion, aesthetics, architecture, politics, etc.) 
that claim an overarching authority concerning human knowledge. The term 
x- buddhism aims to capture two crucial and incontrovertible facts about this 
abstract whole: (i) it splinters into innumerable variables (as some x), and yet, 
somewhat counterintuitively (ii) it repeats itself incessantly (as Buddhism). 
Concerning the first point, we could study each variable x. Such a study would 
be both diachronic and synchronic, historical and comparative. It would enable 
us to compile an exhaustive descriptive catalogue of Buddhist communities, 
graphing their relations and tracing their divergences. In so doing, we would 
discover differences concerning, for instance, each x’s version of the means and 
end of the whole’s, of Buddhism’s, grand authority, in all of its minute detail. From 
such a study we would begin to see that the whole, Buddhism, breeds virtually 
interminable interpretation not only of the world, but of itself. Thus, Buddhism 
fractures into unending modifiers while simultaneously retaining its identity. 
Laruelle terms this enclosed recursive quality “auto- position,” and highlights 
its importance by dubbing it “the highest formal act of the philosophical 
Decision.” The act is “formal” because it concerns the “objectification of [x- 
buddhism] itself ”49— the result of the fracture is always some form. Buddhism 
posits Buddhism. (In a recurring theme of this book, this sentence appears self- 
evident until we recall that Buddhism claims to posit not the World but the 
world, not itself but the Real, reality as it is, things as they are, thusness.) This 
self- positing conceit of some given form of Buddhism, some x- buddhism, also 
carries a spatial sense. Here, auto- position means that the x- buddhism occupies 




position ensures that Buddhism remains external to, over and above, the realms 
of knowledge— the nature of consciousness, phenomena, causality, personhood, 
science, etc.— over which it inevitably prevails. Such transcendence, of course, 
also further ensures the force of the principle of sufficient Buddhism. As our 
second point articulates, the obligation to maintain sufficiency means that auto- 
position entails “repetition of a more or less differentiated Same.” This “Same” 
results from the “certain invariant” that Laruelle refers to in the definition above. 
That is, a study of the x- variables would generate clues as to the very function 
that is producing such difference- of- the- same. After all, each modifier indicates 
membership in the single set, Buddhism. “Decision” is the cut in each x that 
determines its identity as a member of the set. At the same time, it is that which 
constitutes the identity of the set as a whole as “an operation of transcendence 
which believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of a unitary 
discourse on reality.”
It is this “operation of transcendence” that establishes Western Buddhism 
as a form of faith rather than of “first- science” or even of knowledge. In 
Laruelle’s trenchant formulation, one that should ring true to Buddhist ears, 
this operation marks each x- buddhism as “a faith, with the sufficiency of faith, 
intended by necessity to remain empty but which necessarily evades this void 
by its repopulation with objects and foreign goals provided by experience, 
culture, history, language, etc.”50 As such, if Western Buddhism currently 
comprises knowledge, it is necessarily a visionary form of knowledge. If it 
comprises a science (even in Laruelle’s denuded sense) it is a visionary form of 
science. If Western Buddhism is to contribute otherwise to human knowledge, 
the repudiation of the principle of sufficient Buddhism is unavoidable. This 
repudiation, in turn, requires the annulment of buddhistic decision. Our task 
now is then to investigate that which instigates this vision, or, as Laruelle calls 
it, this hallucination, in the first place, namely, the “repressed distribution of 
transcendental and empirical functions.”
I said that each x is marked by a cut that determines its identity as a member 
of the Buddhism set. In keeping with this fractal imagery, we can now view the 
entire edifice of Buddhism as possessing this same cut. “Decision” thus indicates 
a scission between Buddhism’s “transcendental and empirical functions.” So, 
in order to discern Buddhism’s identity, we need to perform not an analysis, 
based on its self- imagined unitary nature, but rather what Laruelle calls a 
dualysis, based on its unacknowledged, because unconscious, split nature. It is 
this scission that creates the gap we saw at work earlier, when, for instance, the 
Real first name “self- void” became confused for the Buddhist vision of “no- self.” 
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It is within this gap, in other words that the amphiboly occurs, permitting the 
frictionless (mis)turn from the Real to the hallucinated material. I  think the 
clearest way to see this function in Buddhism is to consider the role played by 
the concept of The Dharma.
An ubiquitous term from the founding of Buddhism, The Dharma is “the 
sum total of the ways in which the Buddha and his disciples after him tried to 
communicate . . . the experience of Enlightenment to others.” To the uninitiated 
observer this totality is extraordinarily complex. To the practitioner, however, 
“it is really very simple.” For, “the Dharma is nothing other than the means 
to this experience.” It is, in other words, “the way to Enlightenment.”51 As its 
very root meaning denotes, The Dharma literally establishes, supports, sustains, 
and preserves the decisional operation that defines Buddhism.52 In the several 
instances that we have come across it in the present text, additional meanings 
of this extremely multivalent term are apparent. When Kabat- Zinn speaks of 
his Mindfulness doctrine as a “translation of a universal understanding,” he 
is invoking the ancient Indian sense of The Dharma as the cosmic principle 
of truth and order, somewhat comparable to the Christian idea of logos. 
Buddhist teacher Stephen Batchelor echoes this meaning when he speaks of 
“the dharma” as comprising a “universal set of values” that is impervious to 
the endless bickering of those (non- Buddhist) practitioners who deal in mere 
“truth- claims.” Unlike such claims, “which will inevitably conflict with other 
truth- claims . . . dharma practice is not about being ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ ”53 The 
reason, of course, is that The Dharma is also the fundamental force animating 
proper conduct, duty, right, justice. It is, in short, the Universal Law, the 
obeying or flouting of which determines the ultimate character of one’s life, 
life after life. When Batchelor calls for “a praxis- based, post- metaphysical 
vision of the dharma,” furthermore, he is invoking an additional meaning of 
The Dharma, namely, as signifying the Buddha’s teaching. We saw earlier that 
Ken Jones means the same thing when he insists that his socially conscious 
engaged Buddhism is “firmly based on the core tenets of the Dharma.” In 
Buddhist discourse, however, this sense of the term as teaching carries with 
it the former sense; hence, the Buddha’s teaching is that which is grounded 
in the cosmic order. Buddhist teachers, from the Buddha on, can thus speak 
grandly of “the eternal and timeless dharma,” which infuses with the lifeblood 
of enlightenment the dharma- gates, dharma- lineages, dharma- transmissions, 
dharma- talks, dharma- heirs, dharma- names, dharma- friends, dharma- 
body, dharma- protectors, dharma- realms, in short, the treasury of the true 





singular— The Dharma, the teaching, the dispensation— further indicating the 
unitary nucleus active within Buddhism’s plural x forms.)
In terms unintended by Sangharakshita’s conventional presentation above, 
I, too, view the function of The Dharma as being “very simple.” The Dharma 
is, namely, simply the pivot on which the empirical- transcendental axis turns. 
It is simultaneously the warden of reality’s inventory and the guarantor of 
that inventory’s warranty. This dual function means that The Dharma must 
necessarily split reality. The totality of minute elements that comprise some x- 
buddhist teaching is intended, of course, to constitute a perspicuous, indeed 
an “enlightened,” description of the immanent world. (Additional meanings of 
dharma as atomic constituents of reality and elemental properties of experience, 
are apparent here.54) These features are thus held to be empirically verifiable. 
As such, the x- buddhist teaching assumes the attitude of a science: it faithfully 
tracks phenomena. It does so, moreover, at the risk of its own sufficiency since 
a science- thought is perpetually testing, adjusting, eliminating, reformulating, 
etc., even its most fundamental hypotheses and conclusions. This gesture, 
finally, requires that the teaching hover unfailingly near the Real, looking out 
toward the world. We know, however, that this last requirement is not met. The 
misturnings that we witnessed are the result of a reflexive, specifically Buddhist, 
impulse to turn back toward the origin of the concept, toward precisely The 
Dharma. The Dharma is thus the “a priori” that Laruelle mentions in our 
definition. It is the prior “authentic reality” that ensures the verity of the posited 
empirical claims of x- buddhism. Significantly, however, unlike the presumably 
immanent, thus empirically verifiable, features of that teaching (suffering- desire, 
self- void, nihility, etc.), the guarantor is posited ideally, and thus “equipped with 
transcendental functions.” One of these functions is, as I have already said, that 
of cosmic underwriter for the teaching. This function, however, is fulfilled at 
the cost of other, further debilitating, ones. In order to guarantee the necessary 
warrant of sufficiency, The Dharma must mix its transcendental idealism 
into its ostensibly immanent materialism. Mixture, being “characteristic 
of specifically [buddhistic] unitary syntaxes,” is, in fact, a “first name for the 
[buddhistic] Decision.”55 This intermixture of immanent and transcendent 
features is responsible for the unscientific “visionary” nature of Buddhist 
knowledge. Śūnyatā as “pure meta- sign and empty element” constituting “the 
precondition for [some given x- buddhism’s] effective functioning,” to return to 
Eagleton’s formulation, must not be permitted to remain immanently empty. 
Mixed with the tessellation of postulates that constitute it as a properly dharmic, 
hence transcendental, term, x- buddhist emptiness becomes, as Timothy Morton 
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informed us above, a near- miraculously, if inconstant and “shimmering,” 
productive fullness. It is in this manner that decision implicates Western 
Buddhism in perpetual auto- position and auto- donation:  Buddhism is that 
which posits Buddhism and gives Buddhism. If it fashioned itself as “a faith, 
with the sufficiency of faith,” we would not have to bother with a critique since 
a faith requires no justification for positing and giving itself:  it requires only 
faith. Western Buddhism, however, as the progeny of the “Knower of the World” 
(lokavidū), fashions itself as a rigorous organon of things as they are, and so 
requires the scrutiny that only a science- thought enables.56 Laruelle thus offers a 
key to further “dualysis” with the following description of decision.
We will say that Philosophical Decision is the Idea of a relative- absolute whole. Its 
most encompassing and least detailed mechanism can in effect be described . . . 
as a structure in 2/ 3 terms, as a Dyad + One.57 . . . First, an identity of 2/ 3 (insofar 
as the third term, synthesis, is immanent to the dyad, philosophy being in need 
of itself). Second, a 3/ 2 identity (insofar as the term of synthesis is transcendent 
to the dyad, philosophy being in excess to itself).58
This “fractional matrix in 2/ 3 terms” (read as “two three,” not “two thirds”) is the 
“most universal invariant trait” of Buddhism. In the most general terms, we can 
therefore say that it constitutes the absolute aspect of the buddhistic decisional 
whole. At the same time it produces the algorithmic function within Buddhism 
that initiates the recursive procedure out of which a virtually infinite sequence 
of x- buddhisms might be generated. As such, it also constitutes decision’s 
relative aspect. We can consider this relative- absolute whole in more specific 
terms, whereby the “matrix” might operate as follows. I  nominate saṃsāra 
(S) and pratītyasamutpāda (P) as the most viable Buddhist candidates for the 
dyad because of their role as succinct and acute descriptors of the Buddhist 
World.59 S means “the world,” empirical reality as a circular maelstrom of 
being. The individual beings who inhabit the world are driven into potentially 
endless transmigration by the forces of desire and ignorance. As such, S, as the 
popular Buddhist trope has it, is an ocean of suffering. P means “contingency,” 
the causal, or better, conditioning, mechanism that determines both the being’s 
perpetuation in S (rebirth and suffering) and, potentially, its cessation (nirvāṇa).60 
As “the heart of the Buddha’s doctrine,” P is “the central principle of the Buddha’s 
teaching, constituting both the objective content of its liberating insight and 
the germinative source for its vast network of doctrines and disciplines.”61 The 
canonical formula for this mechanism goes: “When this is, that is; this arising, 








Buddhist usage, P thus denotes the interdependent, mutually conditioned, 
nature of all phenomena.62 As conditioned being (S) and conditioning Being 
(P), this dyad can be seen as the definitive (absolute) Buddhist scaffolding on 
which the minute (relative) x particulars are mounted. S is the world given to 
our senses. It is the unimaginable agglomeration of beings, from infinitesimal 
subatomic particles to oceans and mountains and planets and galaxies, and to 
the teeming crush of bacterial, animal, and human organisms that populate 
them to the immense multiversal receptacle that contains it all, from brute 
matter to enlightened sentience, swirling and undulating eternally, each element 
arising, persisting, conjugating with interminable other forms, dissolving, then 
disappearing. Why is this “whole mass of suffering” the way that it is? P is both 
the explanation and the solution, for “Who sees interdependent origination 
(P) sees The Dharma; who sees The Dharma sees interdependent origination.” 
Whatever “the Buddha” might have meant here, I suggest we understand it in all 
of its multivalent glory.
Let’s just note in passing that within the articulation of a unitary discourse 
like Buddhism, “the world” transmutes into “the World.” The world, immanent 
and material, empirically given, is, within the very articulation, transformed 
into the World, transcendent and ideal, buddistically given. Since, however, a 
committed Western Buddhist would deny this distinction— for he or she has, 
by definition, made the decision that the World is precisely the world— we 
have to take a different tack. A  more substantial critique requires that we 
identify the internal operation that renders this decision cause for conceptual 
hallucination rather than for a generically “liberating insight.” The S- P 
combination is, in Laruelle’s formulation, “a Dyad of contrasted terms and a 
divided Unity, immanent and transcendent to the Dyad.”63 In our definition, 
this “immanent” state of affairs is represented as “a structure in 2/ 3 terms, 
as a Dyad+One.” The Dharma (D), as the lawful function that synthesizes 
the dyad of S and P, is the +one that, moreover, transforms the empirical 2 
into a rational 3. In order to serve as the dyad’s synthesizing (and necessary) 
guarantor within the empirical world that the S- P dyad aims to lend liberating 
intelligibility, however, D must simultaneously be extrinsic to the world given 
as the dyad. Thus, the “matrix” may also be understood as a “3/ 2 identity.” 
The unity of the ostensibly empirical and thus phenomenologically verifiable 
2 is divided and then subsumed within a transcendentally grounded 3 (the 2 
plus the 1). The base assumption here is so crucial that it bears repeating: the 
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Again, the believer will object. And she must! The operation, however, 
constitutes an inescapable circularity, whereby the premise (D) is contained 
in the conclusion (S- P), and the conclusion, in the premise. In other words, 
the entire decisional structure of Buddhism amounts to an explanans (D: the 
teaching, cosmic structure), that is already present in every instance of the 
very explanandum (S- P:  phenomenal manifestation), and an explanandum, 
every instance of which already attests to the truth of the explanans.64 In x- 
buddhistic terms:  The saṃsāra- pratītyasamutpāda nexus is visible through 
The Dharma, and The Dharma is visible in the contingent swirl of the 
world that it, The Dharma, minutely indexes. Indeed, it is true:  whoever 
sees interdependent origination operating in the world sees The Dharma; 
and whoever sees The Dharma operating in the world sees interdependent 
origination. Decision constitutes the specifically x- buddhist vision of the 
world. It is in embodying this vision that the practitioner becomes “the shape 
of the World.”65
It may help to clarify this somewhat technical explanation of decision by 
returning briefly to the “real world/ true world” distinction discussed earlier. In 
synthesizing the two terms of the dyad, The Dharma ensures the dyad’s unity, 
verity, and sufficiency. However, being necessarily external to the dyad, The 
Dharma also creates the division between the “real world” of the (immanent) 
dyad and the “true world” of its (transcendental) grounding. “Real” has a 
valuable resonance for us since it is the term that lies at the heart of this 
critique. We will return to this point in the following chapter. Ultimately, 
however, “apparent world” is more salient than “real world.”66 Nietzsche’s 
ultimate goal in introducing this distinction was, after all, to abolish “the 
greatest error that has ever been committed.” That error is generated in the 
metaphysical pretense that we possess “a criterion of reality in the forms of 
reason” on which we erect the “true world,” and, along with it, the very notion 
of the mere appearance of the “apparent” world. For the x- buddhist, The 
Dharma constitutes such a criterion. Nietzsche’s fuller statement is instructive 
for our purposes.
This is the greatest error that has ever been committed, the essential fatality of 
error on earth: one believed one possessed a criterion of reality in the forms of 
reason— while in fact one possessed them in order to become master of reality, 
in order to misunderstand reality in a shrewd manner— 
And behold: now the world became false, and precisely on account of the 






Nietzsche, recall, wants us to see the reality- constituting terms that institute 
this error— change, becoming, ultimate truth, The Dharma, etc.— as fetishistic 
explanatory concepts plucked from the tree of reason rather than gathered 
along “the road to science.” We are involved here in a “fiction of a world that 
corresponds to our desires: [a] psychological trick,” he says.
The intention [is] to deceive oneself in a useful way; the means, the invention 
of formulas and signs by means of which one could reduce the confusing 
multiplicity to a purposive and manageable schema.67
Again, as interesting as it would be to illuminate this affective, psychological, 
aspect of decision, it would not get us very far. If the Western Buddhist World 
is for the nonbeliever but a “psychological trick” it is for the believer, as Stephen 
Batchelor taught us above, a “universal set of values” impervious to the “right” 
and “wrong” of mere “truth- claims”; and the attempt to sort out the difference 
leads to nothing but fruitless bickering. Uncovering the cognitive aspect is 
another matter entirely. In delineating the internal grammar of decision, we have 
a truly powerful instrument of critique. It enables us, believer and nonbeliever 
alike, to identify the character of Western Buddhist discourse (speech, text, 
argumentation, rhetoric). Most importantly, perhaps, it allows us to consider 
the human consequences of the main features of this discourse: a form of life 
ensnared in circularity and specularity. “Specularity” refers to the reflexive 
tendency within Western Buddhism to gaze into the world and see reflected 
back its own theories, postulates, categories, etc. Specularity ensures that the 
world becomes, for the Western Buddhist, the mirror of Western Buddhism. 
Specularity thus offers a seductive means to, in Nietzsche’s words above, 
“reduce the confusing multiplicity” of possible ideologies “to a purposive and 
manageable schema.” It is the decision to accept this image in the mirror of the 
world that catalyzes a person’s interpellation into the Western Buddhist thought- 
world. Circularity ensures Western Buddhism’s infinite capacity to interpret 
the world. The practitioner can rest assured that she possesses the “criterion of 
reality” that renders all things buddhistizable.68 Finally, in giving thought to the 
real life effects of decision on an actual living human being, some of my readers 
may find that Laruelle’s occasionally violent language is not only justified but 
imperative. Let’s imagine you conclude that there is at least some merit to the 
claim that decision usurps human interests in the name of a visionary form of 
knowledge that, crucially, presents itself as a science of the Real. If so, is not 
language, however figurative, that speaks of victimhood, insurrection, the x- 
buddhist arsenal, amputation, and even murder, suddenly pertinent? Perhaps the 
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decided Western Buddhist will still say no! Well, I suppose there will always be 
bickering among incommensurable communities of thought. To the undecided 
observer, one outcome, however, seems likely:  Western Buddhist figures who 
ignore the consequences of the decisional matrix are trading their seats at the 




The great feast of knowledge
Picture the scene:  A colossal hall packed full of massive wooden rectangular 
tables, around which are sitting, standing, pacing, gesticulating the motliest 
throng of human beings you can imagine. Wealthy and poor, well- dressed and 
ragged, smart and stupid, saints and monsters, the ruined and the saved; at 
turns pensive, polite, inflamed, and furious, merging, submerging, coalescing, 
colliding in excited anticipation. The hall reverberates with the raucous roar of 
booming voices. The Great Feast of Knowledge is at hand! The feast is a place 
where ideas— concepts, beliefs, myths, truths, fantasies, hopes and dreams— are 
subjected to a ravaging ordeal; they are:  exalted, weaponized, hunted down, 
beaten, contested, defended, slaughtered, thrown into the fire, served up, 
desecrated, devoured. This feast has been unfolding since the first primitive 
grunts of human communication. Though refined through the centuries, 
the feast is still permeated by the most primeval dual need of homo sapiens 
ape: security and belonging. At the imposing entrance stands a guard. His task 
is to collect the weapons from the grand disciplinary forces seeking entrance 
to the feast. Philosophy, History, Physics, Literature, Law— everyone may enter, 
but first shorn of sword and insignia. Look! Buddhism is arriving, arrayed 
with its battery of concepts, inexhaustible treasures illuminating the darkness 
of the world; its bodhisattva field marshals armed with seductively confident 
arguments; its Buddha, glowing with the sovereign nimbus of the thaumaturge. 
Stripped down, deprived of their regency, institutionally indigent, the Buddhist 
agents enter the hall indistinguishable from everyone else. They take their seats 
amid the chaotic swarm. The struggle begins.
The Western Buddhist no! that I supposed, rightly or wrongly, at the end of 
the previous chapter, should not be passed over too quickly. I also mentioned 
there the endless bickering (Nietzsche’s “war”?) that typically characterizes 
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incommensurable communities of thought. Almost invariably, what follows 
this bickering is the end of dialogue, each party retreating back into the secure 
warm bosom of its community. If my critique is to have any effect beyond a self- 
selected group of already critical- minded readers, it is crucial that it offer a way 
through this quagmire. The trick, of course, is that the way proposed be agreed 
on by all parties. That rarely happens in real life. The trope of The Great Feast 
of Knowledge, however, is intended as a way forward in thought at least. I will 
say more in a moment about that idea specifically. First, some exploration of the 
very idea of incommensurability and how it might, paradoxically, enable even 
the most recalcitrant reader’s reception of this critique.
As Laruelle claims for non- philosophy, I  claim for the present book, and 
for non- buddhism specifically, namely, that it offers “thought for [Western 
Buddhism], but which [Western Buddhism] does not want, and which it resists 
de jure.” Of course it resists! This critique is claiming, after all that Western 
Buddhism currently has more in common with a “psychological trick” than with 
a “science.” I acknowledge the necessity of this resistance even though, as I have 
emphasized throughout this book, Western Buddhism (Buddhism, x- buddhism, 
Mindfulness, Zen) fashions itself as something like a rigorous science. Still, to 
entertain the possibility that it “relies on this thought to make something other 
than a simple transcendental illusion which is ignorant of itself ” is a lot to ask 
a fan of Western Buddhism. This is true even though I further claim that this 
thought aims to relate to Western Buddhism as a “new type of ‘object,’ ” one 
which Buddhism itself has perhaps concealed from us, and “which can do so 
without destroying [Buddhism] through positivism.”1 There seems to be some 
element in our respective approaches that marks as adversarial this x- buddhism/ 
non- buddhism encounter. To leave it at that, however, would be a grave 
mistake, one that undermines the very intent of my critique. It would be equally 
unproductive to leave the seemingly intractable issue of incommensurability 
unaddressed. The Polish microbiologist Ludwik Fleck calls these differing 
approaches thought styles. To psychoanalyze our feast participants for a moment, 
we might say that their respective thought style is a mere symptom, a manifest 
sign of an underlying identification; it marks the place— the “(w)hole” of 
discourse— that the participant has “fallen into.” A person’s thought style thus 
reveals his or her subscription to a program of knowledge. More specifically, 
Fleck defines a thought style as “the readiness for directed perception and 
appropriate assimilation of what has been perceived.”2 He explains that what 
directs perception and determines appropriate assimilation is the particular 
thought collective that produces a thought style. But first, I should mention the 
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role that mood plays in the allure of ideas. Although Fleck is taking the natural 
sciences as his example of the genesis and development of knowledge, anyone 
referring to religious material such as Buddhism should recognize the qualities 
of this “mood.”
[The mood] is expressed as a common reverence for an ideal; in the belief that 
what is being revered can be achieved only in the distant, perhaps infinitely 
distant future; in the glorification of dedicating oneself to its service; in a definite 
hero worship and a distinct tradition.3
Significantly, the symptomatic nature of a thought style ensures that the 
interlocutor employs it reflexively. This reflexivity, in fact, marks the successful 
subjectivization of the person within a particular ideological apparatus; or, in 
Laruelle’s terms, it is indicative of the force of decision in assuming a World. It is 
this apparatus that Fleck refers to as a thought collective. A committed Western 
Buddhist practitioner is called to, is made to desire, Buddhism as a system of 
knowledge on hearing the promise of its powers. But that practitioner must 
then spend time within the institutional structure that encodes the master’s 
knowledge, being formed as the “special ‘carrier,’ ” as the embodiment, of that 
knowledge via the thought style of the collective.
A “thought collective” [is] a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas 
or maintaining intellectual interaction . . . The individual within the collective 
is never, or hardly ever, conscious of the prevailing thought style, which almost 
always exerts an absolutely compulsive force upon his thinking and with which 
it is not possible to be at variance.4
It is this tendency toward style invariance combined with institutionally 
reinforced personal identity formation that foreshadows incommensurability. 
An astronomer might listen “with respect” (as we like to believe) as her astrologer 
interlocutor explains the impact of Venus’s rising in Gemini on the love life 
of earthlings, but she won’t be buying any of it. Conversely, the astrologer, on 
hearing from the astronomer that Venus’s atmosphere consists of 96  percent 
carbon dioxide, 3.5  percent nitrogen, and less than 1  percent of carbon 
monoxide, argon, sulfur dioxide, and water vapor, might, while feigning interest, 
secretly believe his interlocutor to be “trapped in the intellect,” and thus wholly 
missing the point. Both interlocutors are “experts on Venus.” But to each, the 
other’s thought style, and by extension institutional thought collective, is deeply 
misguided, even foolish. The institutional inculcation that is necessary for the 




108 A Critique of Western Buddhism
Because it belongs to a community, the thought style of the collective undergoes 
social reinforcement . . . It constrains the individual by determining “what can 
be thought in no other way.”5
At The Great Feast of Knowledge, Western Buddhism must enter into dialogue 
with disparate thought collectives. Imagine, for example, the conversation 
between agents of, say, Biology and Buddhism on the necessity of lust/ lobha for 
human existence, for reproduction and perpetuation of the species, for instance. 
Such an encounter, such a fusion, creates a new thought collective, however 
fleeting and begrudged. For, a nonnegotiable premise of The Great Feast of 
Knowledge is that all disciplines think. At the feast, thought circulates freely. 
Among other consequences, this feature accounts for the possibility of what 
we all know to be true of systems of thought, even the most sacrosanct:  they 
change. Hence, as Fleck says, a “fundamental phenomenon of epistemology 
is the fact that the circulation of thought is always related, in principle to its 
transformation.”6
So, our reflection on incommensurability has a hint of promise. But, as the 
rowdy medieval image of the feast is meant to convey, it is a promise that carries 
with it a certain threat of conceptual anarchy. For who can say what might be 
bred in the dregs of thought’s circulation? Who can say whether the trajectory 
of “transformation” might not be mutilation, defacement, undesired mutation, 
perversion? Yet, as the great champion of the unbridled anarchy of thought, Paul 
Feyerabend, insists, perhaps knowledge absolutely depends on the communal 
sounding of discordant local knowledges:
Knowledge . . . is not a series of self- consistent theories that converges 
toward an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is rather 
an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps even 
incommensurable) alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth 
that is part of the collection forcing others into greater articulation and all of 
them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of our 
consciousness.7
But before we celebrate our escape from the morass of incommensurability, 
Feyerabend reminds us that this turbulent ocean of knowledge is populated not 
only by the “lucubrations of experts” but also by “ancient and modern prejudices 
. . . and the fantasies of cranks.”8 How can we determine the difference? By what 
criterion can we judge?
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Thinking from the Real-One
Recall Kafka’s figure standing before the law. The law is nowhere to be seen or 
heard or otherwise apprehended by the senses. Neither is it an invisible mystical 
force available only to nonsensorial intuition. Neither is it the product of reason 
or the concoction of superstition. The law is real but it does not exist. The man 
from the country is evidence of that conundrum because he is its effect; he is a 
lived instance of the law’s real authority. Seeking entrance to the law, the man is 
compelled by the law to stand before the law. With the devotion of a saint, he 
endures in order to behold the face of the law, to gain liberating insight into the 
law. But since there never has been an outside to the law, such a relationship is 
simply not possible. So, he waits in vain. To stand thus is to stand already, it is to 
have always stood, before the face of the law.9
It is the same for the agents who submit themselves to unarming at the door 
to the feast. The decimation of their conceptual arsenal was already the case. 
The stripping of their power regalia had already occurred. The depotentializing 
of their charisma took effect ab aeterno. The Great Feast of Knowledge is where 
World’s collide. The background to this struggle, though, has always been and 
will always be the world, the “black universe,” itself. Seeking a secure place on 
which to stand, yearning for membership in a community of Wisdom, “the 
human gropes in the World,” says Laruelle, but “the World floats in the Universe, 
powerless to touch its borders.” Incommensurability, the ring of dissonant siren 
songs, the violent commotion of the multitude defending cherished views, 
the heart strings’ refusal to be plucked by the soul’s eternal vibrato— this is all 
evidence of the good news:
Humans toil the Earth, live in the World, think according to the Universe.
The Earth is our ground, the World our neighbor, the Universe our secret.
We already know that we, us human beings, derive our material sustenance from 
the earth. We have been reminded by thinkers like Marx, Althusser, Nietzsche, 
and Laruelle that in inhabiting a specific World we reify community and forge 
identity. Now, we are faced with the proposition that our thinking is somehow 
properly bound to “the Universe.” What can this mean? In the terms of Kafka’s 
fable, we said that “the law” is the cause of the effects we witnessed. We can 
now say that that is because “the law” determined, in the last instance, the man 
from the country’s thinking. The two, cause and effect, the law and the thinking, 
are indistinguishable. And yet, the law possesses no actual content, much less 
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literal being (hence my use of scare quotes). Yet, as I hope to show, it still makes 
sense to say that “it” has force, that it exerts an influence. Its influence, moreover, 
is exerted unilaterally, from its side only. Most significantly, perhaps, the law 
is wholly foreclosed to anyone who would enter. It inheres solely within itself, 
unmixed with foreign objects and desires, undivided by dueling disciples and 
decisions, for “the Universe is not reflected in another universe.”10
These statements are from one of Laruelle’s most experimental texts, “On 
the Black Universe.” Elsewhere, he confesses that he is practicing a “poetry of 
thought.”11 However obliquely and experimentally, it is clear, though, that he 
is speaking about his most important topic: “the One.” Synonymous with “the 
Real,” the One is equally the pivot on which the present critique turns. While, 
believe it or not, Laruelle’s strange text may, in the end, be our surest guide to 
the One, we will have to wind our way along a sturdier path. For, as the cosmic 
imagery and the whisper of a “secret” should amply warn us, we are treading 
perilous terrain. We have already seen how suddenly the road to science can 
turn toward the New Age desert; how suddenly an organon of knowledge can 
mutate into a weapon of ideology; how suddenly a perspicuous human insight 
can morph into an hallucinated vision. We must tread carefully.
Before setting out, it might be of help to mention briefly that it is precisely this 
danger that accounts for the character of the approach I have been employing. 
Some readers may be scratching their heads at Laruelle’s method, its difficulty 
and abstraction, its reluctance to engage specific examples from the history of 
philosophy, its weird vocabulary. I have been culling Laruelle with awareness of 
the fact that my readers are accustomed to a much more reader- friendly Western 
Buddhist discourse. I am even more acutely aware of the close correspondence 
between the spirit of this critique and that of Buddhism itself. The difficulties 
inherent in borrowing from Laruelle are unavoidable because they arise from the 
dire and absolute necessity of not instituting yet another iteration of x- buddhism, 
much less another idealist mirage in the New Age desert. The history of Buddhism 
is brimming with examples of internecine struggles for dominance. Pace the 
apostles of “One Dharma,” the history of Buddhism down to the present day has 
largely been the history of institutional and doctrinal competition. Although 
I claim that the present critique is of a fundamentally different genre than, say, 
reform literature, I also fully expect most readers to resist that claim. In fact, in 
the spirit of The Great Feast of Knowledge and Paul Feyerabend’s anarchy of 
ideas and Ludwik Fleck’s incommensurability of thought styles, I welcome such 
resistance. The greater danger lies in a certain kind of acceptance. Is it not obvious 
that we do possess the mighty, avenging instinct to spin yarns about another 
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world, as Nietzsche told us about earlier? The incessancy and psychological 
urgency of our yarn- spinning, so often to our own detriment, means that even 
non- philosophy or non- buddhism is ripe for insertion into the meaning void. 
The danger, of course, is that the reader fashions from this material new forms 
of decision, sufficiency, and hallucination. Hopefully, the virtue of my Laruellean 
borrowings, however intricate, is that they serve to limit this danger.
We can begin our journey toward the One by offering this provocative 
paraphrase of Anthony Paul Smith:  resistance to the One is how x- buddhism 
produces itself. But this quintessentially x- buddhist “act can only be called 
resistance because it is always only a relative negation.” That is, it is only a 
precarious resistance to and never an accomplished negation of the One or the 
Real. Smith says further:
[Buddhism’s] attempt to negate the indifference of the Real by attempting 
to englobe or encompass it with transcendent names like [The Dharma or 
emptiness or dependent origination, etc.] never actually absolutely negates the 
Real or the One. It is thus only constituted as resistance to the foreclosed Real’s 
unrepresentability.12
This statement, of course, leaves unsaid just what this foreclosed and 
unrepresentable Real is, but it still contains essential information. There is 
something about engaging in this very practice of naming that implicates x- 
buddhism in a certain kind of operation. We saw in the previous section how 
this operation works. What x- buddhism names pertains to the ostensible 
constituents of reality (personhood, consciousness, causality, matter, etc.). 
The pertinence of its names is phenomenologically verifiable; for the naming, 
being a naming of the world, is a purely immanent practice. However, in order 
to establish an  incontrovertible and unitary sufficiency for this naming as 
uniquely x- buddhist, it must be grounded in another name— an exclusively x- 
buddhist name— that is transcendent to the empirical naming. If it is not thus 
externally grounded, as the guests at The Great Feast of Knowledge remind our 
Buddhist agents, Western Buddhism must be said to be engaging in a completely 
different kind of operation than it says it is; namely, that of a nondecisional 
science- thought or of an insufficient non- buddhism. Such an operation requires 
no transcendentally englobabling operator, such as The Dharma. With the 
cancellation of this operator’s warrant, resistance ceases. For, it never entailed 
resistance to the Real because x- buddhism fashions itself as precisely an organon 
of the Real. Rather, it evidenced a refusal to accept the fact that the Real cannot 
be articulated and dominated— englobed— within x- buddhism’s system of 
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representation. Recall that the man from the country wholly accepts “the law.” 
That acceptance is what hails him to the impassable portal. Catalyzed by his 
idealized vision of the law, he acts and thinks as he does, vainly hoping and 
scheming and waiting. As long as the man holds that vision, named “the law,” 
to constitute the law’s reality, he is incapable of any other response. What he is 
thereby resisting, however, is the foreclosure of the law to any sort of “entry.” That 
which has received the name of the law is as indifferent to this naming as it is to 
the man’s vision and even less so to his longing. Until he realizes this facet of the 
law, he remains the interpellated subject of the ideological vision, and not that of 
what he so desires. Like the identity of an individual, the identity of a system of 
thought pivots on one’s response to the Real’s foreclosure. Acceptance engenders 
a (materialist) science- thought and science (in Laruelle’s sense) while resistance 
engenders (idealist) decision and a hallucinated World. It is in this manner that 
resistance to the One or the Real is productive.
Of what would nonresistance to the Real be productive? What, in other 
words, would it mean to think with the Real or from the One? When Buddhism 
expounds on emptiness, no- self, dependent origination, The Dharma, and so 
on, it is thinking the Real. It is doing so, of course, by thinking toward the Real:
Buddhism → the Real
Thinking in this direction is what constitutes Buddhism as the grand system 
of human enlightenment that it is. It, better than any other form of thought, 
provides us with the terms that name absolutely exigent and categorically 
determinate principles of existence. That, at least, is Buddhism’s major, sine qua 
non, postulate. Moreover, this naming, or more precisely the amphiboly ensuing 
from its naming, is what constitutes Buddhism’s sufficiency. With Buddhist first 
names in place of the non- philosophical One, the formula looks like this, for 
example:
Buddhism → emptiness
Buddhism → ultimate reality
Buddhism → The Dharma
Unlike art and literary fiction, Buddhism does not purport to be offering aesthetic 
devices or creative metaphors for understanding the Real. Like a science, it 
claims to give us phenomenologically exact, ideologically unencumbered, access 
not only to the vault of the Real, but to the Real in the last instance. Emptiness, 
that is to say, is ultimately real. This means that it is real such that all Buddhist 
postulates are effectively true by virtue of this Real, of emptiness, to which they 
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are but faithful protectors. Buddhism thus positions itself as nothing less than 
an organon of the Real; or, in the terms of its self- presentation, than as a means 
for understanding the real conditions of, and overcoming and ending, the cycle 
of dukkha. With my treatment of decision, I hope to have shown that Buddhism, 
contrary to this self- presentation, perpetually gives us Buddhism (auto- donation) 
and produces more Buddhism (auto- position). The result of these two features 
of Buddhism is that the very postulates that are intended to enlighten us to the 
truth of emptiness instead are injected into emptiness, mixed with emptiness, 
and confused for emptiness, or whatever other first name Buddhism might offer. 
(In a similar move in the history of ideas, if in a somewhat different register, the 
deaf and mute black universe becomes the space of astrological causality, the 
abode of heaven, the beautiful exteriorization of the soul, and so on.) We can 
graph this fecund circular mixing as follows:
Buddhism ⇆ x1- buddhism ⇆ x2- buddhism ⇆ x3- buddhism ⇆ the Real
The solution to cancelling this circularity is simultaneously the realization of 
the Buddhist desire for the Real. Again, this is good news. It requires only one 
modification in Buddhism’s operation, namely, the removal of its sufficiency 
postulate. The removal of this single postulate, of course, produces a significant 
mutation. It metamorphosizes x- buddhism (Buddhism, Western Buddhism, 
Ordinary Mind Zen, Mindfulness, Vajrayana, etc.) into non- buddhism. We 
can see this point more clearly by considering how, in this regard, non- 
buddhism is akin to non- Euclidean geometry.13 Briefly, the difference between 
Euclidean and non- Euclidean geometry lies in the behavior of a line in space. 
Euclid’s fifth postulate axiomatically assumes parallelism. In upholding this 
postulate, along with the other four, Euclideans limit the field of possible 
forms. Rejecting this single postulate, non- Euclidean geometry enables 
radically different possibilities, such as elliptical and hyperbolic curvature. 
Significantly, non- Euclideans preserve all of Euclidean geometry except that 
single postulate. Similarly, by removing the postulate of sufficiency, non- 
buddhism radically extends the formal possibilities of Buddhism without 
negating it as such. (This point will be revisited in Part 3.) The first and most 
far- reaching result of this removal is in Buddhism’s relation to the Real, which 
can now be graphed as:
Buddhism ←/ the Real
Or, with Buddhist first names:
Buddhism ←/ emptiness (dependent origination, thusness, etc.)
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Rather than enabling an intervention into the Real, rather than producing 
knowledge of it, buddhistic naming and decision has “coagulated, condensed, and 
refolded the [buddhistic] space in on itself, encumbering it and separating it from 
its force.”14 The removal of its encumbering necessity to provide sufficient Wisdom 
for humanity frees Buddhism to manifest its force as, for instance, potentially 
valuable human cultural material. Paradoxically, however, it can do so only by 
forfeiting its claim on the Real. We saw above that Buddhism does not resist the 
Real per se. What it resists is the “foreclosed Real’s unrepresentability.” As the 
graph indicates, the Real, like Kafka’s law, is closed (/ ) to Buddhism’s conceptual 
incursions (→). This is precisely as Buddhism itself would have it, for emptiness 
must remain empty, the self- void must remain void of self, dependent origination 
must remain dependently originated and originating. When so allowed, the Real 
is seen as the cause, in the last instance, of Buddhism (←). Thusness, things as they 
are, emptiness, the Real, etc., come first. The abiding human concern to know, 
say, thusness, causes the endless production of material we know as Buddhism. 
To have it otherwise, to reverse the direction of the arrow, is to confuse x- 
buddhism’s representation of thusness for generic thusness, and thereby to commit 
a parapraxis and to create an amphiboly. So, to answer our question— of what 
would nonresistance to the Real be productive; what would it mean to think with 
the Real or from the One?— we can say that, at a minimum, it would entail the 
genuinely, radically immanent “pragmatics” that Buddhism so confidently grants 
itself, as well as a human subject who is faithful to this occasion.
Before presenting Laruelle’s radical means to “thinking (from) the Real- one,” 
I think it will of help to offer a concrete instance of what is at stake, using an 
example that is universally dear to Buddhists.
Interlude: The immanence of an actual suffering
Can anyone with a beating heart take issue with Western Buddhism’s sole 
purpose for being:  to lessen the pain of living? As we saw in Chapter  3, the 
technical term dukkha is understood to exceed the register of our concept 
“suffering.” That is, it ranges from that barely conscious, unnamable disquiet that 
many of us experience from time to time, through all- too- common varieties 
of disappointment, sadness, and anxiety, to debilitating physical suffering and 
agonizing emotional despair. Due to the subtly corroding effect of impermanence, 
it is present even in moments of pleasure. This pervasiveness is the reason that 
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and end of the Buddha’s teaching. If dukkha permeates sentient existence, that 
teaching is permeated by the single flavor of liberation (vimuttirasa) from the 
mental conditions that engender that dukkha. As Jay Garfield, a Buddhist studies 
scholar trained in Western philosophy, notes, however, “Siddhartha Gautama’s 
genius was not simply to see that we suffer, or that many of us are unhappy.” 
Indeed, we don’t need a Buddha for that. Together with the themes of falling in 
love and the inevitable loss of those same loved ones, the theme of pain is the 
impetus of art, poetry, music, and much more. If Freud is right in Civilization 
and Its Discontents, we have traded much of our vivifying, if violent, animal 
drive for the civilizing, if inhibiting, controls of culture. Freud is quick to add, 
of course, that the great paradox of civilization is the fact that in circumventing 
the miseries ensuing from our brute animality we have created new, equally 
unyielding forms of pain. Along with the arts, the disciplines of philosophy and 
religion are attempts to account for and expiate this pain. In this sense, Freud 
shared with the Buddha the fact that, as Garfield says of the latter,
His genius was instead to see that dukkha is the fundamental structure of our 
lives, what Heidegger would have called our existentiale. To be human is to live 
in dukkha.
This equation of dukkha and existential is interesting in several regards.15 Garfield 
is a leading proponent of cross- cultural studies. He is particularly prominent 
in the effort to establish parity between Buddhist philosophy and its Western 
counterpart. So, it is not surprising that he employs a behemoth of German 
thought to corroborate his point here. His aim, of course, is to underscore not 
only the inseparability of dukkha from life itself, but the universality of the very 
notion that lived existence (as opposed to object presence) possesses particular 
qualities as such. For, an Existenzial (henceforth, existential), as Garfield 
intimates, is not merely one of many possibilities present in human experience, 
such as, say, blueness might be the property of a coffee cup. An existential is 
rather a structuring element of worldly being per se. Heidegger, for instance, 
names as such elements the “mood” of fear or anxiety that helps to disclose the 
further existentials of being “thrown” into the world, of “finding” oneself in the 
world, of potential understanding, etc. As an existential, therefore, dukkha is not 
just either present or not present in the world, as the case may be, in the way that, 
say, a concrete slab either is or is not lying on the road. Rather, it is constitutive 
of lived being, in the way that concrete in the road is precisely the road. The 
genius of Heidegger, Freud, and the Buddha was thus to see that some dukkha- 
like quality not only permeates but structures human existence. The Buddha’s 
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genius, Garfield tells us, further enabled him “to see that this is a problem, indeed 
the problem of human life.”
For dukkha is universally undesirable, or at least it is undesirable to most of us. 
And this means that our lives and the worlds we inhabit, which are the most 
desirable of all things, are in fact, as they are lived, undesirable. If our lives are 
to be worth living, and if they are to be sources of happiness and legitimate 
motivation, this puzzle demands solution. This is the absolute foundation of the 
Buddhist view of the nature of human life.16
The key term in Garfield’s statement is “solution.” Is it an exaggeration to claim 
that our entire history as Homo sapiens has been driven by a desire to solve the 
problem of the disease that flows through experience? From the constant deluge 
of labor- saving appliances and pleasure- giving gadgets, to the multibillion dollar 
effort to cure cancer, to totalitarian politics and perpetual warfare, we are apes 
with a flair for the fix, quick or otherwise. Thus, as anyone who has read them 
knows, each of our geniuses has an awful lot to say about, to put it in the Buddhist 
idiom, pain and its ending. We have already seen how Freud extends Schelling’s 
“veil of despondency that spreads itself over nature” to envelop the massive refuge 
of human security wishfully named “civilization.” Freud asks us to factor into 
our calculations for happiness the real possibility that there will always remain 
some “unconquerable” thing driving us inexorably toward pain, dissolution, and 
death. We have also seen that Heidegger wants to counter Cassirer’s hopeful 
affirmation of the human capacity to craft symbolic meaning by disclosing 
instead “the nothingness” of our existence. Being thus thrust back into this 
“hardness of fate,” we just might discover some capacity for “authentic activity.” 
Is that a desirable solution? What about Freud’s ultimate tradeoff of “hysterical 
misery” for “common unhappiness”? Does the notion of mental health as being 
“better armed against that unhappiness” offer anything worthy of the term 
“solution”? Is minimally neurotic unhappiness the “cathartic absolution” we so 
desire?17 We can throw into this melancholy mix Lacan’s unassuming contention 
that “An analysis should not be pushed too far. When the analysand feels that he 
is happy to be alive, that is enough.”18 If the typical reception of such “solutions” 
is any indication, the reader will feel these statements to be negative, pessimistic, 
somber, or perhaps darkly humorous, rather than modest and bracingly honest. 
Yet, given that we began with the shared premise that dukkha, like a Real or 
an existential or an unconquerable thing, is not only existentially pervasive but 
structurally determinate, we have to ask: what is the alternative? Yes, pain is a 
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possible? Garfield reminds us that the shared Buddhist position holds, among 
others, the following postulates:
The origin of dukkha is in primal confusion about the fundamental nature of 
reality, and so its cure is at bottom a reorientation towards ontology and an 
awakening (bodhi) to the actual nature of existence.
The elimination (nirvāṇa), or at least the substantial reduction of dukkha 
through such reorientation, is possible.19
Echoing the second and third noble truths respectively, these two postulates do 
offer a robust solution. Garfield’s Western Buddhist “reduction” is less emphatic 
than the canonical “cessation” (nirodha) insists; but this is, I  imagine, a result 
that will satisfy most Western seekers today. It certainly lacks the putative 
moroseness of Freud. But before we can certify it as a bona fide solution, we 
have to ask some questions: Is dukkha, then, not an existential after all? Can a 
“fundamental structure of our lives” really be solved by seeing things otherwise? 
Does such a “reorientation” entail, then, an idealism in which the “hardness 
of our fate” really is entirely compliant to the meaning- making “works of the 
spirit”? Or might such a reorientation be, yet again, a conceptual parapraxis, a 
misturning from the Real of pain as an existential structure of human experience 
to the Buddhist “rumor” of dukkha “transmitted by hearsay, imitation, 
specularity, and repetition”?20 Might such a misturning give rise, yet again, to 
an amphiboly whereby the Buddhist concept dukkha is confused for the Real of 
human pain? A couple more questions: Is the pain that is “caused by a cognitive 
superimposition of permanence, independence and intrinsic nature on things 
that lack it” even the pain that we desire to relieve? Is the pain that “can be 
alleviated by, and only by, the cessation of this superimposition” even worthy 
of the name “pain”?21 Finally, might there then be a world (or should we say “a 
World”) of difference between eliminating dukkha and eliminating human pain?
When Garfield hedges Buddhism’s wager of dukkha’s nirvanic elimination by 
adding “or at least [its] substantial reduction,” he is performing a quintessentially 
Western Buddhist move. Canonical Buddhism, indeed, traditional Buddhism in 
contemporary Asia and North America, ultimately pursues nothing less than 
the virtuosic cataclysm of a “total cure, opening to the unconditional beyond 
space and time.”22 I  thus see Garfield’s hedge as an expression of an adamant, 
if respectful and reluctant, Western Buddhist reorientation in its own right. 
The reorientation is away from Buddhist legacies that entail overtly religious 
forms of transcendence and mysticism and toward forms of immanence and 
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of the misturnings of meaning, conceptual amphibologies, and the role that 
The Dharma plays in decision, I  think that the more “atheist” or “secular” or 
“naturalized” Western Buddhism becomes, the more it remains, in fact, deeply 
implicated in transcendence. Grumblings from certain outposts of Western 
Buddhism, online in particular, can be heard concerning the embarrassingly (to 
some) asocial and apolitical implications of this idealist inheritance of Western 
Buddhism. Or perhaps Garfield’s qualification is simply an effort to stem the flow 
of a genetic feature of Buddhism. For, this bifurcation is nothing new. The tension 
between an orientation toward otherworldly transcendence (gods, rebirth, 
heavens and hells, supermundane nirvāṇa, luminous consciousness, a cosmic 
Buddha, etc.) and an orientation toward this- worldly immanence (materialist 
psychological analysis of subjective experience, emphasis on empirical data, a 
human Buddha, etc.) is at least as old as the extant redactions of the Pali and 
Sanskrit canons. Obviously, I  have no intention— or hope— of extracting this 
gene from the corpus of Western Buddhism. And why would I even want to? 
Throughout history, this genetic trait has spawned extraordinarily creative, 
if multiple and occasionally schizophrenic, tradition- personalities. When 
we consider the thought- world of Siddhārtha Gautama’s India, the gene was 
probably present at Buddhism’s inception. And as far as I can make out, from 
those earliest days to the present, its Janus- faced progeny appear completely 
normal to most Buddhists, Western or otherwise. As a passionate participant 
at The Great Feast of Knowledge, however, I have to mention two facts: In India 
as in the West the struggle between the royal agents of transcendence and the 
peasant partisans of immanence is as old as the hills. And never has an attempt 
at rapprochement been coherent.23 It is, as the Buddha says of practice generally, 
a divided pathway, one leading to cultivation, and the other to decline.24 Which 
is which, not even the brilliance of a Heidegger and a Cassirer can determine. 
For, as yet another luminary, Emmanuel Lévinas, who was present at the crisis- 
driven dispute at Davos said, “a young student could have had the impression 
that he was witness to the creation and the end of the world.”25 Creation and end. 
Cultivation and decline. In the terms of this critique, though, the direction is 
clear. For, following Laruelle, it is rather a matter of sufficiency or insufficiency, 
decision or the “Undecided (of the) Real,”26 the aristocratic or the democratic, a 








 Immanent Practice 119
To arrive at a good- faith, good- subject understanding of Buddhism’s incursions 
into human pain (→) we must, first of all, decide on Buddhism. That project 
would begin, of course, with our comprehension of the first term dukkha. In that 
sense, Garfield’s statements are unimpeachable. For them to be so, however, we 
have to read his statements with the understanding of dukkha as a buddhistically 
sufficient first term for human pain. Read dukkha, in other words, as the 
overdetermining bearer of numerous Buddhist postulates about human pain, 
suffering, disease, etc.
The origin of dukkha is in primal confusion about the fundamental nature of 
reality, and so its cure is at bottom a reorientation towards ontology and an 
awakening (bodhi) to the actual nature of existence.
The elimination (nirvāṇa), or at least the substantial reduction of dukkha 
through such reorientation, is possible.
Graphically, what Garfield is saying, in the terms of our rereading, is this:
dukkha ← x- buddhism ←/  pain
The origin of the Buddhist concept dukkha lies in Buddhist thinkers’ confusing 
the doctrinal concept of dukkha with the actual suffering experienced by sentient 
beings. Because this amphibology resolves into numerous Buddhist grammars of 
pain (→dukkha), we must add the variable x. The human Real of suffering itself is 
ultimately foreclosed (/ ) to the x- buddhist incursion. Being, as Garfield says, an 
existential, or, in his other words, a fundamental nature of reality, suffering has 
caused (←) x- buddhism. That a reorientation toward the ontological fact of pain 
can eliminate or substantially reduce “dukkha” is not only possible, but probable. 
The reduction, of course concerns the force of a representation of pain, not pain 
itself. In doing so, the x- buddhist subject will be transformed into what Laruelle 
terms “the stranger subject.” We will revisit this idea in the next chapter; but, by 
way of contrast, it might be useful to mention here that this type of subjectivity 
refers to “The identity of the Real [as] lived, experienced, consumed while 
remaining in itself without the need to alienate itself through representation.”27 
Such a reorientation serves as the occasion of awakening. However, as with 
elimination/ nirvāṇa, we would have to perform similar operations on the first 
term bodhi to arrive at a generic, rather than x- buddhist, “awakening.”
What might a “stranger- subject” version of Garfield’s rendition of the x- 
buddhist statement on suffering look like? It would have to be one performed, 
thought, and lived from this side (←/) of the Real of pain. I know of no better 
candidate than, for my money, the greatest genius of them all, Emily Dickinson28:
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They say that “Time assuages”— 
Time never did assuage— 
An actual suffering strengthens
As Sinews do, with age— 
Time is a Test of Trouble— 
But not a Remedy
If such it prove, it prove too
There was no Malady— 
To understand how we might perform such a strange “reorientation towards 
ontology and an awakening to the actual nature of existence,” we now turn, first, 
to a reflection on the concept of immanence, and then to Laruelle’s move to 
“axiomatize” the Real.
Radical immanence
I imagine that for many readers the contour of radical immanence is slowly 
coming into view by now. Much of the work done in this critique has been precisely 
to expose operations in Buddhism that, in one moment, assert something like 
radical immanence and, in the next, compromise that principle. With concepts 
like anātman, dukkha, and śūnyatā, Buddhism does think the immanent Real. 
For instance, such terms allow it to articulate features of reality that our non- 
Buddhist symbolic system disavows since those features threaten our finely 
wrought constructions of order and meaning, not to mention the integrity and 
completeness of the symbolic system itself. Buddhism wants to convince us that 
it— as The Dharma— illuminates the way things are prior to or independent 
of language, representation, ideology, and so on, such that its articulations are 
necessary and sufficient explanations of our human situation. Thus, with concepts 
like saṃsāra and pratītyasamutpāda, Buddhism, furthermore, thinks that which 
in the history of ideas has been called “the One” and “the Real.” That is to say, 
Buddhism sets itself the task of classical metaphysics; namely, to identify the 
ultimate unity, and if possible, the unitary source, that underlies the seemingly 
infinite multiformity of phenomenal proliferation. Buddhism, in short, teaches 
us how it all hangs together. That is fine and understandable. If the history of 
ideas is any indication, discovering such a principle is a timeless human desire. 
It is the desire to know, to intimately embrace or even to be consumed by that 
which is fundamentally real. It is a desire born, perhaps, from the lived human 
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experience that involvement with the things of this world— objects, people, 
events— does not produce abiding pleasure, and, indeed, is too often the very 
source of pain. Indeed, Buddhism teaches us nothing if not that material, worldly 
entities and events are more painful because somehow less real than some prior, 
and ostensibly immanent, principle, such as emptiness, the unconditioned, 
primordial awareness, Buddha nature, dharmadhatu, innate goodness, and so 
on. That Western Buddhism both streamlines and doubles down on tradition’s 
ancient task of articulating a version of radical immanence by extolling its ability 
to, in common contemporary terms, “reclaim” the “wonder” and “power” and 
“magic” and “miracle” of “the gift of the present moment,” is not being contested 
here. Rather, using Laruelle’s concept of decision, I  have aimed to show that 
Buddhism’s immanent Real- One, however precisely conceived, invariably 
metamorphoses into a transcendent representational- 2/ 3. This alteration is the 
inevitable result of the scission required to maintain Buddhism’s sufficiency. 
Buddhism establishes its dharmic foundation at the exorbitant cost of dividing 
the Real- One, that is to say its very principle of radical immanence, against itself.
Before turning directly to Laruelle’s solution to this transcendentalizing 
function of buddhistic decision, it may be useful to step back and say more about 
what I mean generally by “immanence,” as well as why it is being viewed here as 
necessarily a good. Rocco Gangle offers this helpful definition: “ ‘Immanence,’ 
roughly, names any metaphysical position or method rejecting the notion 
that the ultimate structure of reality may be investigated independently of its 
real content.” It is, moreover, a position that “disallows ‘one- way’ arrows from 
metaphysics to ontology, or from logical grammar to real semantics.”29 In the 
examples I  have been providing, including the one in the previous section, 
what proves problematic in each case is precisely the allowance of this one- 
way arrow. The diagram Buddhism→pain means that our knowledge of the 
ontological Real of pain necessarily and sufficiently flows from the direction of 
the metaphysical system that articulates it. Historically, the fecund nature of this 
articulation is such that it has produced out of this (singular) “real semantics” 
numerous (plural) “logical grammars”; thus the diagram is properly given as x- 
buddhism→dukkha. It should be clear by now that a crucial move of this critique 
is to posit, following Laruelle, the foreclosed nature of “real semantics” (an actual 
suffering) to any “logical grammar” (dukkha as the articulation of this suffering). 
Now, the reader may have observed that we still have a “one- way arrow”: ←/ . 
It is, however, from the Real and to the form of thought that is subsequently 
engendered by that thought’s very endeavor to think that Real. As should also 
be clear, a central thesis of this critique is that this reversal, from metaphysics to 
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ontology, in Gangle’s language, produces a consequentially different relationship 
to the Real. This is a relationship, I  have been arguing, to which Western 
Buddhism itself aspires, yet, trapped in decision, perpetually fails to realize. 
One of the immanental functions of “foreclosure” is to disable the circular and 
sufficient forces of decision, and thereby to cut off recourse to any “exterior.” We 
saw that The Dharma is such an exterior since, as the transcendental vault to 
the “ultimate structure of reality,” it reveals how things are, crucially including 
how they ultimately hang together. With the path to absolute transcendence 
thus cut off, all forms of thought are shown to be interior or immanent to 
human existence, even those that persist in thinking this immanence, this “real 
content,” in terms of some transcendent differential. Some readers may have 
observed that “immanence” itself offers a view of how things are and, as such, is 
still indeed a “metaphysical position.” As Gangle points out, however, “its claim 
about how things hang together is in part that they do not hang together in 
any way that is illuminated finally by differentiating between what is and how 
what is is structured.”30 Laruelle thus wants to speak of any “radical” concept 
as being minimally or relatively transcendental. So, “radical immanence” claims 
to be merely a “clone” of immanence rather than “absolute immanence” itself. 
Because we cannot circumvent the involvement of conceptualization, language, 
and representation, for instance, we must admit that in claiming “immanence,” 
we are, to whatever limited degree, making a metaphysical move.31 This 
admission that “metaphysics” operates on our thinking of “ontology” and 
toward the Real at such an early moment of consideration does not diminish 
the value of immanence as a concept. On the contrary, this creeper- like quality 
of metaphysics, this relentless threat of alienating ideation, provides us with the 
most compelling reason we require for mobilizing the concept at all.
This last point raises the question: Why is immanence necessarily a good? This 
question has a corollary: Why is transcendence necessarily a bad? An obvious if 
perhaps too precious answer presents itself. Imagine a beast in the wild inquiring 
into the Being of the Life it is about to snuff out for supper. The only thing that 
matters to it is the rabbit scampering away. It would be ridiculous to raise the 
question of what grander principles ultimately undergird this event. Concepts 
like Being and Life are superfluous. There is only a living rabbit. And then, after 
the deed is done, there is neither Death nor non- Being; only a particular dead 
rabbit. Here, an immanent focus is a good because in orienting the beast to the 
actual features of its environment it facilitates survival. But such an answer is 
too easy. For, us humans in the wild, having caught and cooked and eaten the 
rabbit, do reflect on such first principles. This difference is captured by a cartoon 
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that shows beastly creatures emerging out of the ocean on to the land. The 
first creature is fish- like, followed by progressively evolved mammal- like ones, 
ending with a human male dressed for a day at the office. Above each creature is 
a thought bubble that says, “Eat. Survive. Reproduce.” The man, however, glances 
wistfully toward the heavens, wondering, “What’s it all about?” Cassirer names 
us humans animal symbolicum, the symbolizing animal, precisely because we 
have developed into this earthly creature whose most significant characteristic is 
the creation of meaning- bestowing, World- making, signifiers.32 Aided by reason, 
there is virtually no limit to our speculations. And so richly complex cultures 
arise with their myths, religions, philosophies, ad infinitum, explaining precisely 
what it’s all about. The Enlightenment founder of the very binary immanent/ 
transcendent, Immanuel Kant, suggests what “bad” may be lurking herein.33
We will call the principles whose application stays wholly and completely within 
the limits of possible experience immanent, but those that would fly beyond 
those boundaries transcendent principles . . . [By the latter] I  mean principles 
that actually incite us to tear down all those boundary posts and to lay claim to a 
wholly new territory that recognises no demarcations anywhere.34
Such unchecked speculation morphs imperceptibly into a “transcendental 
illusion,” the human penchant for taking “a subjective necessity of a connection 
of our concepts . . . for an objective necessity in the determination of things in 
themselves.”35 Or, as Nietzsche put it, our propensity to fall for psychological 
trickery— we mistake our subjective wishes, interests, needs, etc., for the way 
things objectively are, or might be:  unity, permanence, substance; primordial 
awareness, The Dharma, dukkha. Like Nietzsche, Kant recognizes the fetishistic 
power of such explanatory concepts when he points out that “Transcendental 
illusion . . . does not cease even though it is uncovered and its nullity is clearly 
seen into by” a critique. What lies behind our intransigence is that the same 
mechanisms of thinking that produce valid reasoning (concepts that are 
“wholly and completely within the limits of possible experience”) also produce 
metaphysical fantasies (concepts “that would fly beyond those boundaries”). 
I imagine that many readers, nonetheless, want to argue for the whole or partial 
good of transcendent, metaphysical concepts: they give consolation in times of 
hardship; they offer hope in the face of cosmic meaninglessness; they soothe 
fears related to inevitable death; they help to create cohesive communities; 
we do not really know what lies beyond, anyway, and so on. To these kinds 
of responses, I would remind the reader that the purpose of critique is not to 
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for all. The purpose is, rather, to expose how that idea functions in thought and 
in the formation of a subject within a World, and to make determinations about 
the desirability of the idea in light of its consequences. As this point reminds us, 
“immanence” itself is already veering, however reluctantly, toward metaphysics. 
The inescapable suction of the metaphysical vortex should be reason enough to 
see the good in the concept of immanence. In times of peril, say, during surgery 
or while flying through heavy turbulence, wouldn’t we all fervently hope that the 
surgeon’s or pilot’s attention remain “wholly and completely within the limits 
of possible experience”? Some readers may still disagree. But even the Pope 
says: “You pray for the hungry. Then you feed them. That’s how prayer works.”36 
So much for that which flies beyond the boundaries of the immanent world in 
times of real need.
The primacy of the immanent principle is, as I mentioned at the start of this 
section, a principle conceit of Western Buddhism. The representation of even 
the most traditional forms of Buddhism as, at heart, empirical, naturalistic, 
pragmatic, phenomenologically oriented, and so forth, is, indeed, a definitive 
feature of Western Buddhism. Western Buddhist teachers often illustrate the 
good of immanence with the famous parable of the arrow. In this parable, a 
man has been wounded by a poisoned arrow, shot at him by some unknown 
assailant. When the physician arrives to remove the arrow, and thus save his 
life, the man proves to be a recalcitrant metaphysician. He will not permit 
the arrow to be removed until he has attained knowledge of the transcendent 
organizing principles at work: Who shot the arrow? Was he low class? Middle 
class? What kind of bow did he use? Was it a longbow? A crossbow? Was the 
bowstring that was used to shoot the arrow made of swallowwort plant? From 
some sort of hemp? Were the feathers on the shaft from a vulture? A peacock? 
A stork? What about the sinew that was used to wrap the shaft? Was it from 
a cattle, water buffalo, deer, or monkey? And the arrow itself, was it razor- 
tipped, curved, tubular, calf- toothed, oleander? And so on and so forth.37 
This tedious and somewhat slapstick scene certainly drives home both the 
endlessness and absurdity of untimely speculation. By the time our injured 
metaphysician has gathered all the data required to reveal how it all hangs 
together, the arrow, smeared thick with poison, will have rendered moot 
his unitary model of reality, however accurate. Even though our victim is 
actually asking for empirically verifiable evidence, the parable simultaneously 
serves Western Buddhism’s denunciation of transcendence and metaphysical 
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The purpose of the Buddha’s teaching is not to resolve doubts about the nature 
of “reality” by providing answers to such conundrums [as who shot the poisoned 
arrow] but to offer practice that will remove the “arrow” of reactivity, thereby 
restoring practitioners’ health and enabling them to flourish here on earth.38
This critique has presented numerous arguments that contest the success of 
Western Buddhist “practice” for accomplishing such a result. Speaking of arrows, 
in fact, I  have argued that x- buddhist auto- donation, auto- position, decision 
and so on (→) does precisely what Batchelor says it does not (resolve doubts 
and provide answers), and does not do precisely what he says it does (restore 
health and enable flourishing). I am not going to repeat those arguments here. 
My purpose in presenting the parable is to offer an example of the immanent 
principle’s centrality to Western Buddhism itself. The question now is how to 
preserve that principle rather than to determine it. It should be clear to the reader 
by now that implicit in this question is my contention that Western Buddhism 
fails at the former and succeeds at the latter. It should also be clear that this 
critique views such success as Pyrrhic because it transforms Western Buddhism 
from a viable “science according to the Real” into an ideology of the Real. It is 
here that Laruelle’s solution of an axiomatized immanence can assist Western 
Buddhism in realizing its cherished goal of a restorative human practice.
Axiomatic Real
A monk asked Yün- men, “What is Buddha?”
Yün- men said, “Dried shitstick.”39
This is a kōan from a thirteenth- century Japanese compilation usually translated 
into English as The Gateless Gate. The collection, like the kōan practice it 
promotes, was made popular in the West by a generation of Second World 
War– era teachers who were instrumental in fashioning American Zen, and by 
extension, Western Buddhism as a whole. I  present it here in order to make 
a sequence of connected points. To begin, I  would consider this “case” to be 
a fine example of the Buddhist concern for the Real. The monk is asking a 
question that, on the face of it, concerns the Real itself, signified by the first term 
“Buddha.” Yet, the wise Yün- men recognizes that the question is so embedded 
in a system of knowledge that its answer has already been largely determined. 
In Buddhist parlance, the question constitutes a “thicket of views”: it is bound 
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on, such that no answer but the already predetermined one will suffice. And 
such an answer is, of course, no answer at all; it is merely a confirmation of the 
program to which the questioner has already subscribed. In Laruellen parlance, 
in invoking the particular first term “Buddha” and apparently confusing this 
representation for the Real itself, the questioner has already made a decision. It 
is a decision, moreover, that, Yün- men seems to suspect, requires a redoubled 
transcendental splitting; initially between “the monk” and “the Buddha,” and 
then between the world and the World. Can you conceive of a straighter path 
back to the immediacy of the questioner’s situation than “dried shitstick”? I like 
to think that the master would have been pleased with Artaud’s “Where there 
is a stink of shit/ there is a smell of being.” In any case, we are not, of course, 
speaking here of shit. “Dried shitstick” itself is but a first term for the Real. 
Unlike “Buddha,” however, it is one that is difficult if not impossible to shoehorn 
into one of the countless “artificial forms and static norms” that people devise 
to subjugate others’ morality. In invoking it in response to the all- too Buddhist 
monk who stands before him, the master intends precisely to “wrest vital 
potentialities” from the confusion. In Laruelle’s own kōan- like utterance, we can 
say that Yün- men wants to enable the Real to be “given- without- givenness.” The 
monk’s “Buddha” establishes the buddhistic auto- position that in turn constitutes 
the “givenness” or determination of that which must remain precessional. Yün- 
men, that is, wants to insist that the “representation of the One,” for instance 
“Buddha,” “follow from the One or be determined by it.”40 Certain operations on 
“Buddha” are required to correct the grammatical confusion that has enamored 
and captured our monk. “Dried shitstick” represents such an effort to, in our 
earlier terms, reverse the direction of the arrow. As always, a decisive question 
now arises: does tradition permit the reversal to hold? Unfortunately, Wu- men’s 
comment on this “case” contains the following prognostication:
It must be said of Yün- men that he was too poor to prepare even the plainest 
food and too busy to make a careful draft. Probably people will bring forth 
this dried shitstick to shore up the gate and prop [open] the door. The Buddha 
Dharma is thus sure to decay.41
It is clear enough from the kōans ascribed to Yün- men that he was a man 
of few words. Aitken relates the story that when, at the ceremony honoring 
his appointment as master of the monastery, Yün- men ascended the teacher’s 
high seat to deliver his inaugural address, and proceeded to utter barely more 
than, “Be careful!”42 As for the remainder of the commentary, Aitken himself 
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how could he not? Aitken had obviously already quite robustly decided on 
Zen and Buddhism.) Conceding that Yün- men’s speech must remain terse 
in order not to introduce extraneous and fetishizing representations (“Even 
the shit was dried up on his stick,” he says!), Aitken adds the following 
(extraneous and fetishizing) remark: “Yet it [the dried shitstick] looms up and 
takes over, reaching to the Tushita heaven where Maitreya Buddha stirs in 
his deep samādhi. It won’t be long now!”43 Be careful, indeed! I trust that the 
reader is adept at recognizing the manner in which Aitken himself “bring[s] 
forth this dried shitstick to shore up the gate and prop [open] the door” of 
x- buddhist sufficiency, auto- donation, and all the rest. I only point out how 
ironic it is that Aitken reads Wu- men’s remark as a warning to see through 
the “charisma” and “fakery” of “teachers who shout and wave their arms.” By 
contrast to such snakeoil, “worthy teaching . . . will cut off speculation, and it 
will be faithful to the one who is taught.”44 Of course, where I see Aitken and 
the Zen commentarial tradition vis- à- vis the Real as speculation soaked in 
serpens oleum, and as being quite unfaithful to their students, American Zen 
readers see enlightened expressions of awakened consciousness. I  am fairly 
certain, too, that these same readers see my interpretation as the expression of 





Okay! But can we also agree to Be careful! with that “buddhahood”?
I would expect nothing less from a Western Buddhist, Zen or otherwise, 
than to counter my non- buddhist ruminations on Yün- men’s case with grave 
criticism. After all, a critique like the present one is driven, and driven hard, by 
the very “discursive intellect” that the kōan is intended to “confound . . . freezing 
it into a single ball of doubt, and finally to trigger an awakening (Japanese satori) 
to an ineffable state beyond all ‘dualistic’ thinking.”46 And with this point, we 
come to a pivotal aspect of radical immanence. Taking “state beyond all ‘dualistic’ 
thinking” to be but another first term for the Real (for, otherwise— well, see 
the section on “Wisdom” in Chapter 1), must we not admit that, contrary to 
being “ineffable,” this “state” is, in Nick Srnicek’s memorable phrase, “infinitely 
effable”? That is, based on the prodigious evidence of the history of ideas, the 
Real or the One “provides the basis for an infinite number of names for itself.”47 
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the question, how many Ones are there, in kōan- like fashion: “330 million.”48 Wu- 
men, in other words, may well conclude our case with:
A flash of lightning,
sparks from flint;
if you blink your eyes,
it is already gone.
But if the history of commentarial literature, not to mention the interminable 
dilation of dharma talks, books, articles, and so on, that gush forth from x- 
buddhist communities are any indication, “it” will remain forever undetermined. 
That is not to say, of course, that it will remain undecided. To make a decision 
concerning the proper signification of “it” is precisely the act that constitutes 
and validates a given x- buddhism’s sufficiency. As Ray Brassier points out, 
however, such an act, being “inherently reflexive or specular,” means that the 
assemblage of x- buddhist communities that perform the act “remains a loose- 
knit grouping of interpretative strategies rather than a rigorous theoretical 
praxis.” It is worthwhile to quote Brassier at length on this point.
This fractional loop [of decision], this auto- positional and auto- donational 
structure, constitutes [x- buddhism’s] in herent ly reflexive or specular character. 
It guarantees that everything is potentially [buddhistizable], which is to say, 
possible grist for the decisional mill. Thus, if [buddhistizing] . . . remains a loose- 
knit grouping of interpretative strategies rather than a rigorous theoretical praxis, 
it is because decisional specularity ensures the world re mains [x- buddhism’s] 
mirror. [Buddhistizing] the world becomes a pretext for [x- buddhism’s] own 
interminable self- interpretation. And since interpretation is a function of talent 
rather than rigour, the plurality of mutually incompatible yet unfalsifiable 
interpretations merely perpetuates the uncircumscribable ubiquity of [x- 
buddhism’s] auto- encompassing specularity. Absolute specularity breeds infinite 
interpretation— such is the norm for the [x- buddhist] practice of thought.49
What can be done? What might a step toward “a rigorous theoretical praxis” 
be? How might we stem the proliferation of x- buddhist interpretation of its self- 
articulated Real, and help to inaugurate a new norm for its practice of thought? 
As usual, Buddhism itself offers a potent solution. I imagine that most Western 
Buddhists have heard the story of Nan- in. A  nineteenth- century Zen master, 
Nan- in, one day “received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen”:
Nan- in served tea. He poured his visitor’s cup full, and then kept on pouring. 
The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could restrain himself. 
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“It is overfull. No more will go in!” “Like this cup,” Nan- in said, “you are full of 
your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first 
empty your cup?”50
Whether full of water, full of shit (sticks), or full of the Real, emptying, Laruelle 
would concur, is a stellar idea. In yet another kōanic twist, however, it will be 
the quintessential “university professor” who schools the Zen master in the 
proper mode and manner of such emptying. So, to begin, Laruelle recommends 
application of his threefold “discovery,” the first facet of which is that “of the 
autonomy of the One as Real or of its essence of radical immanence.”51 As 
alluded to earlier, a first name for this Real- One is “given- without- givenness.” 
This construction, x- without- xness or x- without- X, occurs frequently in Laruelle. 
In brief, it indicates precisely the immanent phenomenality of some x. That 
is to say, it aims to abjure the usurpation of the transcendental signifier that 
inevitably lays claims to the x, and thereby to render the x “generic.” I was tacitly 
applying this principle earlier when I  argued for emptiness- without- Emptiness 
against Buddhism’s Emptiness, where the capitalized E represents that which has 
been constituted through the decisional operation. As a more concrete example, 
consider woman- without- womanness. Cultures and ideologies, advertising 
agencies and masculine fantasies will endlessly construct notions of what 
properly constitutes womanness or Woman. Outside of the idealized Platonic 
form, this entity, Woman, we all know, never actually exists. Therefore, if we want 
to permit the concept at all, she must be given; “she” must be presented within 
some system of representation. Only this woman or that woman, only a woman, 
ever empirically exists. That is the reason we can say that that woman is already 
given, she is present prior to any transcendentally pre- and overdetermined 
givenness. She is always and already, we could say, woman- in- woman. Similarly, 
Laruelle says of the One or the Real:
If the One is in- One, then it is so first by its essence and not as thinking the 
Real (from the One)— it is the suspension of every idealism at the heart even of 
thought. If there is a thought or a representation of the One, it can only follow 
from the One or be determined by it, but irreversibly.52
If we want to allow that dukkha, to use another of our examples, serves as an 
adequate first term for the Real of “suffering” or “pain,” then pain must remain 
in- pain, and dukkha must be determined by it rather than by the system of 
dukkha- postulates determined by x- buddhism. That is, it, pain, is “given without 
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We have already seen that this manner of thinking disallows the reversal of the 
operation. It should be clear that to do so, to flip the arrow or to permit a two- 
way arrow, would be to rev once again the rockets of decision. It is in refraining 
from such an act that a new practice of x- buddhist thought might be born. This 
possibility, in fact, constitutes the second facet of Laruelle’s discovery, namely, 
that the irreversibility of the operation lays bare the “causality of the Real- One 
as determination- in- the- last- instance.”54 While this operation enables a wholly 
positive, thus not merely critical or deconstructive, usage of x- buddhist material, 
it does so in a fashion that is so rigorous as to render that material buddhistically 
strange, to say the least. I will return to this point in Part 3. First, we will benefit 
from briefly considering the nature of this rigor in more detail.
Determination- in- the- last- instance “is not simply an immanent causality but 
radical immanence itself.”55 It may be useful to recall that “radical immanence” 
does not mean “reality.” The word “reality” signifies the infinitely multifaceted 
and interminably mutable phantasmagoric Gestalts that we fashion from the 
Real. This statement, of course, falls far short of saying just what the One or the 
Real is. Historically, as many readers have already learned from x- buddhism, 
an aura of inscrutability surrounds “the Real.” More than that even, there is 
a foreboding sense of a consequential miscalculation to be entailed if we say 
anything more about it. It is as if, for all but the most naïve, incautious, or 
committed among us, saying what “it is” puts us in jeopardy of dire profanation. 
Like the ancient Romans, for whom “sacrum” sufficed as the name of that which 
was infused with the awesome and precarious power of the gods, we halt at the 
first term. It is here, at the profanum, in front of the temple precinct, before the 
threshold of the gods’ terminus, that we feel the least jeopardized. And yet, like 
the man from the country in Kafka’s fable, we long to be granted entry into “the 
law,” into sacrum. We long to possess the “universal object of desire,” the “origin 
of reality” that “is” the logos of the One, the Real.56 On the shadow side of this 
longing, of course, is the cool suspicion that it is yet another instance of what 
Lacan sees as a desire for imaginary plenitude. Among the crucial functions of 
the imaginary, recall, is to obscure the fact that our cherished symbolic system 
is incomplete, and, conversely, to enable us to complete that lack. The ensuing 
sense of plenitude permits the delusion that will avoid the “trauma” or “damage” 
that ensues from the Real’s inevitable disruptions. Freud, too, would see the 
supposed subjective “source of the religious spirit” in the “oceanic feeling” as 
but an infantile regression into a primal sense of oneness (with the mother, with 
the world of objects, with the source of pleasure, etc.).57 We could, of course, 
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and their refutations. And it is precisely this indeterminate “effing” of the Real 
that necessitates a concept of radical immanence. Laruelle would say that such 
an exercise ensues from the fact that “the One only acts in- the- last- instance, 
[meaning] that it does not exit itself, does not alienate itself in this act.” Since it 
does not exit itself, since it remains always One- in- One rather than One- in- the- 
infinite- ocean- of- Being as signified by our 330 million gods, a model or “clone” 
of the One is required in the form of a first term or a system of thought. It is 
required, I should quickly add, not for the sake of the One, but rather only “if it 
must have an act,” as, for instance, in the x- buddhist necessity to theorize pain 
as dukkha. Here we get our first glimpse of both the rigor and the strangeness 
of Laruelle’s method. Before I say more, it seems necessary to address questions 
that I imagine must be arising for many readers, questions along the lines of: Is 
Laruelle merely offering us yet another god in some sense? For, he himself 
warns that “There is always a God lying in ambush.”58 Might Laruelle be blindly 
constructing his own imaginary plenitude, and asking us to share in his self- 
inflicted hallucination of the Real? Is Laruelle trying to delude us into believing 
that we can mystically circumvent language and ideology and enter into some 
sort of presymbolic noumenon? Does his “determination- in- the- last- instance” 
or “radical immanence” entail, like God, Being, or śūnyatā, a kind of idealist 
decision?
Critical questions like these are, of course, valuable. By way of addressing 
them, I first say that, necessary as they are, such questions miss a fundamental 
point. The function of “the Real” in Laruelle is purely axiomatic. Think of how a 
mathematical axiom functions to enable certain subsequent operations, and to do 
so regardless of the axiom’s relation to the (nonmathematical) world. I will return 
to this point in a moment. The point here is to address any misunderstanding 
that the theory exists to adjudicate between, much less make pronouncements 
concerning, this or that view of reality. Unlike Western Buddhism— the object 
of this study— non- philosophy or, as we will see, non- buddhism, has no interest 
in offering a specular view of how things are. Laruelle’s method is certainly not 
intended as an aid for grasping the Real. It is intended rather to help us grasp 
the idealism and the typically unacknowledged transcendence that, he claims, 
invariably constitutes ostensibly empirical or materialist philosophical, and 
I argue, buddhistic, forms of thought concerning the Real. The axiomatic Real- 
function is unconcerned with “being,” “meaning,” and even “reality” precisely 
because it serves to disable the decisional circuitry that is required in making 
(unscientific) pronouncements concerning such matters in the first place. 
So, initially at least, it is not a question of whether, say, anātman is correct or 
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incorrect, whether or not, that is, the concept accurately tracks some feature 
of reality. It is rather a matter of whether we are employing a decisional or an 
axiomatic method in evaluating “anātman.” Outside of a “first science,” “correct” 
and “incorrect” require decision. That makes them a move in a philosophical or 
an x- buddhist game. The antinomy correct/ incorrect requires a decision both in 
the weak version of deciding for or against some theory of x, and in the strong 
version of necessarily grounding, whether explicitly or not, that decision in 
criteria that are not given in the x. Like Wu- men and presumably all the other 
thinkers we have encountered in this text so far, Laruelle is aiming for an extreme 
rigor of thought. But unlike them, apparently, he believes that this rigor, if it is to 
depotentialize circular decision, requires an axiomatic formulation. In short, his 
is a method for seeing (though not determining) what happens to some Real first 
term when this term is “foreclosed” to the interminable incursions, postulations, 
and pronouncements that x- thought labors to mix in. It certainly appears to be 
the case that, as Althusser says, “From the first moment to the last, the lonely 
hour of the ‘last instance’ never comes.”59 This appears so because we seem to 
only ever have the competing cacophonies of occasional or regional knowledge 
systems among which we are bidden to decide. “Determination- in- the- last- 
instance,” to put it crudely, is a massive deaf and dumb stone positioned for those 
systems to crash against on their way to the Ideal. This effect, however, may 
be more incidental than it is essential. It is called “determination- in- the- last- 
instance,” after all, because it is that which “despite everything, finally or really 
affects,” ultimately causes or determines, every one of our regional systems of 
thought. Crucially, however, it does so not as an element within the Great Chain 
of Being, but as an “abstraction of the axiomatic type.”60
So, what exactly does Laruelle mean by the rigor of an “axiomatic” method? 
It is now necessary to distinguish more emphatically between the largely 
psychoanalytical and philosophical notions of the Real that I  have been 
employing in this work from the non- philosophical one. We have, for instance, 
enjoyed some good returns on Lacan’s coinage of the Real as that which pertains 
“in the name of the logical obstacle of what, in the symbolic, declares itself to 
be impossible,” or, on Eagleton’s definition of “the pure meta- sign or empty 
element in any semiotic system whose function is to indicate the truth that it 
cannot be totalised.” Freud, too, has offered value in his speaking of this evasive 
but determinate aspect of existence in terms of drives, the unconscious, the 
unconquerable “thing,” even the irreversible pain of social relations. We have 
also encountered philosophical notions of the Real as, for instance, a noumenal 
facet of existence presupposed, yet unaffected, by human symbolic systems, such 
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as language and ideology. Arguably, every one of the x- buddhist concepts the 
I have employed so far can be classed in one of these two categories: no- self and 
suffering- desire, for instance, as roughly psychoanalytic, emptiness; dependent 
origination and emptiness, as more or less philosophical. For Laruelle, all of 
these concepts are all- too philosophical. Similarly, we can say that they are all- 
too Buddhist. Every one of them represents not, as claimed, a rigorous practice 
of thought but rather, as Brassier said above, “grist for the decisional mill.” Each, 
that is, functions in an overall system that is “reflexive” (referring always back 
to x- buddhism itself), “specular” (gazes into the world and sees x- buddhism 
reflected back), and interpretive (perpetuating the replication of the properly 
subjugated x- buddhist practitioner). In Laruelle’s axiomatic notion, the One or 
the Real requires, and therefore receives, absolutely no further explication. So, in 
now moving away from earlier psychoanalytic- philosophical notions of the Real 
to a more generalized, all- encompassing notion, we appear to be closer to x- 
buddhist concepts such as tathātā (thusness), yathābhutam (things- as- they- are), 
dharmakāya (totality of reality), paramārthasatya (ultimate truth), and dharma 
(natural order). In, however, “breeding infinite interpretation,” such notions 
ultimately constitute x- buddhist mixtures or overly determinate interventions 
into the Real. The non- buddhist solution to this confusion is axiomatization.
The identity of the Real, or of whatever first name we desire to give it— 
the One, Idea, nature, sabba (the All), The Dharma, yathābhutam— as 
axiomatic function not only requires no interpretation, it is impervious to 
it. Thought- systems like x- buddhism that articulate some such Real first 
name are performing a profoundly valuable service for all of us:  they are 
identifying that which is thought fit and worthy to be assumed (this is the Latin 
definition of axiōma). They toil, often for centuries and across continents, to 
create material— concepts, words, texts, teachings, rituals, practices, human 
subjects, physical institutions— that present and represent elemental features 
of human existence. But this is not to say that their performances and their 
material necessarily effect their desired end of routing the infidel that is (false, 
deluded, samsaric) reality and thereby of inaugurating the reign of the (true, 
enlightened, nirvanic) Real. When Laruelle insists that the One “does not exit 
itself,” he means that it does not split off from itself (it is One- in- One) and wade 
into the ontological- phenomenal battlefield precisely wherein each thought- 
system parades, patrols, struggles for the high ground, becomes entrenched, 
and flies its flag. It does not do so because it already “is” that, all of that, all of 
the forms, the ideas, concepts, thought- systems, battlefields, in short, material, 
that were mentioned above and throughout this work, including the book in 
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your hands and the very thoughts and energetic labor that went into producing 
it and now go into reading it. The fact that we have for our consideration, say, 
The Dharma, even as a transcendental grounding or warrant for dependent 
origination— for even “transcendence” is, in the last instance, material and 
immanental— is evidence of the causal nature of radical immanence. “The 
Dharma,” that is to say, is precisely a material clone or model of that which 
Buddhism considers worthy to be assumed: thusness, just that, things- as- they- 
are, the unconditioned, the deathless, a dried shitstick. But to remain faithful 
to the Real which it names, the identity of this clone must not be fashioned 
into “an objective, a proclamation, an object.” In other words, it must remain a 
“manner or style of thinking,” and not an item to be collected and catalogued by 
epistemology.61 It must remain precisely an “abstraction of the axiomatic type.” 
As Duke physicist Robert Brown reminds us:
Axioms are not self- evident truths in any sort of rational system, they are 
unprovable assumptions whose truth or falsehood should always be mentally 
prefaced with an implicit “If we assume that . . .” . . . They are really just assertions 
or propositions to which we give a special primal status and exempt from the 
necessity of independent proof.62
As yet more evidence of Buddhism’s profound proximity to a radically immanent 
form of thought, some compassionate teacher once tried to shore up against 
our inevitable objectification of emptiness as a thing to be known precisely by 
axiomatizing it. She did so by articulating the concept of śūnyatāśūnyatā, the 
emptiness of emptiness, or, in Laruellen terms, emptiness- without- Emptiness.63 
Emptiness. When we close it off to the incursions of the competing armies of 
meaning (/ ) and proceed not toward but from there (←), we have a good, solid 
x- buddhist axiom. So, we may now simply assume that emptiness is a concept— 
literally a construct, a mental thing, a material abstraction— that is worthy to 
serve as an instrument of our thought. Emptiness is a fit first name for the Real 
because it has no content. Emptiness is empty! Pace the x- buddhists, the Real of 
emptiness is indifferent to its revalorization as “a fullness of particular things” 
wherein “everything is realized as it is, in its total dynamic reality,” and thus 
harkening the good news of the “overcoming of an active nihilism.”64 To be 
clear, as inventions crafted from the material concept “emptiness,” those kinds 
of statements are heartily welcome: we can think with them, initiate a life- form 
out of them, experience their force, and thereby evaluate their fitness. But as 
proclamations of correct and sufficient decisions concerning reality, they are 
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hallucinate a World on their terms, or against them, and join the immemorial 
brawl for epistemological domination. Eschewing either choice, we refuse to go 
looking for our donkey riding on our donkey. For, as Zen Master Foyan (1067– 
1120) sternly reminds us:
I tell you that you need not mount the donkey; you are the donkey! The whole 
world is the donkey; how can you mount it? If you mount it, you can be sure 
the sickness will not leave! If you don’t mount it, the whole universe is wide 
open!65
It may seem harmless that Master Foyan rewards such nonmounters with the 
epithet “wayfarer,” or sojourner on the path to enlightenment. But is it harmless? 
In order for such wisdom to auger a world devoid of doctrinal warfare we 
must introduce an additional non- buddhist condition here: If, however, in not 
mounting the donkey, you have performed a Zen- not- mounting or a Buddhist- 
not- mounting, then the whole universe once again shrivels up! What is at 
stake is nothing less than the introduction of “peace into thought by means of 
democracy.”66 Not mounting the donkey of decision, we may begin the very 
task that Master Foyan ostensibly recommends, namely, “to think and create 
theory for human beings.”67 We may finally “put the Real at the heart of the 
person [and] the person at the heart of the Real.”68 To do so, however, is not to 
reinscribe onto “the person” yet another codex of subjectivity that some actual 
person may or may not finally realize. It is rather to free “the person” of any such 
compulsion. Laruelle’s “Theorem 000000: On the Suicide Disguised as Murder” 
offers an image whose violence provocatively posits the stakes involved, namely, 
a self- sacrifice perpetuated in the name of an apotheosis, of being raised up as 
some idealized persona— wayfarer, bodhisattva, arhant, mindful one, Western 
Buddhist, etc. We can paraphrase for our purposes what he writes in the 
experimental text “Theorems of the Good News”:
Buddhism has but one goal: to make the person believe that he must identify 
himself with Buddhism; to make the person assume this suicide, a suicide 
disguised as murder charged against the person.69
Perhaps the most significant consequence of thinking from the axiomatic Real is 
that it inaugurates a new kind of relationship between, in our case, x- buddhism 
and the person who uses its materials. And what is that relationship? It is 
one in which the material is subservient to the person, and not the other way 
around. Really, this is always the case, and the only possible case. The “suicide” 
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illusion. As Laruelle says in “Theorem 0 or the Transcendental Theorem:  On 
Nontransferable Identity” (in paraphrase):
Nothing can, except through illusion, substitute itself for the person and for his 
or her identity. And the person cannot, except through illusion, substitute herself 
for x- buddhism . . . The person is an inalienable reality. There is no reversibility 
between the person and x- buddhism.
Another word for the nonalienated figure is “stranger subject,” to which we 
now turn.
The stranger subject
What makes the stranger subject so strange is that it indexes resistance to all 
ideological determinations of “the person.” If Master Foyan’s good student, the 
one who chooses not to mount the donkey, thereby attains the salutary status of 
“wayfarer,” the stranger subject, who similarly struggles with decision and the 
World, receives no such nomination. I spoke earlier of Laruelle’s use of violent 
language, and we saw it just now in “Theorems of the Good News”: victimhood, 
insurrection, suicide, murder. Why such language? For, look at how sincerely 
those compassionate regional knowledges— applied philosophy, positive 
psychology, x- buddhism— desire to mold us into exemplary beings. A rational 
animal, a happy human, an enlightened Buddha. Yet, surely anyone who has been 
party to the formative communities that foster such exemplars can attest to the 
violence, subtle or otherwise, done to their members in the name of the exalted 
ideal. For what is a thought- world devoid of its subject, wrenched, to whatever 
extent, into an actual human being?
Before further pursuing Laruelle’s idea of the stranger subject, it will be of 
help to create context by reflecting briefly on the Western Buddhist idea of the 
subject. The theme is obviously too complex to treat in depth here. Instead, I offer 
some broad remarks that I hope will stimulate the reader to further thought as 
we turn to the non- philosophical stranger subject. Consistent with what I have 
been arguing throughout this book, I  understand Buddhism to be offering 
material for constructing a subject that would be faithful to the Real (to thusness, 
emptiness, the all, no- self, things as they are, and so on) but for the eventual and 
inevitable turn required by x- buddhist sufficiency. As is often the case with 
Buddhism, a certain binary appears to be operating here. In some instances, 
the practitioner is understood to be shaped into a particular (Buddhist) subject. 
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He may show up at the sangha as a reprobate good- for- nothing, but through 
sustained cultivation of particular qualities, such as concentration, compassion, 
equanimity, lovingkindness, proper speech, and so forth, he may attain to a kind 
of Buddhist perfection. An opposing view disparages this model of cultivation. It 
does so because it adamantly dismisses the very premise on which it is founded, 
namely, the conditionality, and hence constructability, of “Buddhahood.” In 
this view, our ne’er do- well practitioner has “cultivated” nothing whatsoever; he 
has simply become what he has always been but failed to realize: an awakened 
being, a Buddha. We find this latter position in, for instance, the kōanic “How 
can you hope to polish a tile to make it into a mirror?” and other such views 
derived from the theory that all sentient beings already possess an indwelling 
“Buddha matrix” (tathāgatagarbha). The former position is reflected in, for 
example, the Dalai Lama’s Ge- luk view that awakening is “not a given that awaits 
our discovery, but something that must be created through discursive (textual) 
and nondiscursive practices.”70 We see this basic binary throughout Buddhism’s 
history. It is at work to varying degrees in, for instance, the ancient debates on 
practice between “village dwelling” and “forest dwelling” practitioners, medieval 
ones between “gradualists” and “suddenists,” and modern ones between what I’ll 
call diurnal destressers and enlightenment virtuosos. Perhaps this bifurcation is 
yet another genetic inheritance of Buddhism. For we find both views represented 
in the Pali canon. The Buddha says there, for example, “I do not say, monks, that 
the attainment of wisdom happens all at once. Rather, the attainment of wisdom 
comes after gradual training, gradual action, gradual practice.”71 However, he 
also says that, “This mind, monks, is luminous but is adulterated by adventitious 
defilements.”72 Again, the former in each case suggests a “materialist” subject, 
one that is initially absent then created via a sustained and disciplined regimen 
while the latter suggests an “idealist” one that is already present then discovered 
as soon as the practitioner but “understands this [indwelling luminous mind] as 
it really is.”73
I think it is safe to say that a survey of contemporary Western Buddhist 
teachers will prove this two- fold heuristic roughly reliable. One caveat that 
I  would make to that claim is that the distinction is largely rhetorical. That 
is, I  would submit that the typical contemporary Western Buddhist teacher 
fails to understand this difference that has animated so much intra- Buddhist 
debate, between, namely, a discursive and an essentialized subject. Not only do 
contemporary Western Buddhist teachers woefully undertheorize subjectivity, 
but to the extent that they broach the topic at all they seem simply to assume the 
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Many readers surely object to my characterization of an “essentialized” Western 
Buddhist subject. If any topic is anathema in well- instructed Buddhist company, 
it is “essence.” That news may come as a surprise to the student of Buddhism, 
who commonly comes across terms like “true self,” “Buddha nature,” “original 
goodness,” “primordial consciousness,” and so on. I would refer those rightfully 
perplexed students to Tom Pepper’s lucidly argued “Taking Anatman Full 
Strength and Śāntideva’s Ethics of Truth.”74 Because it so deftly articulates the 
prevailing view of Western Buddhist subjectivity, as well as the inter- Buddhist 
contradictions and, hence, missed opportunities, that that view entails, it will be 
of use to present a few assertions from this article. Pepper writes, “I take the term 
atman to refer to the concept, common in the time of the historical Buddha, 
of a world- transcendent, essential, and unchanging life- force, consciousness, or 
soul.” The Buddha, of course, challenged this atman view with his concept of 
no- , not- , non- , an- atman.
The teaching of anatman, then, can be understood as an assertion that there is 
no eternal and unchanging consciousness, life force, or soul, singular or plural, 
nothing which can escape this dependently arisen world and continue on in 
eternal bliss. Rather, the only kind of self we have is a dependently arisen self, 
completely caused by the conditions of its existence. Full- strength anatman, 
then, does not say that we do not have a “self,” that the self is mere illusion, or 
that it is non- existent. Rather, we do have a self, it is real, and has real causal 
powers, but it is impermanent, constructed by the conditions of its existence, 
can be changed, will come to an end, and is completely non- dualistic, radically 
immanent to the material world.
As I  will show in a moment, Laruelle’s stranger subject is coming into view 
here. The question would be, then, whether x- buddhists themselves theorize 
such a “full- strength anatman,” or whether they water it down with splashes 
of sufficiency and dollops of decision. Pepper offers this succinct account of 
Western Buddhism’s current state of affairs concerning this matter, whereby:
Everybody seems to want to assert fidelity to this central Buddhist teaching, but 
nobody is quite as eager to embrace all the implications . . . It is too troubling, for 
a multitude of reasons, to accept the possibility that the early Buddhists really 
meant that there is no atman at all, of any kind. So, we get a host of watered- 
down, more palatable versions of anatman, which turn out always to sneak some 
kind of atman in under another name. The implication of this, I will argue, is 
the complete elimination of any possibility that Buddhist thought and practice 
could function to decrease suffering in the world, the complete destruction of 
the bodhisattva path.
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This compelling conclusion resonates with my own contention, stated at the 
very outset of this book and repeated throughout. I  restate that contention 
here:  Buddhism offers us valuable resources, both concepts and practices, 
for consequential reformations of self and society in the contemporary West. 
However, in light of both the past and the present, we are compelled to draw the 
conclusion that the term “Buddhism” indexes a deep human ambivalence toward 
unleashing the full force of its liberating thought. Although Pepper goes on to 
discuss “the bodhisattva path” in the specific terms laid down by Śāntideva (fl. 
eighth century), we can take his warning about its destruction as a generic claim 
concerning Western Buddhism’s unwitting function as an ally of the current, 
and quite possibly doomed, socioeconomic status quo. The negative side of this 
function is the inability of Western Buddhism to aid us in our current condition 
of being “addicted to suffering, to stagnation, and to the rapid destruction of the 
very conditions of our existence.” Again, although I say “Western Buddhism,” 
that is just shorthand for the many actual people who labor to fashion and 
perpetuate its particular World, a World in which neither “a dose of full- strength 
anatman” nor its faithful subject appears to be a part of the solution.
In the Pali canon, the Buddha uses two interesting terms for the subject. Again, 
we see a binary. The first term is “uninstructed worldling” (assutavā puthujjana). 
Although this is a technical term with a copious descriptive apparatus, an 
uninstructed worldling is basically someone who responds to pain, life’s 
vicissitudes, and general change the way I assume everyone reading this book 
does: he or she is averse to the first, affected by the second, and concerned with 
the third. This figure is contrasted with another subject: “the instructed noble 
disciple” (sutavā ariyasāvaka). Unlike the all- too- human uninstructed worldling, 
this subject “endures [pain] patiently, without sorrow, resentment, or distress”; 
takes life’s vicissitudes (gain and loss, fame and disrepute, praise and blame, 
pleasure and pain) with perfect equanimity; and faces inevitable change with 
imperturbability.75 The uninstructed worldling, in other words, is a subject for 
the world while the noble disciple can only realistically be one for a World. Well- 
instructed readers surely take exception to my admittedly uninstructed opinion 
that the latter is a fantastical, unattainable figure, and, even if attainable, wholly 
undesirable. Now, we may “only” be dealing here with subjects, with discursive 
conceptions of what an actual person should or might be. But considering the 
lived effect of such subject discourses on actual people, Laruelle’s insistence that 
the man or woman is an “inalienable reality,” an “irreversible identity,” whose 
submission to such notions constitutes a figurative “suicide disguised as murder 
charged against the person,” begins to sound like the more liberating discourse 
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of the two. If nothing else, it valorizes a degree of performative honesty found 
lacking in idealizing (in both senses) subject discourses like Western Buddhism. 
In some cases, this performative impossibility might be understood as an integral 
aspect of the very practice. It is always hard to be sure. What, for example, would 
a literal effort to fulfill the bodhisattva’s vow to save all sentient beings entail? Yet, 
Dainin Katagiri, an influential Zen teacher in the United States, insists in true 
Wisdom fashion that, yes, “to the intellect it seems impossible”:
But actually it is possible. When we say the vows in English, we say “I vow.” 
But bodhisattvas don’t assert the “I.” The bodhisattva’s life is completely 
without subject or object. This is full concentration. Thus, a bodhisattva is not a 
bodhisattva. This bodhisattva is really, fully alive.76
Typically, though, the performative impossibility is unacknowledged. I  close 
these remarks about the Western Buddhist subject with an example that is 
quite possibly currently the most widely circulated single sentence on the 
topic:  “Mindfulness is awareness that arises through paying attention, on 
purpose, in the present moment, non- judgmentally, to things as they are.”77 The 
“instructed” Mindfulness subject strives to embody such a condition, and, non- 
judgmentalism notwithstanding, actual practitioners really believe that they do 
and I, for example, don’t (otherwise, would I be questioning its viability?). Yet, 
if we disallow the exception that Wisdom grants such statements, how do we 
even begin to sort out the “thicket of views” here— the unstated assumptions 
about consciousness and cognition, about awareness, agency, time, the faculty 
of judgement, about their being a definitive “way” that things are, and much 
more? Even if we could do so, we are immediately met with the additional 
claim that “[mindfulness] is a way of shifting from doing to being so that we 
take in all the information that an experience offers us before we act.” Like the 
Buddha’s impervious, imperturbable, noble disciple, even if it were possible, 
would such a post- human calculating machine be desirable? Wisdom, of course, 
explains it all. But does it do so without lapsing into vacuous platitudes, logical 
absurdities, and remedial instructions? Yes, counters the subjugated practitioner. 
To which I then ask, okay, but is that assertion not just an admission that we are 
dealing here with an ideologically driven rhetorical performance rather than a 
generic “whole other way of living our lives”?78 To repeat a familiar pattern of 
this book, I  want to quickly add that the existence of an ideologically driven 
rhetorical performance is certainly not a target of criticism. The critical gears 
start cranking when an amphibology, a confusion- causing ambiguity, is detected 
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thing is that the critique- worthy issue arises when we become suspicious about 
whether sensei does in fact do what he says and say what he does. Laruelle views 
this performative inconsistency as a defining characteristic of those who traffic 
in sufficient thought- systems.
The philosopher, legislating for reason, the life of the mind or social life, makes 
an exception even of the fact that he does not do what he says or does not say 
what he does, but, speaking the law, he makes an exception and enjoys the 
privilege of speaking about it and imposing it with his authority. I  speak the 
truth, says the liar; I speak democracy, says the anti- democrat: this is the paradox 
of the philosopher as thinker of the Whole who is never short of expedients for 
presenting the paradox as if it were acceptable.79
You might think that the sickening spectacle of enlightened sexual predators, 
spiritual snake oil salespersons, and crazy wisdom creeps among the propounders 
of The Dharma would be more than enough to detect the machinations 
permitted by the “expedients” of Wisdom. But obviously it is not. Yet how much 
more difficult to discern the exceptionalism of which Laruelle speaks, masked 
as it typically is by kind wise eyes and a compassionate, if faintly self- righteous, 
affect. Consideration of the stranger should prove rewarding to anyone desiring 
a conception of a subject faithful to the full implications of Western Buddhism’s 
discerning thought. It should be obvious from the preceding remarks that one of 
those implications is not that the stranger, like some sort of secular mystic, has 
seen the face of the inscrutable Real and thereby attained stranger enlightenment. 
The Real, recall, entails a “unilateral causality,” such that:
stranger ←/  Real
The Real determines the stranger subject but the stranger subject does not 
determine the Real. “The stranger subject”— whether as concept, utterance, 
imagined archetype, or embodied agent— is yet another material derived from 
the Real. The same, of course, can be said of the Western Buddhist subject. So, 
what is the difference? The Western Buddhist subject is determined by the One in 
the last instance only. But the merits of that proposition become clear only after 
doing a considerable amount of work. This critique is an example of the required 
work. We have, for instance, seen the ways in which the Western Buddhist subject 
is primarily constituted through its decision to stand within the World as seen 
through the prism of Buddhism. We have seen how Western Buddhism gazes 
into the Real, projects into it its elaborate determinations, desires, and goals, 
and sees this complex mixture reflected back to it, not, of course, as the Real, 
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but as paramārthasatya/ ultimate truth, tathātā/ thusness, śūnyatā/ emptiness, 
pratītyasamutpāda/ dependent origination, rigpa/ primordial consciousness, 
the mindful present moment, The Dharma, and so on. The Western Buddhist 
subject stance thus entails a form of thought and life that is adequate to the 
organon of x- buddhism. None of this describes the stranger. This stranger is 
constituted by the fact that it attends outwardly, toward the countless material 
cloned from the One, including the material labeled “Western Buddhism.” This 
subject, contrary to deciding on the sufficiency of this material, receives the 
material, engages with it, grapples with it, fights against it, appropriates elements 
of it, struggles further with it, creatively appropriates it some more, and maybe 
in the end fashions a form of life from it. The subject’s very knowledge that this 
is a necessary procedure for avoiding capture by sufficient x- systems is precisely 
that which makes possible its thought and action against the pretensions of a 
World and in accordance with the One.
This form of “stranger” thought, in fact, constitutes Laruelle’s third “discovery,” 
namely, the “force (of) thought.” As the resonance with Marx’s “labor power” 
(Arbeitskraft; typically translated into French as force de travail) indicates, 
the force (of) thought is a “capacity, or power of the living individual.” Marx 
continues:
Labor- power, however, becomes a reality only by its exercise; it sets itself in 
action only by working. But thereby a definite quantity of human muscle, nerve, 
brain, etc., is wasted [or exhausted, spent: verausgabt], and these required to be 
restored . . . The value of labor- power resolves itself into the value of a definite 
quantity of the means of subsistence. It therefore varies with the value of these 
means or with the quantity of labor requisite for their production.80
Similarly, the force (of) thought must be exercised if it is to constitute a “drive” 
with pragmatic force in the world.81 And like the static potentiality of labor 
power it must be continually enacted in order to resolve this dismantling into 
adequate use- value. Significantly, though, unlike for labor- power, the resolution 
of the force (of) thought into use- value does not entail the subject’s alienation. In 
fact, it entails alienation from the alienating structure itself (hence, “the stranger 
subject”), that is to say, in our case, from the system of production and exchange 
called x- buddhism. The value derived from this estrangement is that the force 
(of) thought “dismantles fetishism of thought- representation” and thus becomes 
“adequate to the radical autonomy of the One.”82 I must quickly add that this 
should not be understood to mean that the stranger subject is a thinking ego, 
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thinks some content that effectively “reifies or thingifies [the One] into an 
ontic element or into a transcendental imagination.”83 The stranger’s force (of) 
thought is “adequate” to the Real because it constitutes a “clone” of the Real, 
“rather than its production or reproduction into some material form proper to 
it.”84 A clone, recall, is identical to but not the same as its original. In other words, 
1 + 1 = 1: 1 (the Real) + 1 (the stranger) = 1 (vision- in- One), and not 2 or the 
One- in- a- Second or the One- in- Another.85 If this sounds obtuse or far- fetched, 
we can once again consider how the object of this critique approaches very near 
this equation. The Japanese Zen teacher Musō (1275– 1351), as an illustration, is 
posed the question:
It is said that there are some people who practice kufū in all things and others 
who do everything with kufū. What is the difference between the two?
The term kufū (Chinese, kung- fu) is a first name for the Real. To practice kufū 
properly, therefore, is to live in accordance with the Real. This fact reveals the 
enormity at stake in the question. The German Buddhologist Heinrich Dumoulin 
translates this idea into Buddhist language: “In everything they do, disciples of 
the Way should be totally devoted to the Dharma— they should practice kufū.” 
Recalling Kafka’s guardian of the law, Dumoulin has another master tell us that 
there is “no separation between the law of the Buddha and the law of the world.” 
So how else can Musō answer the question than to say that whether eating, 
sleeping, reciting sūtras, or shitting, subjects of the Way practice kufū? As to 
the question of the difference between the two: “there is no difference between 
‘within all things’ and ‘within kufū.” 1 + 1 = 1.86
The Dharma subject is similar to the stranger subject in another way. For the 
former, too, something like the force (of) thought is deemed necessary. Indeed, 
Western Buddhism is nothing if not a Mayday concerning the pernicious 
fetishism of thought: “Thought is samsara. Being free of thought is liberation. 
When we are free of thinking, we are free of thought.”87 More damningly, in 
thinking that which is foreclosed to it, namely, thusness, emptiness, the Way, and 
so on, thought obscures the very truth it both seeks and is:  “Before ideation, 
before the mind begins to construct [representations and images], the mind 
touches the ultimate dimension, the realm of suchness.”88 Therefore, what 
conclusion can we rationally draw but:  “if you seek truth, you should value 
silent awareness and . . . consider it more important than any thought”?89 Both 
subjects, the stranger and the x- buddhist, are being alerted to the alienating 
effect of mistaking a representation of the Real for the Real itself. Both subjects 








144 A Critique of Western Buddhism
which they live. Both subjects are being taught that it is precisely within the 
indetermination that constitutes representational thought that their respective 
subjectivities are to be found. Both subjects are being implored to struggle 
against the World and to resist the hallucination conjured by its thought. Finally, 
both subjects are being advised to “experience” the intimate, immanently “lived” 
or performed thought that follows immediately from the Real. So, again, the 
crucial question arises: what is the difference? And the answer is the same I have 
offered throughout this book. Whereas the x- buddhist is corralled in- Buddhism, 
the stranger remains in- One. That is, in the quotes above, x- buddhism continues 
to harass us. It clears the way of delusional representations only to construct 
a new way, an x- buddhist way. And it must! That is precisely what sufficient 
thought- systems do. Once again, the critical issue is that it does so in a manner 
that constitutes an amphiboly, a confusion engendered by its mistaken equation 
of its representations for the Real. It may be true that its representations— its 
texts, concepts, models, language— are, as D. T. Suzuki says, comprised of “mere 
waste paper whose utility consist in wiping off the dirt of the intellect”; but 
this towering figure of Western Buddhism errs profoundly when he adds, “and 
nothing more.”90 As an example of what this decisive “more” consists in, we can 
look at the fuller context of one of the above quotes. Bear in mind that the “inner 
commentary/ speech” is synonymous with “thought” and “thinking.”
Sometimes we assume it is through the inner commentary that we know the 
world. Actually, that inner speech does not know the world at all. It is the inner 
speech that spins the delusions that cause suffering. Inner speech causes us to be 
angry with our enemies and to form dangerous attachments to our loved ones. 
Inner speech causes all of life’s problems. It constructs fear and guilt, anxiety and 
depression. It builds these illusions as deftly as the skilful actor manipulates the 
audience to create terror or tears. So if you seek truth, you should value silent 
awareness and, when meditating, consider it more important than any thought.
This paragraph is a directory of subject determinations. It is rife with tacit 
assumptions about the subject, with passive- aggressive demands, hidden values 
and prejudices, gas- lighting manipulations, and quite a lot more. In short, the 
passage illustrates the fact that if x- buddhism enlightens us as to the actual 
indetermination burrowed within representational thought, such that its subject 
is grounded in emptiness, no- self, thusness, etc., things quickly turn dark with 
its extreme overdeterminations of the same. On this point alone we can turn 
toward the stranger subject and discern the decisive difference. For, if the Real is 
“foreclosed” to philosophical, psychological, x- buddhist or any other authority, 
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then it must remain foreclosed. If “before the mind begins to construct, [it] 
touches the ultimate dimension,” then the system of thought that teaches us this 
fact must at all costs avoid propagating constructions about that dimension. It is 
for this reason that Laruelle says that the force (of) thought is “the first possible 
experience of thought— after the vision- in- One, which is not itself a thought.”91 
Such x- buddhist constructions amount to thinking the in- One (the ultimate 
dimension, suchness, in x- buddhist language) as “the first possible experience of 
thought,” and all additional thoughts as stemming from that experience. Where 
the x- buddhist subject proceeds under the dependence of the sufficient system of 
determination known as The Dharma, the stranger subject proceeds “Under the 
dependence of the vision- in- One in- the- last- instance,” on, that is, the basis of 
its specific form of practice such that “it transforms the material of [buddhistic] 
statements and particularly the datum of the images of [its] thought” so as to 
render them coterminous with the science- thought discussed earlier.92
I hope to have made it clear, or at least plausible, that the Western Buddhist 
subject position entails a practice of thought that is adequate to the organon 
of x- buddhism. As with Western Buddhism and indeed all forms of thought, 
the force (of) thought, too, is an organon. But it is an organon that, as we have 
already seen, “works through hypothesis or axiomatic ‘real’ decision,” rather 
than through the kind of unitary and sufficient decision that explains the 
Western Buddhist stance. This point touches yet again on a central feature of 
my critique, and, as a way of rousing the spirit of Part Three, it bears repeating. 
The problematic of this critique is not to intervene in the World of Buddhism 
in order to correct its errors and render it palatable to us all- too- sophisticated 
twenty- first century secularists. As I  suggested in the very first sentence of 
this book, the problematic of this critique is driven by the question what are 
we to make of Western Buddhism? As Laruelle claims for non- philosophy, I am 
claiming for a speculative non- buddhism that the problem is how to use it, how 
to make something from it and for the stranger.
The problem is how to use philosophy so as to effect a real transformation of the 
subject in such a way as to allow it to break the spell of its bewitchment by the 
world and enable it to constitute itself through a certain struggle with the latter. 
The goal is not to effect a specular doubling or duplication of the world, thereby 
reinforcing its grip, but to elaborate a new order, that of the radical subjectivity 
of the Stranger as subject who is in- struggle by definition.93
This is a remarkably positive statement coming from Laruelle. It nearly resembles 




146 A Critique of Western Buddhism
concrete program of action. It seems to suggest that practice has consequences 
beyond theory, beyond, that is, practice as theoretical reflection and theoretical 
reflection as practice. We will turn more directly to this issue in Part 3. What 
I want to suggest is that my explicit hedging on the stranger’s positivity here is 
absolutely necessary. For, whatever else the stranger subject might be, it is barred 
from the endless determinations and representations that mark discourses 
like x- buddhism. Admittedly, this foreclosure produces a subject that sounds 
somewhat machinic, somewhat generic and anonymous. But I would argue that 
anātman does so as well. Indeed, that very fact is what makes the Buddhist term 
a viable first name for the Real. For, if it is to mean anything at all, the “lack 
of inherent existence” that characterizes the subject must remain faithful to 
that lack. Eschewing the Western Buddhist “rumor” concerning anātman, that 
rumor “which is transmitted by hearsay, imitation, specularity, and repetition,” 
the concept “stranger” might just be tonic for stimulating a truly void subject, 
one that “does not use [x- buddhism] as if it were already constituted, [but] is 
that use.”94 Being, or better, performing, that use, however, does not entail that 
the subject identify with the Buddhist material. Its identity is irrevocably bound 










The deliverance of fiction
Buddhism has a fascination with fiction. Arguably, fiction is the reigning trope 
of x- buddhist thought. The solid world before us is like a “magical illusion” 
conjured up by our perceptual apparatus, that “charmer of the childlike.” Or it 
is like a dream woven “in the mind of one drunk with sleep.” Or it is a feature 
of all of reality— of samsāra and nirvāṇa alike, of appearance and emptiness— 
wherein all things “arise as the illusory display of unobstructed relativity.”1 Why 
is everything so tremulously like a dream? The classical Buddhist answer is 
saṃskāra— fabrication, formulation, construction. When the saṃskāra that is 
our perceptual apparatus meets the saṃskāra that is the world of form, how 
could there not ensue the fabrications of fiction? The Buddha is the Buddha 
and not, say, the Christ or the Professor, precisely because he was aware of this 
fabulation to such an extreme degree that he awakened from the hypnotic dreamy 
ignorance of seeing things as they seem as opposed to as they are. Of course, that 
story, too, is a fabulation. And by “that story,” I mean not only the tale of Prince 
Siddhārtha, but the entire glorious World that was, continues to be, and will 
in the future be fashioned in his name. I don’t just mean the phantasmagoric 
weaving of fictions within fictions, wherein even that simple tale itself unfolds 
repeatedly not in earthly India but in “as many worlds as there are atoms” in the 
paradisiacal galaxies called Buddha fields and pure lands or where the teaching 
originates in “the most sensitive, delicate, adamantine matrix of life and bliss” 
known as the “Victorious Vagina of the Diamond Female Buddhas.” Even if we 
left it at such dime- a- dozen examples, the story that Buddhism tells would be so 
rich in fictional exuberance that to enumerate its variations, subtle and gross, 
across time and space would be tedious beyond the imagination of anyone but 
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Flames galaxy.2 But there are much more telling, if less obvious, fictions turning 
and turning in the widening gyre of this fabulation called Buddhism.
To say that “Buddhism,” in the singular, tells this tale, is to acknowledge the 
equally singular identity enfolded within this term. And yet, to use it responsibly, 
to actually have the word say something, we must apply plural modifications. 
And to do so, to modify “Buddhism” as the occasion demands, belies even 
deeper, because less apparent, fictions. While speaking of “Zen Buddhism,” 
for instance, creates some restraint within the possibility of “Buddhism,” it still 
harbors highly consequential ambiguities. For example, whose Zen? Dogen’s? 
Eisai’s? Thich Nhat Hanh’s? Robert Pirsig’s? Zenify 100% Natural Stress Relief 
drink’s?3 Even if we say “Dogen’s,” now: which text, which period, for whom, to 
what end, where and when— on Eiheiji in the thirteenth century for elite monks 
abiding in the mind of the Buddha; in Tokyo in the nineteenth, for upper- class 
laymen cultivating Samurai sangfroid; in Toledo in the twenty- first, for middle- 
class women uncoupling from the stresses of the daily grind? Every additional 
element entails literally exponential reconfigurations generated by the algorithm 
“Buddhism.” Indeed, the x in “x- buddhism” is nothing if not a sign of the 
staggering fictional exuberance erupting out of “Buddhism.”
With such considerations, I hope to impress several points on the reader. The 
first is the possibility that the most consequential x- buddhist fictions are also the 
most invisible. They are invisible because they appear to be the very stuff from 
which a bona fide tradition is woven. They are precisely the features that give 
each x- buddhism its air of (nonfictional) legitimacy. As Laruelle says about the 
fictions of Christianity:
So many [Buddhas] have been imagined, so many [sūtras] written, plagiarized, 
copied, canonized or kept secret, unfolded in the light of exegesis or buried 
in the desert; so many [buddhologies] and hermeneutics, so much literature 
elevated to the dignity of [“sacred”] and sometimes “canonical” texts.
So many permutations wrought by time, place, culture, class, gender, politics, 
desire; so much fragmentation, schismatization, disputation, argumentation, 
secularization, naturalization, that— and this is my second point— the question 
becomes: what possible grounds might one offer for not fictionalizing Buddhism 
yet again, but this time out from “under the punctilious gaze” of some putative 
x- buddhist standard? For, given that it is fiction through and through, given 
that Buddhism already is of the genre fabulation, then there can certainly be 
“nothing excessive” in proposing a buddhofiction, a new form of fiction that 




conjugation of renewed scientific- type procedures and old philosophical- type 
theological models.”4 I imagine that the committed x- buddhist reader objects that 
such a thing as a buddhofiction is wholly unnecessary since his or her tradition 
already is a scientific- type procedure coupled to an old philosophical/ religious/ 
contemplative- type model. My claim throughout this book, by contrast, has 
been that something like a non- buddhism is required if Buddhism is to uphold 
its self- proclaimed identity as such. I have offered ample reasons and examples 
for this claim. Perhaps the most consequential aspect of this critique is the pivot 
around which the various arguments turn. I  am referring to the principle of 
sufficient Buddhism. Recall what happens when acute articulations of the Real 
are placed in the service of this principle: the requirement to maintain x- buddhist 
sufficiency— its authority, completeness, mastery— converts even emptiness into 
the ideological game piece called śūnyatā. “Emptiness” as an element within the 
vast network of Western Buddhist postulates is not the Real of emptiness. Even 
Buddhism teaches us this fact (e.g., “the emptiness of emptiness”). Until, of course, 
it teaches us something different (e.g., emptiness as “a spectral, shifting presence of 
absence: shimmering substantiality” or whatever). Ultimately, the x- buddhist, as 
Laruelle says of the philosopher, plays with loaded dice. And he must! A unitary 
system of thought such as Buddhism must be protected from the elements within 
its semiotic system “whose function,” as Terry Eagleton pointed out earlier, “is to 
indicate the truth that it cannot be totalised.” My critique will be useful or not to 
the reader depending on whether I have been convincing on this point concerning 
the function and consequences of the principle of sufficient Buddhism.
One of those consequences is the necessity, but not sufficiency, of a non- 
buddhist supplement, or, what amounts to the same thing, of a “buddhofiction.” 
Every x- buddhism must maintain its authority at the Great Feast of Knowledge. 
It must project its colors onto the black universe. It must drive its World- 
dominating axis mundi into the heart of the earth. But the stranger must engage 
in none of this. And with this point we come to a central operating premise 
of Laruelle’s notion of “philo- fiction,” from which I am deriving my concept of 
“buddhofiction.” The term:
may be understood as referring primarily to the “fictionalist” school of 
mathematics, where the warring ontological commitments of traditional debates 
are eliminated by taking up a stance of hypothetical “acceptance” with regard to 
the implications of the various objects they propose.5
A non- buddhism would in this manner “introduce peace into [x- buddhist] 
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which, when the polemos ceases, is after all, a shared banquet; without ever 
losing sight of the black universe; and with feet pressed snugly against the earth, 
non- buddhism “is content to allow all [x- buddhist] knowledges equal validity or 
partial models of the Real that determines them in the last instance.” As we have 
seen, what renders them so is the “unilateralizing force of generic thought.” All 
thought equally, that is, is material cloned from the Real. As thought- system it 
crashes against the One on its way to unitary transcendence- decision- sufficiency, 
but only to be knocked level to lie prostrate on the earth, to appear in “the uni- 
verse that is the human’s true habitat.”7 All thought really only ever remains in- 
One, forever available for thought renewed.
To a convicted x- buddhist, and many other readers besides, I  imagine that 
non- buddhism appears to be yet another x- buddhism. After all, reconfiguring the 
materials that properly constitute “Buddhism” is a practice as old as Buddhism 
itself. That is not the case here. If the reader is not yet convinced of, or not yet 
even open to, that claim, I offer the following considerations before turning to a 
more sustained effort at creating a buddhofiction. First of all, let us be clear: non- 
buddhism, too, is a practice. In fact, it is nothing if not a practice. It is, moreover, 
a practice that entails experience, a practice in theory or, better, practice- in- 
theory, equally in thought and “in- person.” It is crucial to understand, however, 
that it is a practice unfolding under the auspices of the stranger subject. That is, 
it is the practice (of) radical immanence, practice (from) the Real (remember 
that the Laruellen graphics collapse the misleading distance between terms). In 
x- buddhist terms we might say that it is, for instance, emptiness- practice, force 
(of) thusness, vision- in- just- that, (non- )things- as- they- are, shitstick- without- 
shitstickness. If, yet again, this sounds like just more Buddhism, bear in mind that 
“Buddhism” is a term for a quite particular hallucination of the Real. “Buddhism” 
is a material product of the Real that it, as some x- buddhism, so longs to possess. 
It names its object of desire in the most intimate fashion: emptiness, thusness, 
womb of the Buddha, Victorious Vagina, gateless gate, shitstick. But in doing so, 
Buddhism forgets the very a priori that has excited its labor in the first place, and 
thus causes its subject to confuse Buddhism’s production for that a priori itself. 
It is different for the non- buddhist subject, for whom “there is a transcendental 
illusion that is already more consistent” precisely because its practice remains 
“immanent in its principle, and penetrates and encompasses the [x- buddhist] 
system, finding subtle support in each of its parts, brushing up against them 
where necessary without lingering, settling, or becoming attached.” Yet again, 
I  imagine that this point sounds quintessentially “Buddhist” to many readers. 
For, isn’t Buddhist practice all about not becoming attached, nonabiding, letting 
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go? The crucial difference, I have been arguing, is that the non- buddhist subject 
engages the x- buddhist material in a manner “that is no longer nodal but 
unilateral.” The subject is disinterested in the interminable postulates connected 
to, say, thusness. But this not an arbitrary disinterest. It derives from remaining 
faithful to the immanent principle of unilaterality (thusness ← x- buddhism ←/ 
Real) rather than to the principle of sufficient Buddhism (x- buddhism → The 
Real thusness). So, for the non- buddhist subject, “the [x- buddhistizable] a 
priori constantly threatens to reclaim its sufficiency and to ‘recharge’ from its 
[x- buddhist] pretenses; it hides the Real a priori and confirms spontaneous [x- 
buddhism].”8 The stranger, precisely, depotentializes this threat.
As the mention of “a transcendental illusion” above indicates, non- buddhism 
comes in the name of honesty as much as of peace. It proclaims itself to be a 
fiction. Because it, like Buddhism, is a material that is merely modeled on or 
cloned from the Real, it, too, is marked with “certain characteristics of the spectre” 
that is the x- buddhist form of thought. It is, after all, x- buddhist material that it 
is “brushing up against,” though not adhering to. These characteristics include 
a transcendentally posited subject (i.e., posited in- thought), if “transcendentally 
radicalized” (as force [of] thought) subject, as well as further forms of what 
can only be termed hallucination and illusion. This fact may well give rise to 
jubilation among unsympathetic readers that non- buddhism is indeed just, 
and necessarily, another (mini- )version of the grand system of thought called 
Buddhism— so grand, indeed, that even a non- buddhist critique cannot refrain 
from circling back to its refuge in the end. Laruelle has something to say about 
the seemingly inescapable fact that Buddhism will lay claim to any usage of its 
materials:
Philosophy perpetually wants to claim the philo- fiction as just more 
philosophy. But all bets are off; the Lived- life is resilient, the inalienable Real 
cannot be forgotten, for it does not cease to resist any more than the subject 
(transcendentally radicalized) is able to forget itself in the struggle. The outcome 
of non- philosophy is a radical Lived- life of hallucination and illusion. The 
immanent Lived- life is unforgettable . . . It is the real condition of salvation such 
that it engages a task and maintains the subject, head above the world.9
The real condition of . . . salvation? Perhaps our initial acceptance or rejection of 
a practice of thought comes down to whether we desire the World thus entailed. 
And perhaps this desire, in turn, comes down to whether we feel that the 
entailed World is ultimately one of victimization or salvation. Historically, both 
of these outcomes have followed from the materials of The One True Dharma. 
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It is a Buddhist World that produces allies in the Burmese military’s slaughter 
of Rohingya Muslims. And it was from Buddhist materials that Ambedkar 
fashioned a World resisting, with courage and revolutionary zeal, the savage 
bigotry that perennially crushed the dreams of Indian dalits. Similarly, today, 
in North America, it is a Buddhist World that coeffects the comfortable middle 
class numbness necessary for the unchallenged perpetuation of our current 
neoliberal catastrophe. And it is a Buddhist World that offers succor to sufferers 
of soul- crushing anxiety. This exercise has no end. That is because, to paraphrase 
the popular Western– Zen– Buddhist vow, hallucinations are inexhaustible. 
Hallucinations appear real to the person living them, and so they produce 
real- world effects. If we could survey these effects like “the Buddha called 
Pure Knowledge of All Things” does, would we not see that Western Buddhist 
materials are essentially no different from any other in that their potential usage 
virtually spans the spectrum of human possibility?
Who is the subject, what is the World, that I desire to see woven from x- buddhist 
material? That is a question to be posed by every “non- buddhist,” by anyone, that 
is to say, who wishes to create new forms of thought- practice- experience— and 
perhaps even knowledge— using x- buddhist materials. My own desire has been 
in evidence throughout this book, particularly in the micro- buddhofictions 
or non- buddhist conjunctions that run throughout it. For example, I  have 
indicated in so many ways that practice must “render thought adequate to the 
jouissance of an . . . immanent ‘life.’ ”10 The subject of this thought- practice unites 
in one life the quickening duality of enduring enjoyment and pain. The thought- 
practice is adequate to the continuing horror/ excess/ superabundant vitality that 
is concomitant with merely being “one of them, even on the lowest rung,” that 
is a human life within the community of humans.11 It must, furthermore, enable 
the individual to fare well “in its inevitable struggle with the Authorities of the 
world.”12 As Anthony Paul Smith says in this regard, the practice functions as a 
“kind of counter- creation” to that which has been unleashed in the service of 
human “harassment”; and so it must function as a “force of insurrection that 
disempowers the world and operates without concern for its parameters.”13 As 
this point indicates, an essential element of this non- buddhist performance 
is the battery of x- buddhist concepts that enable an awakened perspective on 
the “hardness of fate,” on, that is to say, the a prioris that form the primitive 
conditions of our existence and thus must constitute the elements of a human 
“awakening”:  emptiness, materiality, interdependent phenomenality, radical 
contingency, non- self, and the ensuing imperative of compassion. Buddhism, 






It thinks at the micro level of the discrete momentary thought- object- events 
that entail the fluid psychophysical organism known as the “person.” It thinks 
at the macro level of human organization, earthly care, and cosmic destiny. It is 
itself a brilliant speculative fiction wherein a World of justice, equality, kindness, 
and peace is imagined. It is, however, a fiction that has been programmed for 
decision and sufficiency, and thereby arrogated to the ornamental palace of 
aristocratic Wisdom. As I said in the Introduction, the purpose of this critique is 
not to annihilate this finely wrought edifice of Western Buddhism. The purpose 
is to view that edifice in the glow of a stranger, more creaturely, light. It is to one 
final glimpse from this view that we now turn.
A Buddhism without a past
A buddhofiction is not a rendering of Buddhism. It is a usage of Buddhist 
materials. It is not a contemplation of Buddhism. It is Buddhism practiced 
otherwise. Its practice will be both unrecognizable and unacceptable to an x- 
buddhist. That is because a buddhofiction depotenializes the very mechanisms 
that ensure x- buddhism its aristocratic status. A  buddhofiction, more 
concretely, is an ideology constructed out of x- material run through anti- 
decisional machinery and slapped with the warrant of insufficient. Buddhism is a 
compromised practice of thought because it is performed under the “punctilious 
gaze” of Buddhist mastery. In the end, its subject’s thought must always yield to 
x- buddhism. It is for this reason that x- buddhism is an unrigorous practice of 
thought. A buddhofiction is thought rising in the eternal swell of the One. If 
that statement sounds grandiose, recall that it is this fact which has determined 
the methodology employed in this critique. All forms of thought, equally, rise 
and fall in this swell. The subject who approaches practice in this manner does 
so under the decidedly unpunctilious, because wholly indifferent, gaze of the 
One. In the end, thought must thus yield to this interminably “defestishizing 
experience,” no matter how strange and estranging it becomes.14 It is for this 
reason that non- buddhism is a rigorous practice of thought.
How does one even begin such an exercise? In general, Laruelle proposes a 
peaceful if firm strategy:
We begin by supposing that [x- buddhism] does not exist or no longer exists, at least 
in the sufficient and authoritative mode and manner in which it presents itself, 
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For the more insurrection- minded readers, the following strategy might bring 
a fuller measure of heat to the act. Laruelle proposes taking this approach in 
relation to Alain Badiou, a “great” thinker, a thinker “entirely apart,” someone 
who has not merely attained mastery of his epoch’s wisdom traditions but 
endeavors forcefully to “re- educate” that very dispensation. Surely, “the Buddha” 
is such a consequential a figure. For such a thinker (and his or her acolytes) 
a remonstration against the Master’s overbearingness will merely be brushed 
aside. What is required is a “defensive ultimatum . . . the defense of a certain 
human universality against an individual spokesperson of a tradition that is 
believed to place it in danger.”
To really place [x- buddhism] in question, even if we are obliged to make use 
of [x- buddhistic] procedures, we must invalidate it in one blow and without 
remainder. We must presuppose every conceptual term to be already divested 
of all power. We must presuppose that the generic matrix is already given in the 
virtual state, and thus that [x- buddhist] objects are already reduced to the status 
of symptoms or mere occasions.16
The “generic matrix” that I develop is the practice- theory of meditation. Why 
that? It would be difficult to convince serious observers of the contemporary 
scene that anything other than meditation occupies the pride of place in 
Western Buddhism. This was true from the very beginning— of Western 
Buddhism, that is. In fact, the proliferation of meditation teaching among the 
laity is a primary identity marker of Western Buddhism. Like Western Buddhism 
itself, this phenomenon originated in Asia, becoming an essential feature by the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. “Traditional” Buddhists, those 
“Eastern” Buddhists who had always placed their hopes in the salvation of a 
better future birth, would continue their rituals of merit- making and devotion in 
monk- administered temples. The new Western Buddhist, whether in Mandalay 
or Madison, would flock to lay- run meditation centers in search for the salvation 
of self- awakening. As Heinz Bechert and Jens- Uwe Hartmann write concerning 
the efforts to reform Buddhism in Nepal:
One of the most striking features of Buddhist modernism is the rebirth and 
popularisation of meditational techniques. In contrast to the traditional teaching 
of meditation— provided in each case by one teacher for individual students— the 
modernists have made a kind of mass movement out of meditating. Renowned 
teachers found meditation centers, which usually draw a large response. Apart from 
preaching, there is probably nothing that has so furthered the spread of Theravada 




The reasons for this emphasis have to do with the issues I  raised in the 
Introduction concerning Western Buddhism’s absorption of Enlightenment 
values, Romantic sentiments, and the Protestant ethos. Particularly concerning 
meditation, we can add scientism, medicalism, and psychologism to that mix. 
As David McMahan points out, meditation is typically presented “as a mode of 
internal observation and analysis akin to empirical science and not bound by 
authority and tradition.” As the notion of “analysis” suggests, it is difficult to 
conceive of contemporary Western Buddhist meditation devoid of the values, 
models, assumptions, and even language of American psychology. As McMahan 
further observes, meditation is typically advertised as:
a psychological method for accessing deeper, unconscious recesses of the mind 
in order to expose unconscious constraints and negative dispositions so that 
they may be transformed or released to allow creative and compassionate forces 
naturally residing in the mind to flow forth unimpeded.18
McMahan’s description here highlights several decisive features of Western 
Buddhist meditation. First, it is thoroughly idealist. Abandoning the 
nonnegotiable revolutionary principle of anātman, Western Buddhist meditation 
teachers assume the primacy of an integral agent possessing an internal mind, 
or in other words, an atman. Second, meditation is wholly “detachable from the 
tradition itself.”19 Never mind the arduous treading of the eightfold path, of the 
stages of the path, or even of the pathless path; never mind the taxing ethical 
demands of sīla, dāna, and all of those annoyingly impossible pāramitās:  we 
can simply plop down on our $100 chakra- purple organic buckwheat- filled 
cushion, or better yet, our couch, and meditate away. Third, meditation is not 
merely detachable from the network of postulates that constitutes any given x- 
buddhism, it is detachable from the material structures that constitute society as 
a whole. We saw this idea at work earlier in Matthieu Ricard’s instructions to the 
Davos billionaires: “You are not the slave of your thoughts— just gaze at them, 
like a shepherd sitting above a meadow watching his sheep go by.” Thoughts, this 
thinking goes, might indeed be noxious seepage spewing from the social world 
into the mind, but with meditation you can become adept at rising above them, 
and remain unscathed. To repeat Žižek’s conclusion to this proposition:  “The 
‘Western Buddhist’ meditative stance is arguably the most efficient way for us to 
fully participate in capitalist dynamics while retaining the appearance of mental 
sanity.” Fourth, meditation is reattached to particular x- buddhist postulates in 
order to add conceptual ballast to the reconfigured usage. Mindfulness maven 
Jon Kabat- Zinn, for instance, is notorious for his opportunistic equivocation on 
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this matter, whereby he simultaneously distances himself from the apparently 
unacceptable truth that Mindfulness is bound up in Buddhism in absolutely 
determinate ways and yet adamantly insists that the implicit benefits derived 
from that relationship obtain for his Mindfulness program.20 But Kabat- Zinn is 
not alone. We see some version of this complex collusion even with figures we 
should expect to be allergic to certain Buddhist values and skeptical of Buddhist 
claims, such as Daniel Goleman and Richard Davidson in their neuroscientific 
study of meditation.21 Finally, while emptiness is the heart of Buddhist doctrine, 
meditation is the heart of Buddhist practice. In a grand gathering of leading x- 
buddhist teachers in the Boston Park Plaza Hotel at the end of the last century 
to discuss the future of “Buddhism in America” (the title of the conference), 
the American Dzogchen teacher Surya Das (born Jeffrey Miller), offered several 
“Emergent Trends in Western Dharma.”22 These trends represented the crucial 
features that were informing “the transplantation of Asian Buddhism into 
the fertile fields of the Western world.” Trend number one is that the coming 
Buddhism will be “Meditation- Based and Experientially Oriented.” It is curious 








The ruin of the structure signifies that in the vanished and destroyed aspects 
of the work of art other energies and forms— those belonging to nature— grow 
again, so that out of the art that still lives in it, and out of nature, which already 
lives in it, a new whole, a characteristic unity, emerges.
— Georg Simmel, The Ruin1
1
A black ant brings him to his senses. It’s just a haze of various shades of green and 
brown, at first. Slowly, something— a speck of moving blackness no larger than 
a peppercorn— comes into focus. It is an ant. And a moving leaf. No, the ant is 
carrying the leaf. The leaf is perpendicular to the ant’s body, rising vertically like 
the head sail on a reed boat. The ant is struggling to surmount a cluster of dried 
leaves with its leaf intact. As he observes the ant, he is vaguely aware that his 
left cheek is pressed hard against the forest floor. The sour stench of stale vomit 
fills his nose. He tastes blood on his lips. He squeezes his pulsating head. But he 
keeps his right eye trained on the ant, captivated by its furious determination. 
The ant thrusts forward; the leaf falls; the ant whips around, grabs the leaf; 
charges another fraction of an inch; darts, and dodges an onslaught of branches 
and leaves. The ant loses the leaf in the melee, clinches it, like a buccaneer, in 
its barbed mandibles, and charges again. This is the moment when he passes 
from the mental fog into self- awareness. A simple but invigorating thought bolts 
through his mind— just drop the leaf, fool.
The ground is cool on his cheek. He closes his eyes and breathes in deeply. 
What happened? What the hell happened? He remembers sitting, as usual, cross- 
legged, back straight, head centered on his shoulders, leaning against the tree 
trunk. This memory quickens him. He pushes himself back up until he is sitting 
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against it with his bare legs straight out in front of him, he stares into the woods. 
What happened? He remembers hunching over like a withered reed, gazing at 
the ground. His head suddenly felt as if a strongman were tightening a leather 
strap around it as a headband. Instinctively, he grabbed it with both hands fully 
extended, and began massaging it, hoping, in vain, to ease the pain. He gasped 
with fright when he felt his scalp. It was shriveled and withered. When he rubbed 
his head, the hair, rotten at the roots, fell to the ground. He remembers heaving 
in waves. The vomit shot in a stream onto the ground and splattered on his face. 
He couldn’t hold out. In pain and exhaustion, he finally fell on his face.
He just stares into space now. The woods are dark. He wraps his arms tightly 
around himself, presses his knees against his chest, and pulls the tattered cloth that 
was once his robe over his shivering body. Overcome by loneliness, shame and, 
most devastating of all, a sense of catastrophic failure, he begins to weep. After half 
a minute, he stops. He wipes his face with his sleeve. He sits still, then punches the 
ground. His gaze sharpened, he mutters to himself, now, where’s that ant?
Sadness was his natural element. Anger was his most effective tonic. Together, 
they were elixir, flushing self- pity and delusion from his mind and paralysis 
from his body. As a child already, he had discovered the futility of struggling 
against anger and sadness. It was like trying to prevent rain from soaking the 
ground. He had tried that once. The rains were coming. With the help of a 
servant, he constructed elaborate hemp roofing and dug a complex drainage 
system to protect his herb garden. The result was the ruin of his herb garden. 
The plants were smothered by the collapsed roof, beaten by the rain mercilessly 
into the ground, and finally drowned in ditches. He observed this disaster from 
his window and drew the logical conclusion. Nature is supreme power. Nature 
is perverse. It is element: water, fire, earth, and air. I, too, am this. I am nature. 
I have a stark choice: I can either struggle against nature as it takes its course or 
learn to live as its force. But doing so will take precise knowledge and great skill. 
In the meantime, I will just let the rain permeate the ground, pervade and infuse 
it, saturate it with its very nature, wetness.
Like the rains, anger and sadness were for him inevitable and all- consuming 
forces. When sad, he felt drawn down to the ground, helpless and disoriented. 
He lost all sense of who he was, what he was doing, and for what reason. Anger 
braced him, lifted him up, turned his face squarely toward the world. When 
mixed, these two affects were like the gods’ nectar: they simultaneously clarified 
and impelled. Sadness was a mirror for his self- delusion. It lay open to view his 
fantasies about himself and the world. Anger narrowed his view, sharpened his 
focus. It provoked ideas and spurred him to action.
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Now, here he is, sad and angry. With patience and care he will absorb their 
force and harvest their seed, as he has done so many times before. That is what 
he determines. On elbows and knees, he crawls over to where the ant had been 
struggling with its leaf. That leaf was both its food and burden, he thinks. Both its 
sustenance and its ruin.
Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of thinking.2
2
This text shares Peter Sloterdijk’s premise about practice:  “anyone who takes 
part in a program for depassivizing himself, and crosses from the side of the 
merely formed to that of the forming, becomes a subject.” We can characterize 
the buddha’s struggle to awaken to the elements of the Law that determine 
human existence in these terms, too. In this light, practice is an exercise in 
“deautomatization”; it entails “liberation from infection by blindly reproducing 
unexamined.” We saw earlier that the “dip into a chaos” entailed by the buddha’s 
contemplative experimentation is immersion into a “Dionysian space of 
undoing” within which he enacts “not a system of demonstration, but an ordeal 
in which the mind is given new eyes.” The undoing must persist and the eyes be 
diurnally refreshed. The stark division of subject pathways being pointed out 
here is between that of a World’s automaton and that of a World’s buddha. It is the 
subject awake to the a prioris powering the furnace of life, or really, of a life, one 
at a time. “The buddha” is the name of the subject of this practice. Borrowing the 
term from the ancient Greeks, Sloterdijk calls such practice “anthropotechnics.” 
It is a term that follows from a confrontation with two “massive pseudo- 
evidences.” Sloterdijk reminds us of the first of these extraordinary facts: no such 
thing as “religion” exists. There are only practices of human formation. Some 
practices produce neo- Nazis; others produce bodhisattvas of great compassion. 
Most produce automatons, mere surfaces reflecting the reigning ideology, 
mirroring it for Others and so serving as agents of its replication. Engaging 
a belief system is no less a “practice” than the yogic headstand. The second of 
these errors was proclaimed by Siddhārtha Gautama: no such thing as an inner 
“self ” exists. There is only an interminable psychophysical- social- symbolic work 
in progress wrought by paideia, autopoiesis, ritualization, humanitas, vinaya, 
Bildung— or automation. Contrary to the hysterical fantasies propagated by 
the abettors of the New Age idealist apocalypse, wherein a cataclysmic shift in 
this and that consciousness will augur the dawn of an eternally utopian World, 
 
 
162 A Critique of Western Buddhism
a sober estimation recognizes the profound limitations of “the agent that 
cuts itself out” from our overbearing World. Anyone who has endeavored to 
change a relationship of two individuals much less the multitude of a World 
is frustratingly aware of the “radically asymmetrical, almost self- annihilating 
division” between “own and non- own.” “Non- own” is the sphere of causes, 
conditions, and influence of every single phenomenon arising bubble- like with 
each tick of the earth’s turning. This is a sphere so inconceivably gargantuan that 
it can be contained only in the mind of God. “Own,” as the word agent reminds 
us, is that sphere wherein I may act to drive something into and through the 
world in the way I desire. In other words, a sphere of power and influence that, in 
relation to that of the “non- own,” amounts to “virtually zero.” We may still— just 
barely— speak of autogenesis, that which is “brought about by the repercussions 
of actions on the actor.” Another way of saying this is that an anthropotechnic 
occurs at the juncture of the personal and the social. The individual is making an 
effort to enhance his psycho- symbolic “immunological” status. But such efforts 
must also serve to increase the “cognitive capital of our society.” The clamor it 
causes in the cellar of the personal epoché must rise as tumult on the city’s streets. 
It must, that is, transubstantiate into a force of thought with bodily engagement. 
“Meditation in Ruin” is addressing what I think has to happen at the very outset 
of such a practice, what lies in front of practice. In a sense, the text is asking 
about the a priori or basic conditions that permit us to speak of “the buddha 
subject,” a first cousin, perhaps, of Laruelle’s “stranger subject.” This subject is 
deeply allergic to representations— a condition that in itself must catalyze not 
only an approach to practice generally, but a quite particular practice. And yet, 
representation is a basic requirement of a life shared with others— of language, 
laughter, communication, symbolization, and so much more. How might we 
conceive today of a practice shorn of excess transcendental representation, a 
practice expelled, like Adam and Eve, from the idealists’ haven?3
3
This text once aspired to be an exercise, an exercitia. It desired to say something 
valuable, to be of help, to show a way. But those days have long passed. Its words 
have soiled themselves with doubt. Here is speech pitted with disenchantment. 
Its paragraphs are a squall of confusion, shame, and anxiety. I am afraid that what 
follows is delinquent in the niceties of persuasion. Simply put:  it is too late for 
arguments. For, “can anyone who has reached the limit bother with arguments?” 
That is not to say that this text recoils from overreach and even bombast. Or that 
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it banks its wings away from the sun of beauty. It burns for beauty! But for the 
beauty of Hölderlin: Does the laughter of people make me sad? Of course it does. 
After all, I have a human heart. Stupidly, this text still pines for meaning, goodness, 
hope, and all of that. As you will find, though, it knows only the blackness of a 
faded dream and the memories of someone with the smell of death in his nose.4
4
By turns worrisome and ridiculous, words like that at least exude the ruination 
that I wish to unbind with this text. Think of that goal as emerging from a dialectic 
of excremental inversion. Dialectics posits the dynamism of knowledge— it’s 
alive, it moves. To be effective, our thinking, our analyses, must thus keep pace. 
(Hence:  “To understand analysis is to understand dialectics.”) We will always 
have, first, our abstraction. And whether it is a chimera of reverie or the hardened 
certainty of Weltanschauung, our abstraction always lacks consummation with 
the lived. We come to this conclusion through real- world trial and error. That is 
to say, we will always have, next, our negation. And in the atmosphere of the Real 
the abstraction corrodes. Yet in this very decomposition, something remains. 
It falls. We pick it up. The analysis resumes. We perceive a concrete— some 
electric x that survives the passage from plenitude toward destitution. Short of 
disappearing into nothingness, this x falls with a thud into the lived Real. That 
alluring aroma drifting off the abstract (love, equality, wisdom, etc., etc.) as it 
falls, is its attrition, its cut, molecule by molecule into the fetid stench of the 
unadorned Real. All things turn to shit. But is not shit itself a precious, all- too- 
necessary aide- mémoire of our status as Homo sapiens ape?5
5
This text concerns an organon that places you at the threshold to analytic ruin. 
You may temporarily stave off the inevitable with any number of fantastic 
conceptual constructions. In this case, you turn back. Another possibility:  You 
engage the analysis, but only to palliative ends, and fall short of ruin. Still another 
possibility: You do not flinch from the very fact that drove you back into the warm 
lap of consolation. This fact is central to ruin. This fact is inexorable and inevitable. 
It is rendered doubtful only by virtue of the darkest human ignorance or through 
an act of a gargantuan will to deny. If the history of the world is any indication, 
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our language, of our very biology is any indication, no greater menace threatens 
humanity. The fact: dissolution— the vaporous effervescence haunting existence, 
the genetrix of Homo narcissicus’ bastard bugbear, nihil. Not flinching before the 
presence of dissolution, you cross the threshold to ruin and don’t turn back.
6
Dissolution is self- evident. It obtains immediately in every instance of perception, 
conception, and sensation. Over greater spans of time, say a lifetime, it is made 
evident through comparison and memory. Science traces it over eons, before the 
advent of human beings. Science traces it, too, into oblivion, when “the accelerating 
expansion of the universe will have disintegrated the fabric of matter itself, 
terminating the possibility of embodiment,” when “every star in the universe will 
have burnt out, plunging the cosmos into a state of absolute darkness and leaving 
behind nothing but spent husks of collapsed matter.” Dissolution is instantaneous 
and continuous. It is to extinction what a molecule is to mass, argon to vapor. 
Extinction describes more than the absolute cessation of objects and entities: it 
describes the condition that negates even the possibility of their being further 
extinguished. Extinction is patient: it waits for the final instance. Its purview is 
immense and vast. It sees its object after millions and millions of years. Dissolution 
occurs in the midst of things— in the salience of their rising, persisting, and fading 
away. Its view is minute and narrow. It sees its object in an instant of intimate if 
destructive embrace. Yet, being instantaneous and continuous, dissolution is not 
extinguished. Although a concept itself, dissolution is one that hovers near the 
fact it names, rendering it intelligible. Dissolution as concept lends lucidity to 
what, without it, remains a dark, foreign, and harrowing domain. The concept 
dissolution makes possible the thinking of the fact of dissolution. Yet, thinking 
is mere thinking. The facts of human being seem to necessitate no constraint 
to human thinking. Thinking is often contentedly at odds with phenomenality. 
Intelligibility and lucidity, by contrast, though characteristics of thinking, suggest 
thought wading into the surging sea of immanence.6
7
We can view it in the register of thought itself, for “What is at all familiar and 
cognitively understood is not really understood for the very reason that it is familiar. 




 Meditation in Ruin 165
something as familiar and then to drop the subject. Such knowledge, with all of 
its back and forth chitchat, never gets anywhere, without ever knowing why.” We 
do know why, of course. Thought seeks the consolations of familiar certainties, 
even if they are mere positive abstractions, and thus refuses to “linger, to “tarry” 
with the infinite negativity that constitutes both the subject and his conceptions. 
Such tarrying is experienced as death— ideological, subjective, and always with 
premonitions of the impending actual. “Death . . . is the most terrifying thing 
of all, and to hold fast to what is dead requires the greatest strength. Powerless 
beauty hates the understanding because the understanding expects of her what she 
cannot do. However, the life of wakefulness is not a life that flinches from death 
and saves itself from ruin; rather, it bears death, and in death, it sustains itself.” 
That life, the life of wakefulness, is not found in the refuge of our abstract positives. 
It is found only in “absolute disruption” that is this lingering, this tarrying in the 
negative. “This lingering is the magical power that converts it into being . . . The 
activity of dissolution/ analysis is the force and labor of the understanding, the most 
astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power.”7
8
Is there an organon of dissolution? I  believe that there is. But unlike the 
inflated flights of fancy roused by the ghostly shades of familiar representations 
(abstractions), the organon entails relentless deflation. The voiding of imaginary 
plenitude requires unflinching commitment to the banalities of immanence. 
The organon is thus rooted in our shared sensorial embodiment. Even thinking 
appears, in its midst, as physicality— as materially immanent fact itself. The 
organon is the laying- bare of phenomenal display, along with the display’s 
ideological matrix. The organon is to consciousness what skin is to the 
body: organic interface, exposure to, and coalescence with environment. Like 
skin, it is a tool, a means of apprehension, an organ. It is the laying bare of body 
to body in and of itself, of sensation to sensation in and of itself, of thought to 
thought in and of itself, of each to the other, of each to the whole, and of the 
whole to environment. This organon, like skin, is rooted in the surface of things.
9
The organon consists of two modes: the anthropotechnic per se and the 
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using “calculus” in three distinct but related senses. A  calculus purports to 
model change. It is concerned both with the tangent or trajectory of continuous 
instantaneous change and the area or space that ensues, even if only momentarily, 
from that change. As such, a calculus is concerned with the quantification of real- 
world limits. Newton’s use of the calculus allowed a mathematical description 
of physical phenomena. The calculus of the organon allows for a conceptually 
deflated, qualitative, description of a noncomponent of the nonphysical 
world: dissolution. What the calculus describes is precisely a “noncomponent” 
and is “nonphysical” because “it,” unlike the persevering bodies described by 
physicists, names those continuous instantaneous instants when physicality 
is dissolved. Dissolution— the phenomenon tracked by the calculus of the 
organon— is a nonexistent proxy for what was but is no longer. Glowing like 
phosphorescence where the “no- longer” had just been, dissolution is evanescent 
but immanently real. Another meaning of “calculus” is in play here. This sense is 
derived from the original Latin present active infinitive calculāre, “to account, to 
reckon.” It is surely clear that the calculus results in a perspicuous account and 
reckoning of a profoundly consequential feature of human existence. The clarity 
of this reckoning puts in play the third sense of “calculus.” A  calx (of which 
calculus is the diminutive) was the pebble used for actual accounting. From this 
usage is derived the connotation of a hard lump produced by the concretion of 
minerals. Kidney stones are an example. Tartar and plaque are other examples. 
A  calculus thus names an infinitesimally minute quantity of matter that has 
aggregated and hardened into a quantifiable lump. Such calculi are found in the 
body’s hollow organs and ducts. They are generally painful. The calculus of the 
organon is similarly jarring. It is unflinching, precise, and unequivocal. Most 
crucially, it is conspicuous, manifest, and verifiable. The logic of the calculus is 
unsparing.
10
What is this figure, the anthropotechnic of the organon? Merely taking seriously 
the conceptual calculus renders transparent the imaginaires, the salvific big 
Others, that we so craftily conjure— with the complicity of “the others”— out 
of our suffering and desire. How much more damage is done by pushing the 
calculus to its limit. Doing so shatters the accord that the imaginaire presumes to 
sustain, inducing quite literally chronic, incurable disenchantment. Application 
of the calculus, to any degree, renders childlike all of what is paraded before us as 
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idealist “spirituality” and religion. Still, subjectivity, identity, habitus, ideology, 
etc., being as inevitable as they are indispensable as features of human formation 
(“man produces man”), we have to ask: is not practice, is not a training regimen, 
unavoidable? “Wherever one encounters human beings, they are embedded in 
achievement fields and status classes.” It becomes a question, then, of whether 
to settle content within one’s given field and class, losing sight of the very fact 
of habitus, or to exert oneself, like Nietzsche’s acrobat, in continuous horizontal 
“self- forming and self- enhancing behavior.” Recognizing “the immunitary 
constitution of human being”— this is Sloterdijk’s Homo immunilogicus— we can 
no longer ignore the fact that we live in “symbolic immune systems and ritual 
shells.” Our imaginaires, that is to say, are erected as refuges against biological, 
psychological, and social contingency. This is why, as Rilke noticed, “The creature 
gazes into the open with all its eyes.” Not settling content with the merely received, 
with the accidents of our personal history, we seek a new sublime. And so, to 
that end, we employ an anthropotechnic of verticality— of upward overcoming, 
of self- mastery, of tension from above. I call it sublime because it is, of course, 
impossible to realize. The vertical line is tethered to nothing. It is suspended 
in a void. Its peak is unattainable. And yet: “don’t give up on your desire!” For, 
jouissance, the enlivening surge that spews forth from the erotic embrace of pain 
and desire satisfies to the very extent that it wounds. Even if such consummation 
of the sublime were possible, we are far from cause for jubilation. The sublime, 
recall, is monstrous. “The sublime moves us . . . The expression of a person in 
full thrall of the sublime is serious, at times fixed and amazed . . . The sublime 
is at times accompanied by some horror or melancholy, sometimes merely 
by tranquil admiration, and sometimes by the beauty of a sublime vista. The 
first I want to call the terrible sublime, the second the noble, and the third the 
magnificent. Deep loneliness is sublime, but in a terrifying way.” And yet we lace 
our boots, and set out for Mount Impossible.
11
Let us first consider some consequences of the organon’s calculus for an 
anthropotechnic. If, for instance, the calculus models the trajectory of 
dissolution, if it reveals that everything is always and perpetually dissolving- 
dissolved (instantaneously from the side of subjective apprehension, glacially 
from the side of objects themselves), are not certain possibilities that we so 
dearly hold to be woven into the very fabric of human existence obviated, or 
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at least disastrously impeded? Employing the calculus in good faith implies a 
willingness to replace belief with knowledge; it implies a will to know. What if 
this will to know, to paraphrase Ray Brassier, is driven by the traumatic reality 
of dissolution itself? Can the organon of the traumatic reality of dissolution 
“become equal to the trauma . . . whose trace it bears”? Brassier, whose concern 
is the relation between philosophy, which he insists is the very “organon of 
extinction” since extinction is the very condition of life that makes thought (of 
which philosophy is a concerted instance) possible, and the fact of extinction, 
concludes that philosophy does become equal to the trauma that it traces; and, 
in so doing, “achieves a binding of extinction, through which the will to know 
is finally rendered commensurate with the in- itself.” I  likewise suggest that 
our organon binds with dissolution, rendering the practitioner’s knowledge 
commensurate with dissolution itself. The organon is the instrument, the 
knowledge, of ruin. The calculus is the model of what we come to apprehend 
(the “in- itself ”).8
12
What do we come to know? Can we allow for a moment that “Eros alone 
can fulfill life; knowledge, never . . . knowledge is empty infinity”? Here, 
our knowledge concerns recognition and attraction; it concerns unison, 
carnality, and consummation. (“Adam knew Eve, his wife; and she conceived.”) 
Knowledge of what? Can we not permit— indeed, as decisive— into the sphere 
of our thinking “this thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is without 
meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale, into nothingness”? 
Those readers who balk might prefer to place a statement like this within the 
circle of affirmation that so aggressively rings our Western culture of “wellbeing.” 
Affirmationism:  the transubstantiation of even the basest, darkest, most 
realistic conceptions of human life into nodes of creativity, novelty, progress, 
and goodness. Affirmationism insists:  celebrate! Even Nietzsche felt such a 
need: “We have created the weightiest thought— now let us create the being for 
whom it is light and pleasing!” Stepping outside of this intoxicating circle, we 
hear the stammering voices of the ruined:  “What would be my— how should 
I call it— spontaneous attitude towards the universe? It’s a very dark one . . . There 
is nothing, basically. I mean it quite literally. Like, ultimately there are just some 
fragments, some vanishing things. If you look at the universe, it’s one big void. 
Ultimately, there are just . . . some vanishing things.” The buddha:  she whose 
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gnosis frightens even Mara. The ruined: he who has come to terms. “To the eyes 
that have dwelt on [dissolution], there is no thorough repair.”9
13
Come to terms with what? Let’s try this out. Come to terms:
— With the human subject as the night of the world: “The human being is 
this night, this empty nothing, that contains everything in its simplicity— 
an unending wealth of many representations, images, of which none 
belongs to him— or which are not present.”
— With the fact that our loveliest ideologies, unending riches of 
representations as they are, are at odds with the spirit that haunts 
this night.
— That our conceptual riches toil to hold reality together as a unified whole, 
as an integrated totality, yet everywhere the fragmentary, contingent 
shrapnel of reality gashes our scalp.
— That the incantatory vibrato plucking the soul’s heartstrings struggles to 
stave off of the traumatizing threats of the looming Real.
— That the soul’s symphonies are trembling, unrhythmic, and fitful to the 
very extent that they are emotionally virtuosic.
— That we, the in- human, hear, and, with gnostic exhaustion, move forward 
in the dark.10
14
The components of the calculus name the contours of coming- to- terms. We take 
as our material ruins of the buddhist Real, cloned fragments of the barred One- 
in- One. Already, I  feel that we are frolicking in the eternal sporting fields of 
our happy religions, spiritualties, and even humanist secularizations. So, to give 
yourself a chance, remember— remember!— to recast these ruins as decimated 
(transcendentally minimalized) first names. This remember! is the buddha’s 
practice. Hereby posited as immanent materials, these ruined clones become 
fit for the in- human subject:  disenchantment, ancestral anamnesis, vanishing, 
phenomenal identity, nihility, thinking, contingency, world, surface, lucidity, 
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exigent human knowledge thus: nibbida, sati, anicca, anattā, suññatā, papañca, 
paticcasamuppāda, loka, sabba, paññā, nirvāṇa. I  honor this genealogy of 
ruin. Such honor entails, initially, approbation; then, annihilation; and finally, 
annexation or appropriation.
15
Approbation:  We find value in the concepts. They possess a vibrato that 
purrs so purely. Annihilation:  Yet, we hear a clanking ruction alongside the 
whirring vibrato. That sound is a magisterial big Other forcefully wrenching 
the heartstrings of the yearning soul. So, as Laruelle says of the world- splitting 
specular pretensions of philosophical difference, “we must invalidate [the 
concepts] in one blow and without remainder. We must presuppose every 
conceptual term to be already divested of all power.” Appropriation:  In this 
way, we will make use of the material, annexing it to the always, and already, 
in- human.11
16
The annihilated- annexed concepts, decimated via transcendental molting, are 
rendered, simply, first names:  “Fundamental terms which symbolize the Real 
and its modes according to its radical immanence or its identity.” “The Real” we 
take as an axiomatized function. Let’s think of it as the for- real! Or the get- real! 
We all know the effects of the Real, or should. The effects are those of the “sheer 
lived.” The Real does not concern atoms— it is not matter. It is not an empirical 
plane. It is not given to phenomenological analysis. It can be symbolized and 
conceptualized interminably— just consider the infinity of human ideologies, 
those peculiar mixtures of facticity and fiction. The Real can be symbolized 
because it constitutes the sine qua non condition for thought. And it is constituted 
unilaterally, from its side only, given without being given by thinking or theory, 
closed to the longing phantasms of the human imaginaire. It can be symbolized; 
but it cannot be adequately represented. Though exiled due to the Real’s undying 
indifference, there might be some strangers among us, some who hew closely to 
the Real’s mute and dumb effect. The stranger, “the identity of the Real is non- 
reflected, lived, experienced, consumed while remaining in itself without the 
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the Real is not the point, then we are wasting our time. Or, in another register, 
what if the negation were the core? To show the kind of the labor that might 
be required, I  provide an example from the beginning of the non- buddhist 
dispensation.12
17
Disenchantment. The x- buddhist term is juiced up with the value of an ancient 
ascetic religious regimen: nibbida: revulsion, aversion, disgust. Disenchantment 
solemnly declares:  through insight born of extensive contemplation, the 
mature practitioner comes to see the unsatisfactory nature of the “aggregates,” 
the porous self- structure that conditions individual subjective experience. So 
seeing, he becomes disgusted, turns away from the contents of sensory data, and 
achieves an apocalyptic peace, a peace outside of time and place. Disgust:  the 
ferry of homo religiosus, crossing the lake of fire to the silver shore. Disgust 
is the vehicle to numerous spiritual way stations:  degradation of the flesh; 
valorization of sexual abstinence; hostility toward food; deprivation of desire; 
antipathy toward pleasure; suspicion toward noncompliers. Catherine of Genoa 
claims eternal satiety in the presence of the Lord, yet licks her plate like a feral 
bitch. Today, too, the Young Girl, regardless of gender or age, “struck by sudden 
vertigo whenever the world stops revolving around her,” wills on her mystical 
prepubescent body the holy stigmata— self- mutilation, emaciation, protection 
and devotion tattooed into the flesh. It is a quest for purity and perfection. 
Disgust caws “withdraw and shrivel!” The non- buddhist first name quells this 
ascetic siren call. We hear instead the in- human a priori of disenchantment. 
To the buddha subject, disenchantment is prima causa. It beckons “enough 
already!” It is the base disposition that prepares the cognitive and affective 
apparatuses for the unflinching, “trained ruthlessness in viewing the realities of 
life.” Disenchantment is born of an irrefutable discovery: the fact that no system 
of thought and no single person, not even a phantasmagoric protagonist- as- 
thaumaturge, can identify an ultimate refuge. It entails banishment from the 
sunny climes of the human affirmation- agreement system, being, as that system 
is, “incompatible with the reality of the organs.” Disenchantment catalyzes 
aversion toward the World. It is disgust, it is aversion, but disgust and aversion 
cauterized by compassion. Compassion itself is the unavoidable outpouring of a 
buddha’s gnosis. Think of the painful, disillusioning, disenchanting compassion 
of the Wizard of Oz. Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain! What 
 
 
172 A Critique of Western Buddhism
you are seeking already lies within you! Here, the German word Entzauberung 
illuminates. The atmosphere is crackling with the perilous promise of a 
thaumaturge. Oz is a priestly healer, the one who is supposed to know, and so who 
employs, to conjure his cure, the enchanting spectacle of high ritual pageantry. 
And then, all of a sudden, as if utterly deflated by his clownish bombast, Oz 
skulks from behind the curtain, and hunches before Dorothy’s retinue as plain 
and simple as the overalled farmer in “American Gothic.” Oz’s act is one of 
Enlightened Entzauberung:  demagicfication, despellification, disconjuartion, 
disenchantment. Indeed, there is no place like home. There is no place like home. 
Disenchantment augurs passage.13 
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